An Empirical Analysis of Determinants and Consequences of Earnings Management in Private Firms by Jensen, Morten Nicklas Bigler
An Empirical Analysis of Determinants
and Consequences of Earnings Management
in Private Firms
EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT IN 
PRIVATE FIRMS
Morten Nicklas Bigler Jensen
Doctoral School of Business and Management PhD Series 34.2019
PhD Series 34-2019
EARN
IN
GS M
AN
AGEM
EN
T IN
 PRIVATE FIRM
S
COPENHAGEN BUSINESS SCHOOL
SOLBJERG PLADS 3
DK-2000 FREDERIKSBERG
DANMARK
WWW.CBS.DK
ISSN 0906-6934
Print ISBN:  978-87-93956-10-0    
Online ISBN: 978-87-93956-11-7   
1 
Earnings Management in Private Firms 
An Empirical Analysis of Determinants and Consequences of Earnings 
Management in Private Firms 
Morten Nicklas Bigler Jensen
Supervisors: 
Associate Professor Jeppe Christoffersen 
Professor Thomas Plenborg 
Doctoral School of Business and Management 
Copenhagen Business School
Morten Nicklas Bigler Jensen
Earnings Management in Private Firms:
An Empirical Analysis of Determinants and Consequences
of Earnings Management in Private Firms
1st edition 2019
PhD Series 34.2019
© Morten Nicklas Bigler Jensen
ISSN 0906-6934
Print ISBN:  978-87-93956-10-0
Online ISBN:  978-87-93956-11-7
The Doctoral School of Business and Management is an active national
and international research environment at CBS for research degree students who 
deal with economics and management at business, industry and country level in a 
theoretical and empirical manner.
All rights reserved.
No parts of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any 
means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any 
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the 
publisher.
3 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  
 This dissertation was written during the period from October 2016 to September 2019 at the 
Department of Accounting, Copenhagen Business School. My time as a PhD student has been 
demanding and challenging, yet rewarding and one of the best decisions of my life. I am grateful 
for having had this opportunity and the trust and support that I have received during my studies, 
and I appreciate the generous financial support received by FSR in relation to my studies.   
 I gratefully acknowledge the guidance and valuable suggestion that I have received from my 
supervisors Jeppe Christoffersen and Thomas Plenborg. The dissertation has benefited greatly 
from our discussions, and your persistent push to develop the research papers further. You have 
succeeded in consistently challenging my research, both when I got stuck and had difficulties in 
discovering the right path, and when I was confident and needed arguments against my position. 
I want to thank you for your interest in my research, as well as being what I consider close 
friends.  
 Also, I would like to thank employees at the Department of Accounting at CBS for being 
great colleagues, for insightful comments during my presentations, and for interesting research 
discussions it being during lunches, at Nexus on a Thursday evening, or during conferences. 
You have made the past three years a true pleasure. 
 I am grateful for the comments and critique that I have received from my pre-defense 
opponents Juha-Peka Kallunki and Melanie Feldhues. I appreciate your time, and the 
dissertation has truly benefited from your suggestions. 
 I have been so fortunate to having had the opportunity of spending two semesters abroad at 
Stern School of Business, New York University. I wish to sincerely thank Stephen Ryan for 
being my sponsor, and Mary Billings, April Klein, and Ilan Guttman for running excellent 
courses and allowing me to sit in. My stay at Stern truly opened my eyes towards the academic 
world, and I have acquired many of my research capabilities during my stay at Stern. In that 
relation, I am grateful for the generous travel scholarships received in support of my stay abroad 
from Knud Højgaards Fond, Otto Mønsteds Fond, Augustinus Fonden, Fabrikant Vilhelm 
Pedersen og Hustrus legat, Danmark-Amerika Fondet, Rudolph Als Fondet, Tranes Fond, 
Torben og Alice Frimodt Fond, P. A. Fiskers Fond, and Sehested Hansen Fonden.  
 Also, I would like to thank Alessandro Ghio (discussant), Frøystein Gjesdal (discussant), 
Chen Chen (discussant), and conference participants at the AAA Annual Meeting 2019, the 
EAA annual congress 2019, the BAFA annual conference 2019, the International Accounting 
4 
 
Section Midyear Meeting 2019, and the Nordic Accounting Conference 2018. Also, I would like 
to thank seminar participants at Stockholm School of Economics November 2018, participants 
at the EAA doctoral colloquium 2019 (special thanks to Beatriz Garcia Osma, Ann Vanstraelen, 
and Steven Young for great comments and feedback), and symposium participants at The Three 
Star Symposium, SDU, 2019. You have succeeded in providing feedback and comments that 
have truly improved the quality of my research papers.  
 Finally, I would like to thank my friends and family for your infinite trust and support, and 
for enriching my life with everything beyond accounting (yes – there is a world beyond 
accounting). You have provided high-fives in good times and hugs in bad times, and for that I 
am ever grateful. Most importantly, my partner Barbara has been immensely supporting and 
encouraging. You have provided me with love whenever I was, and was not, in need. I am 
impressed of the way you have supported me during my times of frustration, especially during 
the last months preceding submission. You are my world. 
 
  
5 
 
ENGLISH SUMMARY 
 This dissertation seeks to understand the determinants and implications of earnings 
management in private firms, an economically significant yet not well researched segment of the 
economy. Earnings management occurs when a firm uses discretion and judgement in financial 
reporting to alter financial reports to mislead stakeholders or to influence contractual outcomes 
that depend on the reported numbers, and inherently impair the quality of financial reports, and 
thus hinders efficient capital allocation.  
 The dissertation consists of three chapters that are written in the form of separate academic 
research papers that can be read independently of each other. Despite the chapters being separate 
academic research papers, all three chapters are related as they all investigate earnings 
management in private firms, however from different angles and at different levels of analysis. 
The first chapter explores on a firm level how financially distressed firms use financial reporting 
when they face financial distress, and find that they use discretion in the accrual estimation 
process to signal private information and resolve information asymmetries. The second chapter 
focuses on earnings management driven by the firm’s CEO and exploits a setting in which an 
owner-manager at own discretion can shift her income from salary to dividends at almost no 
direct cost and hence increase reported earnings. Then, the paper explores determinants and cost 
of debt implications of this type of income shifting in owner-managed firms, and finds that such 
behavior is related to the level of debt, and has implications in the form of lower cost of debt. 
The third and last chapter moves beyond the firms’ executives and explores if rank-and-file 
employees explain variation in financial reporting, and find that they do. Specifically, I find that 
firms with a large percentage of criminal employees are more likely to engage in earnings 
management. The following section briefly summarizes each of the three papers by their 
abstracts.  
 
Chapter 1: Financially distressed firms and information value of discretionary accrual 
choices 
This paper investigates the implications of discretionary accrual choices in non-bankrupt 
financially distressed firms on two important aspects of earnings quality: earnings persistence 
and information value about future cash flows. Financially distressed firms can use their 
discretion to either opportunistically conceal poor performance, or to signal firm prospects. I 
find that discretionary accruals of financially distressed firms, relative to non-distressed firms, 
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contribute to higher earnings quality. The effect is driven by income-increasing discretionary 
accruals, and lenders put more weight on discretionary accruals in loan pricing, when firms are 
financially distressed. Emphasizing the information enhancing effects of firms’ discretionary 
accrual choices in financially distressed firms my findings contribute to the ongoing discussion 
on financial reporting discretion and its impact on earnings quality. 
 
Chapter 2: Owner-managers’ income shifting and cost of debt benefits 
Co-authored with Jeppe Christoffersen and Thomas Plenborg 
This paper explores the causes and consequences of earnings management in owner-managed 
firms. We identify an institutional setting in which the owner-manager has discretion to shift 
income from salary to dividends and hence increase reported earnings, at almost no direct cost 
due to approximate tax neutrality between the two income streams. We find that income shifting 
is associated with the magnitude of debt, is more likely when a firm issues debt in the following 
year, and induce firm benefits in terms of lower cost of debt. These relations are stronger in 
magnitude around the zero earnings benchmark. Our findings extend the earnings management 
literature by documenting opportunistic behavior and economic consequences in firms with 
weak manager-shareholder agency conflicts. 
 
Chapter 3: Criminal executives, criminal employees, corporate culture, and earnings 
management 
It is well established in the literature that executives influence corporate culture and firm 
behavior. In this paper, I predict and find that traits of rank-and-file employees capture a distinct 
but correlated aspect of corporate culture beyond what is explained by executive traits. 
Controlling for executives’ criminal record, I find that firms with criminal employees are more 
likely to use earnings management. This effect is concentrated in firms where both executives 
and employees are relatively criminal. My results highlight the importance of employees in 
financial reporting, and show how employee traits can be used to capture corporate culture. 
 
Collectively, the three papers provide novel insights on financial reporting behavior, specifically 
earnings management behavior, in private firms. The first chapter adds to the ongoing 
discussion about discretion in financial reporting, and suggests that private firms on average use 
their discretion in the accrual estimation process to signal private information when 
experiencing uncertainty, highlighting the benefits of discretion on earnings quality. The second 
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chapter shows that opportunistic behavior happens in private firms (specifically owner-managed 
firms) through a channel not previously studied, which raises the question of how owner-
managed firms should report their financials. The third chapter moves beyond executive traits 
and shows that employees are associated with financial reporting outcomes. Currently, firms are 
mandated to publish in the annual report the number of full-time employees. The evidence 
provided here raises the question if firms should report more descriptive information about their 
employees.  
 
 
DANISH SUMMARY 
Denne afhandling forsøger at belyse bestemmende faktorer og konsekvenser af 
regnskabsmanipulation i private selskaber; en selskabsform, der udgør en økonomisk signifikant 
del af samfundsøkonomien, som forskningen ikke i høj grad har belyst. Regnskabsmanipulation 
forekommer når en virksomhed benytter skøn og subjektive vurderinger i regnskabsaflæggelsen 
til at ændre rapporterede regnskabstal for at vildlede eksterne interessenter eller påvirke 
kontraktmæssige udfald, der afhænger af rapporterede regnskabstal. Regnskabsmanipulation 
forringer regnskabskvaliteten, og hæmmer dermed effektiv kapitalallokering.  
 Denne afhandling består af tre kapitler, der er skrevet i form af særskilte akademiske 
forskningsartikler, der kan læses uafhængigt af hinanden. Til trods for at kapitlerne er skrevet 
som særskilte forskningsartikler, relaterer alle tre kapitler til hinanden, da de alle belyser 
regnskabsmanipulation eller regnskabskvalitet i private virksomheder fra forskellige vinkler og 
på forskellige analyseniveauer. Det første kapital undersøger på selskabsniveau hvordan 
økonomisk hårdt trængte selskaber benytter skøn og subjektive vurderinger i den finansielle 
rapportering, og konkluderer at disse selskaber bruger sådanne værktøjer til at signalere deres 
underhåndsviden om selskabets fremtid og dermed afhjælpe informationsasymmetrier. Det 
andet kapitel undersøger regnskabsmanipulation, der er drevet af et selskabs administrerende 
direktør og udnytter en dansk institutionel ramme, hvor en ejerleder tilnærmelsesvist skattefrit 
kan ændre sin løn til dividender og dermed forøge den rapporterede indtjening. Artiklen 
undersøger bestemmende faktorer af en sådan adfærd og konsekvenser for rente-
omkostningerne. I artiklen finder mine medforfattere og jeg at en sådan adfærd er relateret til 
gældsniveaet, og at det medfører fordele for selskabet i form af lavere renteomkostninger. Det 
tredje og sidste kapitel kigger dybere end et selskabs topledelse og undersøger om menige 
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medarbejdere påvirker et selskabs eksterne rapportering, og finder at de gør. Helt konkret, viser 
resultaterne at selskaber med en større andel af medarbejdere med en kriminel baggrund er mere 
tilbøjelige til at lave regnskabsmanipulation. De følgende afsnit summerer i korte træk hver af 
de tre forskningsartikler.  
 
Kapitel 1: Financially distressed firms and information value of discretionary accruals 
choices 
Denne forskningsartikel undersøger effekten af skøn og subjektive vurderinger i 
regnskabsaflæggelsen i ikke-konkursramte økonomisk hårdt trængte virksomheder på to vigtige 
aspekter omkring regnskabskvalitet: den nuværende indtjenings informationsværdi omkring 
fremtidig indtjening og fremtidige pengestrømme. Økonomisk hårdt trængte virksomheder kan 
bruge skøn til enten opportunistisk at skjule en dårlig økonomisk udvikling, eller at signalere 
deres underhåndsviden omkring selskabets fremtid og dermed afhjælpe informations-
asymmetrier. For økonomisk trængte selskaber, relativt til ikke-økonomisk trængte selskaber, 
finder jeg at den del af indtjeningen, der opstår på baggrund af skøn, bidrager til højere 
regnskabskvalitet. Effekten er drevet af indkomstforøgende skøn, og långivere tillægger denne 
information værdi i deres prissætning af lån når selskaber er økonomisk hårdt trængte. Ved at 
fremhæve de positive aspekter af selskabers brug af skøn, bidrager denne artikel til den løbende 
diskussion omkring skøn og selskabers frihedsgrader i den finansielle rapportering, og afledte 
konsekvenser for regnskabskvaliteten.  
 
Kapitel 2: Owner-managers’ income shifting and cost of debt benefits 
Medforfattere: Jeppe Christoffersen og Thomas Plenborg 
Denne forskningsartikel undersøger bestemmende faktorer og konsekvenser af regnskabs-
manipulation i ejerledede selskaber. Vi identificerer en institutionel ramme, hvor en ejerleder 
har frihed til at skifte (en del af) sin løn ud med dividender, og kan gøre dette tilnærmelsesvist 
uden skattemæssige konsekvenser, og dermed forøge den rapporterede indtjening. Vi finder at 
en sådan indkomstforskydning er påvirket af et selskabs gældsniveau, er mere sandsynligt når et 
selskab optager ny gæld i det følgende år, og bidrager til at selskabet opnår en lavere 
renteomkostning. Disse effekter er større omkring nulindtjeningsreference-punktet. Vores 
resultater bidrager til litteraturen omkring regnskabsmanipulation, ved at dokumentere 
opportunistisk adfærd og økonomiske konsekvenser i selskaber, hvor agentproblemer mellem 
ejere og ledere er tilnærmelsesvist ikkeeksisterende.  
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Kapitel 3: Criminal executives, criminal employees, corporate culture, and earnings 
management 
Det er veludforsket og anerkendt i litteraturen at topledere påvirker et selskabs kultur og adfærd. 
I denne forskningsartikel danner jeg hypoteser omkring, og finder, at menige medarbejdere 
fanger et særskilt men med topledere korreleret aspekt af et selskabs kultur. Når jeg kontrollerer 
for toplederes kriminelle baggrund, finder jeg at selskaber med kriminelle medarbejdere er mere 
tilbøjelige til at lave regnskabsmanipulation. Denne effekt er koncentreret i selskaber hvor både 
topledere og medarbejdere er relativt kriminelle. Resultaterne fremhæver vigtigheden af 
medarbejdere i finansiel rapportering, og viser hvordan medarbejderes karaktertræk kan benyttes 
til at beskrive et selskabs kultur.  
 
Tilsammen bidrager de tre forskningsartikler med ny viden og indsigt i adfærd omkring finansiel 
rapportering, mere specifikt regnskabsmanipulation, i private selskaber. Det første kapitel 
bidrager til den løbende diskussion omkring skøn i finansiel rapportering, og konkluderer at 
private selskaber i gennemsnit bruger skøn til at signalere underhåndsviden når de oplever 
usikkerhed, hvilket fremhæver de positive aspekter af skøn i finansiel rapportering. Det andet 
kapitel viser opportunistisk adfærd i private selskaber (specifikt ejerledede selskaber) gennem en 
form for regnskabsmanipulation, som tidligere forskning ikke har afdækket. Denne opdagelse og 
resultaterne i forskningsartiklen rejser spørgsmålet om hvordan ejerledede virksomheder burde 
rapportere eksternt. Det tredje kapitel bevæger sig videre end selskabets topledelse og viser at 
menige medarbejdere påvirker et selskabs tilbøjelighed til at lave regnskabsmanipulation. Det er 
i øjeblikket obligatorisk for selskaber i årsrapporten at rapportere antallet af (fuldtids-
ækvivalente) medarbejdere. Resultaterne af dette kapitel rejser spørgsmålet om selskaber burde 
rapportere yderligere beskrivende statistik omkring deres medarbejdere, der kan hjælpe eksterne 
investorer med at træffe investeringsbeslutninger.  
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SYNOPSIS 
1.  Motivation and contribution  
 Private firms represent an economically significant part of the economy. In the OECD area 
SMEs (primarily private) constitute more than 99% of all firms, represent about 60% of 
employment and 50-60% of value added (OECD 2017). Related statistics consistently underpin 
the economic significance of private firms around the word, including the US (see e.g. Hope and 
Vyas 2017; Hope et al. 2017; Chen et al. 2011; EU 2017). Despite their economic significance, 
compared to the large literature on financial reporting in public firms, little is known about 
financial reporting in private firms. Financial reporting is important because it helps to facilitate 
optimal capital allocation by alleviating information asymmetries between the firm and external 
stakeholders
1
 and by helping firms allocate internal capital to optimal investments 
(Roychowdhury et al. 2019; Chen et al. 2011). It is thus important to understand reporting 
decisions of private firms and its implications. 
 Beyond the obvious benefits of researching an economically significant yet scarcely 
researched segment of the economy, exploring financial reporting in private firms allows the 
investigation of financial reporting behavior in a setting where reporting incentives differ 
substantially from the much researched public firms. For example, private firms are typically 
characterized by concentrated ownership and greater managerial ownership, and therefore one 
primary agency cost of public firms – the separation of ownership and control – is not as acute 
in private firms, and their major capital providers have access to insider information and can 
communicate privately with the firm manager (Chen et al. 2011; Minnis and Shroff 2017). 
These dynamics and information asymmetries raise several interesting research questions, for 
example if and how firms manage earnings absent owner-manager agency conflicts, or how 
lenders influence borrowing firms’ financial reporting.  
 Although managers can communicate privately with capital providers (for example their 
bank) in a private firm setting financial statements are essential in the investment decision and 
hence capital allocation. For example, financial statements are considered the single most used 
source of information in the lending decision (Agarwal and Hauswald 2010; Donelson et al. 
2017) and serve as a verifying mechanism enhancing the credibility of managers’ private 
                                                 
1
 As recognized by the conceptual frameworks of both IASB and the FASB as the general purpose of financial 
reporting. 
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information disclosure (Ball 2013). Accordingly, prior research finds that attributes of private 
firms’ financial statements such as audit status (audit vs. non-audited), reporting format 
(accrual-based vs. cash flow based), earnings smoothness, and earnings quality, influence firms’ 
credit access and cost of debt (Minnis 2011; Allee and Yohn 2009; Gassen and Fülbier 2015; 
Vander Bauwhede et al. 2015). Further, recent research provides evidence that technological 
advances such as XBRL data filings reduce lenders’ information processing costs and influence 
loan contracts (Kaya and Pronobis 2016), highlighting the importance of high quality in 
financial reports on which capital allocation decisions are made.  
 This dissertation aims to shed light on financial reporting behavior of private firms, with a 
focus on earnings management and earnings quality. Opportunistic earnings management 
inherently lowers earnings quality and thus impairs firm stakeholders’ ability to assess the 
underlying economics of firms, as well as firms’ internal investment decisions (McNichols and 
Stubben 2008), which then deters efficient capital allocation. The first chapter of this 
dissertation explores how firms respond to financial distress, and find that they use discretion in 
the accrual estimation process to signal their superior private information on firm prospects and 
hence help resolve information asymmetries. The second chapter seeks to identify a novel 
measure of earnings management that is fully at the discretion of the manager. Specifically, the 
chapter identifies a setting where an owner-manager at almost no direct cost can lower her 
salary and concurrently increase dividends, and uses this measure to examine determinants and 
implications of earnings management in owner-managed firms. The third and last chapter brings 
into the analysis employees, and show how employees through their influence on corporate 
culture and their role in the financial data generation process within the firm influence earnings 
management and thus financial reporting. Broadly speaking, the findings of this dissertation 
contribute to our knowledge and understanding of financial reporting in private firms; an 
economically very significant segment of the economy which has not received much focus in 
the literature. Specifically, the findings offer the following contributions and implications:  
1. Financially distressed firms, a setting in which prior research observes mixed evidence 
on the direction of discretionary accounting choices, use their discretion over the accrual 
estimation to signal their superior private information. Whereas prior research use 
discretionary accrual measures to proxy earnings management, the findings of this 
dissertation suggest that such discretionary reporting choices on average improves 
earnings quality through improved informativeness of current earnings about future 
earnings and cash flows. Notably, this finding is important in a setting where private 
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firms are mandated to publish financial reports, where financial statements are getting 
more easily available due to technological advances, and where lenders increasingly 
value financial statement information. Further, the conclusion adds to the ongoing debate 
on discretion in financial reporting.  
2. In small owner-managed firms the owner-manager’s salary represents a significant 
expense, which provides a channel to manage earnings. This dissertation provides 
empirical evidence on approximately tax neutral income-shifting in owner-managed 
firms, where owner-managers lower their salary and concurrently increase dividends. 
However, I point out that even in jurisdictions where dividends are preferable due to 
lower tax rates, managers have a natural incentive to compensate themselves through 
dividends rather than salary which likely results in abnormally low salary levels that 
inflate reported earnings. By shifting income from salary to dividends and thereby 
increase reported earnings, an owner-manager can obtain benefits in terms of lower cost 
of debt. The finding has implications for users of financial statements, for example 
banks, suppliers, customers, or even employees, and urges caution to financial statement 
users to be aware of the significant influence of the owner-manager’s salary and its 
influence on reported earnings. Further, this finding has implications for regulators, and 
raise the question of how financial disclosures enable stakeholders to discover and 
compensate for owner-managers’ opportunistic behavior. 
3. Albeit firm managers are important for firm behavior, not all firm behavior is solely 
driven by the top executives. In this dissertation, I provide empirical evidence that 
financial reporting is associated with the traits of rank-and-file employees and that this 
effect is incremental to the effect of firm executives. Specifically, the results show that 
firms with a high percentage of employees with a criminal background are more likely to 
manage earnings, suggesting that employees influence financial reporting. This result 
has implications for regulators and raises the question if companies should disclose in 
the annual report information on human capital; a significant capital factor in a 
knowledge economy that is subject to low disclosure requirements. Such disclosures 
could help resolve information asymmetries. Further, the insights are important for 
scholars researching corporate culture and financial reporting, who might benefit from 
looking beyond executive traits. 
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2.  Selected Literature 
 The following broadly outlines the literature on which this dissertation is written. It is not to 
be seen as a comprehensive literature review, but an overview of the literature relevant for the 
research conducted in this dissertation. Because each of the three chapters ask different research 
questions and thus calls for separate background literature, the relevant literature for each 
chapter is covered within each chapter. The following briefly outlines the concept of earnings 
quality, empirical proxies, and its relation to earnings management. Then, different types of 
earnings management as well as proxies for earnings management are discussed. Lastly, 
selected prior research on earnings management in private firms is reviewed. 
 
2.1 Earnings Quality 
2.1.1 What is earnings quality? 
 Earnings quality is a construct which prior research has thought about in a number of 
different ways. For example, Dechow et al. (2010) provide the following definition of earnings 
quality:  
 
“Higher quality earnings provide more information about the features of a firm’s 
financial performance that are relevant to a specific decision made by a specific 
decision-maker.” (Dechow et al. 2010, 344) 
 
 The definition has several noteworthy attributes: (1) Earnings quality refers to the decision-
relevance of earnings and implies that one cannot assess earnings quality without considering 
the decision context. For example, a lender may demand attributes of earnings different from 
what an equity investor may demand. (2) The quality of a reported earnings number is to be 
assessed in relation to its information about the underlying performance, which in nature is 
unobservable. (3) Thus, the quality is determined by the joint ability of the accounting system to 
facilitating decision making (for example, to provide external capital to the firm) and to 
accurately measure performance. I point out that Dechow et al. (2010) define “earnings quality”, 
whereas other researchers use other terms for related constructs, such as “accounting quality” or 
“financial reporting quality” (see e.g. Francis et al. 2006; Hope et al. 2013; Hope et al. 2017).  
For example, Francis et al. (2006) discuss how earnings quality is a summary indicator of 
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financial reporting quality. For those reasons “earnings quality”, “accounting quality”, and 
“financial reporting quality” are used interchangeable throughout this dissertation.  
 Researchers highlight several attributes that contribute to high earnings quality, such as 
preciseness (Francis et al. 2006) transparency (Barth and Schipper 2008; Bhattacharya et al. 
2003) timeliness (Ball et al. 2000; Ball and Shivakumar 2005) persistency (Dechow and Dichev 
2002; Richardson and Sloan 2005; Sloan 1996), and comparability (De George et al. 2016; Neel 
2017).  
 The conceptual frameworks of standard setters provide guidelines for high quality financial 
reporting, and like Dechow et al. (2010) focus on decision usefulness of financial reports. FASB 
defines the general objective of financial reporting as  
 
“[…] to provide financial information about the reporting entity that is useful to 
existing and potential investors, lenders, and other creditors in making decisions about 
providing resources to the entity. Those decisions involve buying, selling, or holding 
equity and debt instruments and providing or settling loans and other forms of credit.” 
(FASB 2018, 1) 
 
In a similar vein, IASB defines the general purpose of financial reporting as 
 
“[…] to provide financial information about the reporting entity that is useful to 
existing and potential investors, lenders and other creditors in making decisions 
relating to providing resources to the entity. Those decisions involve decisions about: 
(a) buying, selling or holding equity and debt instruments, (b) providing or settling 
loans and other forms of credit; or (c) exercising rights to vote on, or otherwise 
influence, management’s actions that affect the use of the entity’s economic 
resources.” (IASB 2018, A17) 
 
 In conclusion, high quality financial reporting is associated with firm stakeholders’ ability to 
make decisions regarding the firm, and the extent to which earnings capture and communicate 
well the underlying economics of the firm.  
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2.1.2 Empirical proxies 
 Researchers have developed several empirical measures aiming to capture aspects of earnings 
quality. The following outlines the key measures employed in the literature. Note that measures 
based on discretionary accruals are covered in section 2.2.2.1. I point out that most estimation 
models scale accounting numbers by for example assets, lagged assets, or average assets, and 
usually control for size (for example 1/TA, log(TA), or log(MVE)) or use a scaled intercept, 
which is not explicitly stated in the following equations.  
 
2.1.2.1 Earnings persistence 
 Researchers generally view high earnings persistence as an indicator of high earnings quality. 
When earnings are persistent current earnings is a good summary measure of future 
performance, which is useful for equity valuation and lenders’ assessment of borrowing firms’ 
capability to meet loan obligations and the potential for future business. Earnings persistence is 
typically estimated with the following equation, where the slope on β1 captures the persistence 
of earnings.  
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀 (1) 
 These type of models are used to assess the informativeness of current earnings about future 
cash flows (Barth et al. 2001; Badertscher et al. 2012; Li 2019), substituting Earnings with a 
measure of cash flow on the left hand side. Further, researchers split Earnings on the right hand 
side into a cash flow component and an accrual component (Sloan 1996), and additionally split 
the accrual component into an “innate” (or normal) component and a “discretionary” (or 
abnormal) component (Allen et al. 2013; Dechow and Dichev 2002; Xie 2001; Subramanyam 
1996), or other divisions of accruals into more and less persistent components (Richardson and 
Sloan 2005; Richardson et al. 2006).  
 
2.1.2.2 Earnings smoothness 
 A basic mechanism of an accrual-based earnings system is that accruals smooth random 
fluctuations in cash flows and thereby better communicate firm performance. Firm managers 
may use their private information about future income to smooth out transitory fluctuations, and 
thereby present a more informative and useful earnings measures. However, smoothing accruals 
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that hide or delay changes in economic performance impair decision usefulness, and therefore 
smooth earnings are not always an indicator of high earnings quality. By virtue of the 
conflicting forces driving earnings smoothness, the opinions held in the literature, as well as the 
empirical evidence on the earnings quality consequences of smooth earnings are mixed 
(Dechow et al. 2010). Prior research (Leuz et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2004; Barth et al. 2008; 
Lang et al. 2003; Lang et al. 2006; Tucker and Zarowin 2006; Gassen and Fülbier 2015) 
operationalizes the following empirical proxies of earnings smoothness:  
 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝜎(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)
𝜎(𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠)
 
(2) 
Where low scores of Volatility indicate smooth earnings.  
 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝜎(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠) (3) 
Where low scores of Volatility indicate smooth earnings.  
 
𝑆𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑡ℎ = −𝜌(∆𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠, ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠) (4) 
Changes in accruals and changes in cash flows are inherently negatively correlated due to the 
role of accruals. However, more negative correlations (i.e. higher values of Smooth) indicate that 
accruals smooth earnings to a high extent.  
 
𝑆𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑡ℎ = −𝜌(∆𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑠, ∆𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠) (5) 
Similar to Eq. (4), however, instead of benchmarking accruals against cash flows, Eq. (5) types 
of regressions measure the extent to which discretionary accruals are used to smooth earnings, 
relative to normal accruals.  
 
Further, to control for innate factors that influence earnings smoothness researchers use 
residuals of estimations of the following type, rather than raw earnings or cash flows.  
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛽3𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +
𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽6
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
+ 𝛽7𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝛽8𝐵𝑖𝑔𝑋𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽9𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽10%𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑦𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀  
(6) 
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Also, variations of this type of estimation are applied, with cash flows substituting earnings on 
the left hand side. Researchers then use the residuals of Eq. (6) to estimate Eq. (2) through Eq. 
(4) and aim to capture the managerial discretion applied to smooth earnings.  
2.1.2.3 Timely loss recognition (conservatism) 
 To be recognized in financial statements good news requires a higher degree of verification 
than bad news, and therefore there is an asymmetry in the recognition of good news and bad 
news. Basu (1997) terms this attribute of financial reporting as (conditional) conservatism. 
Through its accelerated dissemination of bad news, accounting conservatism is generally viewed 
as earnings quality enhancing, because it makes financial statements more useful in several 
contexts, such as corporate governance and debt agreements (Ball and Shivakumar 2005).  
 Generally accounting researchers estimate two general types of models, aiming to capture the 
degree of conservatism in financial reporting. The first type examines how bad news 
information is factored into earnings. Basu (1997) defines the following reverse return 
estimation:  
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝜀 (7) 
 Where β3 captures the difference in sensitivity of earnings to “good news” and “bad news”. 
Conservatism predicts that β3 is positive, because earnings are more sensitive to bad news than 
good news. Basu (1997) use negative returns (both raw and adjusted returns) as an indicator of 
bad news.  
 Based on this setup, Ball and Shivakumar (2005)
2
 estimate a comparable model with accruals 
on the left hand side and cash flows on the right hand side.  
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐶𝐹 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐶𝐹 ∗ 𝐶𝐹 + 𝜀 (8) 
 Where the β2 slope is generally expected to be negative because accruals mitigate noise in 
cash flows. The slope on β3 captures conservatism and is expected to be positive, because 
accrued losses are more likely when the cash flow is negative. Further, Byzalov and Basu (2016) 
estimate several models with accruals on the left hand side, and several indicators for bad news 
on the right hand side, such as negative sales growth, negative employee growth, and negative 
cash flow.  
                                                 
2
 A similar model is estimated by Hope et al. (2013) 
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 The second type of models relies on the notion that negative earnings changes are less 
persistent and tend to reverse more than positive earnings changes. Basu (1997) provides the 
following model:  
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑒𝑔∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + 𝛽2∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠  
+𝛽3𝑁𝑒𝑔∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 ∗ ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + 𝜀  
(9) 
 The magnitude of the β3 slope (expected to be negative) captures conservatism. This type of 
model is also used by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Hope et al. (2013) 
 
2.1.2.4 Earnings response coefficients (ERCs) 
 To measure the information content of earnings, researchers regress stock returns (either raw 
or abnormal) on earnings (either raw or “unexpected” earnings, measures as reported earnings – 
analyst forecast consensus), with different types of the following model:  
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + 𝜀  (10) 
These type of regressions stem from one of the most fundamental questions in accounting 
research: “is our product useful?”; a question that dates back to Ball and Brown (1968) and 
Beaver (1968). Researchers assess the R
2
 (how much earnings explain of variation in returns) or 
the β1 slope (how much one unit of (unexpected) earnings translates into firm value) of such 
regressions to determine earnings quality. Related to conservatism, research finds that ERCs are 
low in loss firms (Beaver et al. 2018; Basu 1997; Hayn 1995).  
 
2.2 Earnings Management 
2.2.1 Earnings management and its relation to earnings quality 
 As with earnings quality no uniform definition of earnings management exists. As discussed 
in Beneish (2001), several researchers have attempted to capture and define earnings 
management. 
 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) define earnings management as:  
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and 
in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
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about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” (p 368) 
 
Schipper (1989) defines earnings management as:  
“…a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent 
of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to say, merely facilitating the neutral 
operation of the process).”... “[a] minor extension of this definition would encompass 
‘real’ earnings management, accomplished by timing investment or financing 
decisions to alter reported earnings or some subset of it.” (p 92) 
 
 Earnings management, which as defined above is opportunistic in nature
3
, impairs earnings 
quality because it introduces noise in the financial reporting (Dechow et al. 2010), and therefore 
earnings management and earnings quality are two closely related concepts. For that reason, a 
large body of the accounting literature aims to empirically estimate and detect earnings 
management and investigates determinants and consequences of earnings management.  
 
2.2.2 Types of earnings management and empirical proxies 
 Researchers typically distinguish between several types of earnings management. The first 
type, accounting earnings management, occurs when firms exercise discretion in accounting 
choices to manage reported earnings. This type of earnings management includes managers’ use 
of discretion in the accrual estimation process (Jones 1991), misleading classification of 
expenses in the income statement (McVay 2006), or hand picking of accounting methods within 
GAAP (Schipper 1989). The second type, real earnings management, occurs when managers 
opportunistically manipulate real activities, by for example cutting discretionary expenses (e.g. 
R&D or marketing expenses), building up inventory to reduce the COGS, or manipulating sales 
figures (e.g. by lowering sales prices towards year, or offering more lenient credit terms, and 
hence generating abnormally high and unsustainable revenues) (Roychowdhury 2006).  
 Accounting type earnings management is typically viewed as less costly than real earnings 
management, because this type of earnings management biases the reported earnings in a 
particular direction without changing the underlying transactions, whereas real earnings 
management implies that the firm manager manipulates real transactions (therein “real” earnings 
                                                 
3
 “to mislead” in Healy and Wahlen (1999), and “obtaining some private gain” in Schipper (1989) 
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management) in the timing or structuring of an operation, which have suboptimal business 
consequences (Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Vorst 2016; Zang 2012).  
 Investigating private firms comes with great opportunities but also limits the availability of 
research designs because certain data points are either not available at all, or are not available in 
machine readable form. For example the datasets employed in this dissertation do not include 
data on accounting methods applied, cash flow statements, R&D, marketing expenses, transitory 
earnings, or COGS and revenue (for most observations), and hence the dissertation is generally 
limited from estimating measures of real earnings management, hand-picking of accounting 
methods, and classification shifting. Therefore, the following only briefly outlines empirical 
proxies of such types of earnings management. As with the earnings quality proxies, I point out 
that most estimation models scale accounting numbers by for example assets, lagged assets, or 
average assets, and usually control for size (for example 1/TA, log(TA), or log(MVE)), or use a 
scaled intercept, which is not explicitly stated in the equations below. 
 
2.2.2.1 Accrual earnings management 
 Measures of discretionary (or abnormal) accruals are used extensively in the literature as an 
indicator of earnings management or earnings quality. For example, in a comprehensive 
literature review Dechow et al. (2010) conclude that “almost one hundred papers in our database 
use abnormal accruals generated from an accruals model as a measure of earnings quality.” (p 
358, footnote 22). Several attempts have been made in the literature to separate innate (or 
normal) accruals from discretionary (or abnormal) accruals.  
 
Jones (1991) defines the accrual process as 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐸 + 𝜀 (11) 
 
Dechow et al. (1995) modify the Jones model to adjust for growth in credit sales which is 
subject to manipulation and thus correcting for it better capture activity growth. 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 − ∆𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠) + 𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐸 + 𝜀 (12) 
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Kothari et al. (2005) further adjust for performance by adjusting discretionary accruals with a 
performance matched peer within the same industry and year, or by including a term of 
profitability (ROA) directly in the regression estimation.  
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠= estimated 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 − performance matched 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 (13) 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 − ∆𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠) + 𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐸 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑡−1 + 𝜀  (14) 
 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) develop another type of estimation and model accruals as a function 
of past, present, and future cash flows because the role of accruals is to shift the recognition of 
cash flows over time, and accruals therefore anticipate some cash flows and follow others.  
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝜀 (15) 
 
In her discussion paper, McNichols (2002) link Dechow and Dichev’s model to prior accrual 
estimation models, and proposes the following model: 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑡+1 + 𝛽4𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝐸 + 𝜀 (16) 
 
 Researchers typically rely on the residuals from accrual estimation models as proxy for 
earnings management or earnings quality. In some research designs researchers use the signed 
residuals, which is useful when the researcher has a prior on the direction of the earnings 
management (Godsell et al. 2017). Conventionally, researchers use the predicted residuals from 
an accrual estimation model, and use it as dependent variable in the second stage. However, 
Chen et al. (2018) show that such approach produces biased estimates and suggest a one-stage 
estimation where both accrual determinants, earnings management control variables, and a 
variable of interest, are included in one regression. Studies which do not predict a specific 
direction of the accruals use unsigned (i.e. absolute values of) discretionary accruals, or the 
standard deviation of residuals. Hribar and Nichols (2007) criticize the use of unsigned 
discretionary accruals, because unsigned discretionary accruals are mechanically negatively 
associated with the goodness of fit from the accrual estimation, positively associated with the 
variance of total accruals, and positively associated with operating volatility. McNichols (2002) 
points out that the standard deviation of residuals is positively associated with accruals 
variability (and therefore firms with greater underlying earnings volatility are classified as low 
quality earnings) and the magnitude of accruals.  
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 Most researchers use working capital accruals, either including or excluding depreciation
4
, 
with Larson et al. (2018) and Richardson and Sloan (2005) being notable exceptions. Larson et 
al. (2018) encourage that barring some compelling reason to focus on working capital alone, one 
should incorporate non-current operating accruals, and empirically show that comprehensive 
operating accruals are much larger in magnitude than working capital accruals. Supporting this 
view, Ball (2013) argues that working capital accounts (such as inventories, receivables, and 
payables) are relatively easy to audit relative to long-horizon accruals and therefore difficult to 
manage.  
 Several researchers have recently raised concerns about the ability of accrual models to 
distinguish innate accruals from discretionary accruals (Ball 2013; Jackson 2018). We know 
little about the determinants of “normal” accruals because accruals absent manipulation are 
unobservable. For that reason, discretionary accruals estimated with an econometric model 
inherently represent a noisy proxy for earnings management. The concerns regard for example 
the following: (1) Discretionary accrual estimates of firm X are affected by peer firms’ 
accounting choices, holding the economics and accounting choices of firm X constant (Jackson 
2018). (2) Discretionary accruals might capture economic shocks, which indeed is the objective 
of accrual accounting (Ball 2013). (2) Amounts of discretionary accruals reported in the 
literature are implausible (Jackson 2018). (3) Discretionary accruals are not related to ex post 
cases of earnings management (such as AAERs or restatements) (Jackson 2018) (4) Using total 
accruals does not tell us which account is used to manage earnings (McNichols and Stubben 
2018).  
 Albeit all critique points have merit, several counter arguments exist against most of the 
critique. For example, as accruals are estimated based on peer firms, the average amount of 
earnings management of peer firms is built into the expectation, and the estimated amount of 
discretionary accruals measures the amount of discretion that is incremental to that of peer 
firms. The typical earnings management research design aims to capture earnings management 
of a treatment group relative to a control group, and therefore such concerns are not detrimental 
to the results obtained from such studies (McNichols and Stubben 2018). Further, recent 
estimation model developments (see e.g. Larson et al. 2018; Collins et al. 2017; Frankel et al. 
2016; Frankel and Sun 2018) help explain the accrual process and allow researchers to better 
                                                 
4
 See for example Larson et al. (2018) Table 1 for an overview of prior research that uses working capital accruals 
(either including or excluding depreciation). From the table I count more than 100 papers that use such measures.    
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distinguish innate from discretionary accruals. For example, Godsell et al. (2017) claim that 
their model does not produce implausibly high amounts of discretionary accruals, and that their 
measure of discretionary accruals covariate with their sample firms’ incentives, indicating that 
contemporary estimation models capture well earnings management in settings in which the 
researcher has priors on the direction of earnings management. Further, the evidence on 
discretionary accruals and ex post measures of earnings management is nuanced rather than non-
existing, potentially due to database limitations (Karpoff et al. 2017) or ex post measures being 
confounded by the lack of misreporting detection (McNichols and Stubben 2018), which might 
be particularly pertinent to within GAAP earnings management of minor magnitude.  
 
2.2.2.2 Classification shifting and real earnings management 
 McVay (2006) shows how firms opportunistically engage in classification shifting within the 
income statement, by shifting expenses from core expenses to special items. Ha and Thomas 
(2019), however, show that managers engage in such behavior to signal which core expenses are 
less likely to persist, and show that income shifting increases earnings predictability, especially 
when uncertainty is high. In an interesting study on classification outside the financial 
statements, Bird et al. (2018) find that firms disclose news to the EDGAR system 
opportunistically, and classify bad news into EDGAR categories that have low investor 
attention.  
 The early research on real earnings management relied on myopic behavior, and examined 
cuts in discretionary expenses, such as R&D (Bushee 1998). More recently, based on the 
estimation models of Roychowdhury (2006) researchers examine real earnings management 
more broadly than cuts in R&D. In a similar vein to the abnormal accrual measures, the real 
earnings management measures are based on residuals from an estimation model. Specifically, 
Roychowdhury estimates the following models:  
𝐶𝐹𝑂 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽2∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀 (17) 
Where price discounts or more lenient credit terms lead to lower margins and hence an 
abnormally low cash flow given the sales level and changes, and therefore negative residuals 
indicate real earnings management.  
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𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀 (18) 
∆𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝜀 (19) 
 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝜀 (20) 
Roychowdhury (2006) models COGS and ΔInventory separately, but combine them in a 
production estimation (PROD=COGS+ΔInventory), where managers can produce more than 
necessary and thus spread the fixed overhead costs over a large number of units, and then lower 
COGS and increase reported earnings. Therefore, positive residuals indicate real earnings 
management.  
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝜀 (21) 
Discretionary expenses include expenses that do not generate immediate revenues and income, 
such as R&D, Advertising, and SG&A, and therefore negative residuals indicate real earnings 
management.  
 Interestingly, researchers compare the use of real earnings management and accrual earnings 
management. This type of research suggests that firms trade off the use of accrual and real 
earnings management, based on their relative costs (Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Cohen et al. 
2008; Zang 2012).  
 
2.2.2.3 Benchmark beating 
 Since Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) researchers have documented “kinks” in the 
distribution of reported earnings around zero, last year’s earnings, and analysts’ consensus 
earnings forecasts. Researchers find a statistically small number of firms reporting just below a 
benchmark, and a statistically large number of firms reporting at or just above a benchmark. A 
common, but not universal, interpretation of this pattern is that firms manage earnings to just 
meet or beat a benchmark and avoid the adverse reactions to missing a benchmark, such as stock 
price decreases (Bartov et al. 2002; Kasznik and McNichols 2002), or cost of debt increases 
(Jiang 2008; Chin et al. 2018).  
 Researchers have provided alternative explanations for such patterns, such as asymmetric tax 
rates (Beaver et al. 2007), or sampling bias and earnings being scaled by price (Durtschi and 
Easton 2005; Durtschi and Easton 2009), especially pertinent to the discontinuities around zero 
30 
 
and last year’s earnings. However, based on a review of the literature on benchmark beating, 
Burgstahler and Chuk (2017) argue that earnings management is the simplest and most complete 
explanation for the body of evidence about earnings discontinuities. Specifically, they point out 
that earnings management explains the discontinuities generally observed in earnings, that 
discontinuities covariate with earnings management incentives, and that discontinuities exist in 
earnings measures that are widely used in stakeholder decisions (earnings before extraordinary 
items, net income, earnings per share), but not in other earnings measures, such as the sum of 
four quarters’ earnings (annual earnings) ending on interim quarter-ends (Jacob and Jorgensen 
2007) and in “as restated” EPS measures following SFAS 128 (Jorgensen et al. 2014). Further, 
Chu et al. (2019) find that firms that consistently meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts are 
more likely to engage in earnings manipulation
5
, and Bernard et al. (2018) extend the thoughts 
of discontinuities to size management around disclosure and audit thresholds in private firms.  
  
2.2.3 External indicators of earnings management 
 The above describes how researchers estimate earnings management proxies based on 
information in the financial statements. Additionally, researchers identify earnings management 
incidences through external indicators (information not available for private firms) such as 
restatements, SEC accounting and auditing enforcement releases (AAERs), and internal control 
weaknesses (Dechow et al. 2010).  
 
2.2.4 Short on incentives 
 Prior research detects a wide variety of determinants of earnings management. For example, 
managers use earnings management to influence their compensation (Cheng and Warfield 2005; 
Guidry et al. 1999; Healy 1985), when raising new external capital, such as around IPOs (Teoh 
et al. 1998b; Sletten et al. 2018), seasoned equity offerings (Teoh et al. 1998a), or bond 
issuances (Liu et al. 2010), to avoid covenant violations (Jha 2013; Dichev and Skinner 2002; 
DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994), to influence credit ratings (Liu et al. 2018), or even to contract 
with employees (Dou et al. 2016). Further, prior research suggests that firms manage earnings 
downwards to mitigate the threat of entry of potential competitors (Tomy 2019), and during 
                                                 
5
 Anecdotally supporting this research, Harry Markopolos, the main investigator behind the report “General 
Electric, a bigger fraud than Enron” comments that he became aware of GE’s suspect accounting at a CFA 
luncheon, where equity analysts, chief investment officers, and portfolios managers all commented on how they did 
not believe that GE’s earnings figures could be true, because they always met or beat analyst consensus forecasts. 
Report available at gefraud.com. 
31 
 
trade investigations where firms benefit from appearing less profitable than the actual (Jones 
1991; Godsell et al. 2017). The literature on the determinants and consequences of earnings 
management is large, and is reviewed thoroughly by Dechow et al. (2010).  
 
2.2.5 Earnings management vs fraud 
 Earnings management and fraud are two closely related constructs. According to the 
definitions of earnings management discussed earlier, earnings management occurs “when 
managers use judgment in financial reporting […] to mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the firm” (Healy and Wahlen 1999, 368), which closely 
assimilates several fraud definitions. For example in the Statement of Auditing Standards 99 
(SAS 99) fraud is defined as “an intentional act resulting in a material misstatement in the 
financial statements”, and the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners6 defines fraud as “A 
knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to 
act to his or her detriment”.  
 As further discussed by Dechow and Skinner (2000), earnings management is a broader 
concept than fraud. Financial reporting choices that clearly violate GAAP can constitute both 
fraud and earnings management, whereas systematic choices within GAAP rather represent 
earnings management. Earnings management lies in the grey area of a continuum with truthful 
reporting and fraud at the extremes. For example, Chu et al. (2019) hypothesize and find that 
managers who consistently meet or beat analyst consensus forecasts initially engage in within 
GAAP earnings management techniques, but as expectations rise, the techniques become 
increasingly more aggressive leading to outside GAAP violations and thus fraud. Accordingly, 
prior research finds that determinants that predict earnings management also predict fraud (see 
e.g. Biggerstaff et al. 2015; Liu 2016). 
 
2.3 Earnings quality and earnings management in private firms  
 Several studies compare earnings quality between public companies and private companies. 
Two conflicting forces shape differences in earnings quality between private and public firms: 
The “demand hypothesis” predicts that public companies, relative to private companies, have 
higher demands for high quality financial reporting, for the following reasons: (1) Public firms 
face regulation that limits private communication (private firms can communicate privately with 
                                                 
6
 https://www.acfe.com/fraud-101.aspx 
32 
 
firm stakeholders) and thus investors to a larger extent rely on public financial reporting, (2) 
ownership is more dispersed in public firms, and thus agency costs are higher. The 
“opportunistic behavior” hypothesis predicts that managers of public companies, relative to 
private companies, are subject to capital market pressure to meet or beat expectations and often 
have equity based compensation packages, and therefore are more likely to manage earnings.  
 These two opposing forces are tested in a variety of geographical settings with different 
empirical proxies. The empirical evidence generally lends support to the demand hypothesis. 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) use a sample of UK firms and find that private firms report less 
conservative (lower timeliness in financial statement recognition of economic losses). 
Burgstahler et al. (2006) use a sample of European firms and compare measures of earnings 
management (tendency to avoid reporting losses, magnitude of accruals to magnitude of cash 
flows, and two measures of smoothness of earnings) between private and public firms, and find 
that private firms have higher levels of earnings management. They conclude that the first order 
effect of financial reporting is to improve earnings informativeness (the demand hypothesis). 
Givoly et al. (2010) use a clever setting of US firms, where their “public” firms have listed 
equity, and their “private” firms have private equity but public debt, and are therefore mandated 
by the SEC to publish financial statements. In contrast to Burgstahler et al. (2006) they find that 
private firms have lower levels of earnings management (accrual persistence, estimation error, 
tendency to avoid loss reporting), but consistent with Ball and Shivakumar (2005) they find that 
private firms’ financial reporting is less conservative. However, the results of Givoli et al. 
(2010) are statistically weak
7
. Hope et al. (2013) use a larger and more generalized sample of 
private US firms, and find that public firms have higher earnings quality (based on discretionary 
accruals, discretionary revenue, accruals to cash flow ratio, and conservatism estimations) 
consistent with the demand hypothesis. However, these effects are muted or eliminated in 
settings where public firms are more likely to manage earnings (just meet or beat, obtain 
external financing in the subsequent year, does not have a big 4 auditor) or face reduced demand 
for financial reports (no analyst following).  
 The setting of private firms is also used to empirically document the consequences of several 
accounting choices that are not possible to study empirically using public firms. For example, 
this type of research finds that firms with audited financial statements (Minnis 2011) and 
                                                 
7
 For example, their result on accrual persistence disappear when they include controls in the regression (Table 2, 
Panel B), and the result obtained from the “estimation errors” proxy is based on simple mean comparison and thus 
does not take into account innate differences between public and private firms.  
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accrual-based financial statements (Allee and Yohn 2009) benefit in the form of lower cost of 
credit, thus providing evidence on the economic benefits of sophisticated and verified financial 
reporting. Further, researchers exploit this setting to examine the muting effects of predation risk 
(Bernard 2016), perceived competition (Dedman and Lennox 2009), and proprietary costs 
(Bernard et al. 2018) on disclosure, or the implications of disclosure for, for example, 
innovation (Breuer et al. 2019).  
 Relative to public firms, financial statements of private firms assume a less important role in 
communicating firm performance, because private firm capital providers have access to private 
information (one of the arguments underlying the demand hypothesis discussed earlier). For 
example, Bharath et al. (2008) find that firms with poor accounting quality self-select into bank 
financing (rather than bond financing), because banks possess superior information access and 
processing abilities that reduce adverse selection costs for borrowers. Albeit the relative 
importance of financial reporting is likely lower for private firms, financial statements are still 
very important. For example, Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) use a dataset on loan applications 
and outcomes from private SME firms, provided by a major US small-business lender, and find 
that 70-80 percent of the bank’s score of (potential) borrowers is based on hard information. 
Donelson et al. (2017) survey 492 US lending officers and provide similar insights: they find 
that their survey respondents make credit decisions “more on the basis of financial statements 
than on the soft information provided by relationship lending” (p 2053). From a firm 
perspective, the perception is that their financial reports of private firms are used by external 
stakeholders. For example, the survey evidence by Graham et al. (2005) suggest that private 
firms perceive earnings and cash flow measures as the most important performance measures 
reported to outsiders, that both last year’s earnings and zero earnings are important benchmarks, 
and that smooth earnings are perceived less risky by outsiders and are important for credit 
ratings.  
 Further, several attributes of private firms’ financial reporting are related to their cost of debt, 
suggesting that banks to some extent rely on financial reports. For example Kaya and Pronobis 
(2016) find that lenders reward voluntary XBRL adopters by charging lower interest rates. 
Further, research generally finds that earnings quality attributes are associated with better credit 
terms (Minnis 2011; Allee and Yohn 2009; Gassen and Fülbier 2015; Vander Bauwhede et al. 
2015).  
 The financial reporting environment of private firms differs substantially around the globe. 
For example, firms located in the US or Canada are neither required to publish financial 
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statements nor have then audited. By contrast, most European firms must publish at least some 
financial statement information and many are required auditing (depending on some rather low 
size thresholds). In a recent interesting study, Minnis and Shroff (2017) find that private firms 
generally prefer not to file financial statements publicly if public reporting were voluntary, 
however the majority of their respondents support a rule requiring public reporting. Minnis and 
Shroff argue that mandatory financial reporting may have positive externalities, because firms 
can use peer firms’ financial reports to make better investments and lower their cost of capital.  
 
3.  The Dissertation 
3.1 Positioning  
 As the three chapters each represent a separate academic research paper, the different 
chapters fit into the literature in different ways. Figure 1 provides a brief overview of the 
positioning of the papers. Dotted lines denote links established in prior research, and solid lines 
denote innovations of the three papers, respectively.  
 The first chapter utilizes the setting of private firms to better isolate financially distressed 
firms’ debt driven financial reporting incentives, and test the earnings quality implications of 
discretionary accrual choices. Prior research separately provides evidence on (1) either income-
increasing (Rosner 2003; Lara et al. 2009; Charitou et al. 2007; Trombetta and Imperatore 2014; 
Jha 2013; Dichev and Skinner 2002; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994) or income-decreasing 
(Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos 2017; Lee et al. 2007; DeFond and Park 1997; Becker et al. 
1998) accounting behavior in financially distressed firms, (2) on discretionary accruals and 
earnings persistence (Allen et al. 2013; Dechow and Dichev 2002; Xie 2001; Subramanyam 
1996), and (3) on discretionary accruals and cost of debt (Bharath et al. 2008; Francis et al. 
2005; Vander Bauwhede et al. 2015). In this chapter, I combine these literatures, and test the 
motivations of financially distressed firm managers’ discretionary accrual reporting choices, by 
investigating how financial distress moderates the relation between discretionary accruals and 
earnings persistence, and the relation between discretionary accruals and cost of debt.  
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Figure 1: Positioning of papers in the literature 
 
 
 
This figure shows how the three papers of this dissertation fit into the literature. Dotted lines denote links established in prior 
research, and solid lines denote innovations of the three papers, respectively 
 
 
 
36 
 
 The second chapter explores a special however prevalent type of private companies: owner-
managed firms, which is not really displayed in the figure. Prior research extensively 
investigates earnings management in public firms, where agency costs arise due to separation of 
ownership and control (Dechow et al. 2010), and to some extent earnings management in insider 
owned firms, such as family firms, where agency conflicts arise between majority owners and  
minority owners (Ghosh and Tang 2015; Srinidhi et al. 2014; Gopalan and Jayaraman 2012; Ali 
et al. 2007; Wang 2006)
 8
. In this paper, my co-authors and I examine earnings management 
behavior in a setting where the owner and the manager is the same person, and hence owner-
manager or owner-owner agency conflicts are practically absent (except in the rare case of an 
upcoming M&A or IPO). We develop a novel measure of earnings management based on an 
owner-managers’ approximately tax neutral income shifting from salary to dividends (Salary-
Dividend Earnings Management: SDEM, hereinafter), and explore causes and consequences. 
Not surprising, we find that SDEM is associated with the magnitude of debt, that owner-
managers are more likely to use SDEM preceding debt issuances and when pre-managed 
earnings fall just below zero. Further, we are far from the first to investigate the implications of 
earnings management (or earnings quality) on credit terms (Jiang 2008; Bharath et al. 2008; 
Francis et al. 2005; Vander Bauwhede et al. 2015). However, SDEM works through information 
that is not disclosed in the annual report (the manager’s salary), and our estimations thus 
indirectly capture lenders’ tendency to ask for private information, and highlight certain adverse 
effects of public disclosure and lenders’ relative low costs of obtaining financial statement 
information, for example through central databases.  
 The third chapter exploits the fact that private firms are large in numbers, which is needed to 
answer the research question asked in the paper: how employees influence corporate culture and 
financial reporting. Prior research links corporate culture to opportunistic firm behavior, 
including measures for earnings management. However, prior research relies on traits or actions 
of firm executives in measuring corporate culture (Liu 2016; Biggerstaff et al. 2015) or use 
indirect proxies such as religiosity (McGuire et al. 2012; Dyreng et al. 2012) or educational 
level (Call et al. 2017) in the geographical proximity of the firm’s headquarter. Based on theory 
on corporate culture (Van Den Steen 2010; O’Reilly 1989) I predict and show that rank-and-file 
                                                 
8
 As pointed out by a reviewer in Wang (2006) (footnote 3) the entrenchment of family firms may lead to greater 
demand for high quality earnings by external stakeholders (such as debt holders) to resolve information 
asymmetries. Therefore, family firms potentially represent an interesting setting to investigate how firms respond to 
agency conflicts between the firm and non-shareholder stakeholders.  
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employees influence corporate culture and financial reporting beyond what is explained by 
executive traits. The chapter thus fits well into the literature on corporate culture and firm 
behavior, and adds to a recent literature on employees’ influence on financial reporting.  
 
 
3.2 Theoretical approach  
 The dissertation largely builds on theory of the firm that aims to explain principal-agent 
relationships and agency costs (or more broadly contracting costs) (Jensen and Meckling 1976) 
and positive accounting theory (Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Watts and Zimmerman 1979) that 
aims to predict accounting behavior by understanding the incentives of an agent. The theories 
assume that information asymmetries exist between the principal and the agent and that 
individuals seek to maximize their own expected utilities and are innovative and creative in 
doing so.  
 Both theories view a firm as a nexus of contracts, both formal and informal. When a firm 
enters into a contract it imposes contracting costs including agency costs (e.g. monitoring costs, 
bonding costs, and the residual loss from dysfunctional decisions), information costs (e.g. an 
outsider’s cost of being informed), and renegotiation costs (the costs of rewriting existing 
contracts because the extant contract is made obsolete by some unforeseen event). Contracting 
costs can occur between a manager and firm owners (i.e. due to the separation of ownership and 
control), between a firm and its lenders, or even between a firm and its suppliers, customers, 
employees, or the tax authorities.  
 Contracting costs arise due to information asymmetries, and financial reporting is one 
remedy to resolve such asymmetries. On the one hand, contracts between the firm and an 
external stakeholder are not efficient when the firm has complete discretion over reported 
accounting numbers. On the other hand, the firm manager presumably has superior insider 
information about her firm that she can disclose through financial reporting. Therefore, 
managers are typically constrained by GAAP reporting requirements, however are still allowed 
discretion in the preparation of financial reports. The firm manager can then use such discretion 
to either increase the total wealth of all stakeholders (for example, by the dissemination of 
private information and thus resolving information asymmetries and decrease contracting costs), 
or to extract rents from firm stakeholders and thereby making the manager better off at the 
expense of for example owners or lenders (for example, by managing earnings and fool 
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stakeholders). Firm managers then balance off the expected benefits and costs associated with 
earnings management in their determination of the optimal level of earnings management.  
 The three papers in this dissertation all draw on such theory. In the first paper, I empirically 
test for firms’ discretionary reporting choices when they are financially distressed – that is, a 
setting in which both incentives to manage earnings and costs of managing earnings are high. In 
the second paper, I use positive accounting theory to predict instances in which owner-managers 
engage in earnings management behavior (debt driven incentives and benchmark driven 
incentives), and further draw on earnings management theory and empirical insights from prior 
research to form hypotheses about the consequences of such behavior (for example the costs of 
being informed mitigating lenders’ propensity to collect private information). In the third paper, 
I use positive accounting theory to predict a setting in which the firm has an incentive to 
increase earnings (when the firm issues new debt) and complement with theory on criminology 
and corporate culture, to form hypotheses about the influence of rank-and-file employees and 
executives on earnings management.  
 
3.3 Data  
 The three chapters are all based on large sample data on private firms’ financial statements. 
The data are obtained through the ORBIS database and the EXPERIAN database. These datasets 
are complemented with additional firm-level data, such as industry membership, data about 
bankruptcies, financial reporting dates, the number of employees, and proprietary data on 
revenue from tax filings. Additionally, in the second and the third chapter those databases are 
further complemented with person-level data on the individuals connected to those firms, it 
being executive managers, rank-and-file employees, owners, and individuals serving company 
boards. The latter data are rich and include income data and income sources, prior criminal 
convictions, personal wealth measures, gender, family data (marital status, number of children), 
residential information, as well as other personal information.  
 As is further elaborated in each of the three chapters the data allow me to shed light on 
certain issues of financial reporting that prior research has not examined, likely because these 
data are difficult to get access to. The dissertation has benefited greatly from access to such 
granular, very interesting, and rather unique data. For example, the data allow me to track 
managers’ salary over time and provide empirical evidence on income-shifting, and to measure 
the traits of rank-and-file employees directly, instead of relying on indirect proxies such as 
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geographical averages (see e.g. Call et al. 2017; McGuire et al. 2012). Further, with the data I 
can disentangle the effects of the manager (e.g. the wealth of the manager and other personal 
characteristics) from the effects of firm financial reporting when investigating the influence of 
SDEM on the cost of debt. The following table summarizes the dataset used in each of the three 
chapters.  
 
Table 1: Overview of data sources 
Data provider Dataset and description Used in chapter(s) 
  1 2 3 
ORBIS (Bureau van 
Dijk) 
Financial statement information of Danish limited liability 
firms, and data on number of full-time equivalent employees 
X X X 
Experian Detailed line-items on current assets and current liabilities of 
Danish limited liability firms. Data on financial reporting filing 
dates.  
X X X 
Statstidende.dk (The 
Danish Official 
Gazette) 
Accessed through konkurs.dk: Data on bankruptcy filings.  X   
Statistics Denmark IDAN dataset: Annual individual-level data on employer-
employee links, salary, employment start date, and 
employment end date. 
 X X 
Statistics Denmark IND dataset: Annual individual level information on income 
and wealth.  
 X X 
Statistics Denmark FIRM dataset: Data on proprietary revenue from tax and VAT 
filings, and complementary data on number of full-time 
equivalent number of employees 
X X X 
Statistics Denmark KRAF dataset: Data on criminal records of all sample firm 
employees and executives 
 X X 
Statistics Denmark BEF dataset: Data on residential municipality and address, 
gender, marital status, birth date, ancestry country, and other 
family related information.   
 X X 
The Danish Business 
Authority 
Ownership dataset: Data on owner(individual)-firm and 
owner(firm)-firm links. Data on starting and termination dates 
of the ownership, along with ownership percentage.  
 X X 
The Danish Business 
Authority 
Executive data: Data on executive-firm links. Data on starting 
and termination dates of the executive employment.  
 X X 
The Danish Business 
Authority 
Board data: Data on board member-firm links. Data on position 
held, along with starting and termination dates of the board 
position.  
  X 
 
 
3.4 Empirical Design 
 The empirical approaches employed throughout the dissertation are primarily econometric, 
and include multiple regressions estimated with ordinary least squares, panel data estimation 
with firm fixed effects estimated with ordinary least squares, multiple logistic regressions 
40 
 
estimated with maximum likelihood, propensity score matching, and instrumental variable 
regressions. Further, the results in Chapter 2 are complemented with interview insights about 
banks’ lending practices. In all standard multiple OLS regressions and logistic regressions 
standard errors are clustered by firm and year to correct for cross-sectional and time-series 
dependence in the error term (Gow et al. 2010). 
 In the first paper, I rely solely on quantitative estimations. I estimate discretionary accruals 
using recent model enhancements (Collins et al. 2017; Larson et al. 2018) and use the residuals 
from the estimation model as a proxy for accrual discretion exercised in the financial reporting. 
Then, I estimate a bankruptcy probability model following Beaver et al. (2005), and use the 
predicted values of this estimation as a proxy for financial distress. Then, to test the research 
question of this paper, I estimate standard earnings persistence regressions with both future 
return on assets and future operating cash flows as dependent variables, respectively, and 
investigate the influence of discretionary accruals on earnings persistence/cash flow prediction.  
 In the second paper, my co-authors and I base the main analysis on quantitative estimations 
and complement the results with interview insights with a number of large Danish banks. We 
estimate the propensity to shift salary to dividends (salary-dividend earnings management: 
SDEM, hereinafter) using logistic regression. Then, to test if the use of SDEM has implications 
for the firm’s cost of debt, we use multiple regressions and estimate future cost of debt as a 
function of current SDEM and controls, and complement with propensity score matching and IV 
regressions. To extend our understanding of how banks use financial reporting information in 
the lending decision, we conduct semi-structured interviews with four large Danish banks. To 
avoid blurred answers we initially tell the interviewees that the research project explores 
earnings management in private firms, but not the specific channel through which we investigate 
earnings management (SDEM).  
 In the third paper, I rely on quantitative estimations. I estimate accruals in a one-step 
procedure (Chen et al. 2018) based on Larson et al.’s (2018) accrual estimation model, with 
several additional controls improving my ability to determine innate (“normal”) accruals, and 
hence discretionary accruals. In the main analysis I rely on the slope on an interaction term 
between the variable of interest and an indicator of new finance issuance. The interaction 
coefficient thus captures the incremental effect of the variable of interest on accruals, given that 
the firm issues new finance. This econometric procedure is similar to that of several related 
research papers (Ayers et al. 2006 Table 1, Panel D; Balsam et al. 2002 Table 3; Call et al. 2014 
Table 5; Frankel et al. 2016 Table 5; Gul et al. 2003 Table 4; Doukakis et al. 2019 equation 1).   
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3.5 Limitations and future research  
 Investigating financial reporting in Danish private firms comes with benefits in the form of 
large sample sizes, access to proprietary data difficult to obtain elsewhere, and special agency 
settings. Despite those important benefits researching earnings management in private firms 
comes with several major limitations: First, market prices are naturally not available. Therefore, 
this dissertation is limited from linking financial reporting to stock returns to test the “value” of 
financial reporting (Allen et al. 2013; Richardson et al. 2006; Richardson and Sloan 2005; 
Dechow and Dichev 2002; Xie 2001; Subramanyam 1996), using market based proxies for 
growth opportunities (Collins et al. 2017), and using market based variables in the estimation of 
the probability of default (Hillegeist et al. 2004; Shumway 2001).  
 Second, a wide range of conventional variables used by prior research (Biggerstaff et al. 
2015; Ali and Hirshleifer 2017; Liu 2016; Davidson et al. 2015; Kallunki et al. 2018; Dhaliwal 
et al. 2011) to capture earnings management, or outcomes of earnings management, are not 
available for private firms, such as restatements, meeting or beating analyst forecasts, SEC 
enforcements, and internal control deficiencies, as well as other proxies for opportunistic firm 
behavior, such as option backdating, insider trading, and shareholder litigations. Future research 
could benefit from obtaining data on other opportunistic firm outcomes of private firms than 
those employed in this dissertation. For example, researchers could obtain data on the auditors’ 
adjustments to managers’ submitted accounting data (see e.g. Lennox et al. 2018), or 
enforcement actions of the business authorities, if such data is available anywhere.  
 Third, detailed data on loan characteristics are not available and thus this dissertation relies 
on proxies of cost of debt using financial expenses scaled by liabilities net of trade payables. 
Other contracting terms that may influence the total cost of debt include collateral, distance to 
the bank, covenants, and length of bank relationship (Cassar et al. 2015; Agarwal and Hauswald 
2010; Granja et al. 2019). If such data are available elsewhere, future research could benefit 
greatly from including those factors in the analysis. Although not currently available, I point out 
that the Danish Central Bank has just recently mandated Danish banks to file with the Central 
Bank detailed loan-level data (instead of aggregated data as off now)
9
. The data will be available 
for researchers through Statistics Denmark’s researcher access later this year. I believe such data 
can contribute greatly to further refine the research questions asked in this dissertation.  
                                                 
9
See http://www.nationalbanken.dk/da/statistik/FIONA/Sider/Banker,-realkreditinstitutter-mv.aspx. Look for 
“kreditregister”. Additionally, I have been in contact with the Central Bank, who plans to launch the dataset in the 
third quarter of 2019.  Which data that will become available to researchers is not yet determined.  
42 
 
I point out that the institutional setting of using Danish firms may impair the generalizability 
of the findings of this dissertation. For example, as with most European countries all Danish 
limited liability firms are mandated to disclose financial statements publicly
10
, and the data can 
be easily extracted from a central database by firm stakeholders, and therefore capital providers’ 
information acquisition costs are likely lower than for example in the US or Canada (Minnis and 
Shroff 2017), which may influence how firm stakeholders use and rely on reported statements. 
Further, the Danish setting is characterized by high legal and enforcement quality and a low 
level of alignment between financial accounts for external reporting and tax purposes 
(Burgstahler et al. 2006)
11
. It would be interesting to see how lenders rely on financial statement 
data (and adjust for managers’ salary) in jurisdictions where public financial disclosure is not 
mandatory, or in jurisdictions without approximate tax neutrality. In the light of those caveats, 
however, most of the findings are based on theories of information asymmetries – issues that are 
present in most countries around the world.  
 
  
                                                 
10
 And as in other European countries the information content of the financial report increases with firm size. 
11
 See also Leuz et al. (2003) and Blaylock et al. (2015) for additional factors characterizing Denmark.  
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ABSTRACT: This paper investigates the implications of discretionary accrual 
choices in non-bankrupt financially distressed firms for two important aspects of 
earnings quality: earnings persistence and information value about future cash 
flows. Financially distressed firms can use discretion to either opportunistically 
conceal poor performance, or to signal firm prospects. I find that discretionary 
accruals of financially distressed firms, relative to non-distressed firms, contribute 
to higher earnings quality. The effect is driven by income-increasing discretionary 
accruals, and lenders put more weight on discretionary accruals in loan pricing, 
when firms are financially distressed. Emphasizing the information enhancing 
effects of firms’ discretionary accrual choices in financially distressed firms my 
findings contribute to the ongoing discussion on financial reporting discretion and 
its impact on earnings quality. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 Prior research on earnings management in financially distressed firms finds mixed evidence 
on the direction of discretionary accounting choices. One stream observes income-increasing 
discretionary accruals in financially distressed firms, such as in most years preceding 
bankruptcy (Rosner 2003; Lara et al. 2009; Charitou et al. 2007), during severe macroeconomic 
financial crises (Trombetta and Imperatore 2014) and when firms are close to covenant violation 
(Jha 2013; Dichev and Skinner 2002; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994), and interprets the evidence 
as opportunistic earnings management where firms hide poor performance. Another stream 
observes a negative relation between discretionary accruals and debt (Anagnostopoulou and 
Tsekrekos 2017; Lee et al. 2007; DeFond and Park 1997; Becker et al. 1998) and interprets the 
evidence as debt serving as a monitoring mechanism that mitigates earnings management. I 
argue that such interpretations about earnings management are premature, unless one can show 
negative consequences of discretionary accounting choices on earnings quality.  
 In this paper, I abstract from fixating on directional relationships between financial distress 
and discretionary accrual proxies. Instead, I explore the implications of financially distressed 
firms’ discretionary accrual choices for two important attributes of earnings quality: earnings 
persistence and informativeness about future cash flows. I do this by investigating accrual 
choices in non-bankrupt financially distressed firms, because they somehow manage to survive 
their situation of financial distress, which motivates the following research question: Do non-
bankrupt financially distressed firms use discretion to hide poor performance, or to signal future 
firm prospects? 
 The question stated above is based on two widely held views in the accounting literature on 
firm insiders’ motivations behind discretionary accrual choices (Badertscher et al. 2012; Beaver 
et al. 2012; Beaver 2002). The first view, referred to here as the signaling hypothesis, is that 
firm insiders hold superior information and use discretion to reveal and signal such information 
about firm prospects, and thereby help resolve information asymmetries and decrease 
contracting costs. In my setting, this hypothesis leads to the prediction that financially distressed 
firms’ discretionary accrual choices improve earnings quality. The second view, referred to here 
as the opportunism hypothesis, is that firms use discretion opportunistically to conceal poor 
economic performance, fool stakeholders and thereby survive. In my setting, this hypothesis 
leads to the prediction that financially distressed firms’ discretionary accrual choices deteriorate 
earnings quality.  
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 Which of the two views stated above on average dominates the reporting incentives of 
financially distressed firms, depends on the benefits and costs associated with opportunistically 
managing earnings and truthful reporting, respectively. As further discussed in section 2 both 
views have merit, and hence the managerial motivation behind discretionary accrual choices of 
financially distressed firms is ultimately an empirical question. 
 Financial reporting of financially distressed firms is likely driven by debt incentives. On the 
one hand, financially distressed firms are in particular risk of lenders demanding accelerated 
debt payments or lenders filing the borrower firm for bankruptcy proceedings, possibly affecting 
those firms’ financial reporting decisions. On the other hand, lenders’ debt investment is at stake 
and therefore lenders exert increased monitoring and scrutiny on financially distressed 
borrowing firms, possibly affecting the demand side of financial reporting. To better isolate how 
financially distressed firms alter their reported earnings due to asymmetries between lenders and 
the firm, rather than between owners and managers, I collect large sample data on private firms, 
because private firms are typically characterized by centralized ownership, greater managerial 
ownership, and low ownership turnover (Chen et al. 2011).  
 To proxy the level of financial distress I use the predicted values of a probability of default 
model based on the estimation developed by Beaver et al. (2005). From these estimates, within 
each year I rank and classify observations into 10 equally sized portfolios, where the 10
th
 
portfolio (DISTRESS_10, hereinafter) contains the firms with the highest predicted probability 
of default, and the 1
st
 portfolio (DISTRESS_1, hereinafter) the firms with the lowest predicted 
probability of default.  
 To estimate the level of discretion exercised in financial reporting I estimate discretionary 
accruals based on the approach outlined by Collins et al. (2017) and further refine their 
estimation model to better capture innate and discretionary accruals, and define discretionary 
accruals as the part of comprehensive operating accruals not explained by lagged accruals, gross 
profit growth
1
, lagged cash flows, current cash flows, or current level of profitability. Because 
the research question stated earlier concerns how non-bankrupt firms use discretion to alter 
reported earnings, for the following analysis I focus on non-bankrupt firms.  
                                                 
1
 I point out that other studies typically use changes in revenue (or sometimes changes in the number of employees) 
as proxy for growth. However, due to exemption rules for small companies, most of the observations in my sample 
do not publicly disclose revenue data. Later in the paper, I estimate discretionary accruals for the subsample of 
firms with employee data (revenue data) available, and find a high correlation of 0.93 (0.80) between discretionary 
accruals estimated with changes in gross profit as proxy for growth and changes in employees (changes in revenue) 
respectively. Further, as I discuss later, the general conclusions remain unchanged when I substitute gross profit 
growth with employee growth or revenue growth, respectively, in the estimation of discretionary accruals.   
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 Consistent with prior research I find mixed evidence on the direction of discretionary 
accruals of financially distressed firms. Discretionary accruals are negative for firms in the 
DISTRESS_10 portfolio and positive for firms in the DISTRESS_9 portfolio. I point out that this 
finding is potentially due to the discretionary accrual model employed. Collins et al. (2017) 
argue that their modelling approach (which is adopted in this paper) might “throw the baby out 
with the bathwater”, and show that their estimation model effectively does not produce 
discretionary accruals different from zero in two extreme portfolios based on probability of 
default (highest and lowest quintile). However, not controlling for characteristics such as 
profitability in the accrual estimation, which is also used to model the probability of default, will 
falsely classify a part of nondiscretionary accruals as discretionary accruals. Ultimately, the 
modeling approach allows me to better distinguish normal from discretionary accruals, which is 
particularly important when testing the implications of such accounting choices, which indeed is 
the primary aim of this paper.  
 Then, I explore how discretionary accruals influence earnings quality of financially distressed 
firms. For these analyses, I estimate standard persistence regressions where I regress either 
future profitability or future cash flows on current profitability and discretionary accruals, and 
thus the predictive slope on discretionary accruals reflect the information content of 
discretionary accruals, controlling for current profitability (Lewellen and Resutek 2019; 
Fairfield et al. 2003). I estimate the influence of discretionary accruals on earnings quality by 
comparing predictive slopes on discretionary accruals between the firms in the DISTRESS_10 
(DISTRESS_10 and DISTRESS_9) portfolio(s) and firms not in this portfolio (these portfolios). I 
find that the predictive slope of discretionary accruals is higher for financially distressed firms, 
relative to non-distressed firms, both in predicting future profitability and future cash flows. The 
results suggest that discretionary accruals are more informative when firms experience financial 
distress, and lend support to the signaling hypothesis.   
 Then, in regressions where I split the sample by income-increasing/income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals, I find that the results are driven by income-increasing discretionary 
accruals. Further, in simple cost of debt regressions, I find that lenders put more weight on 
discretionary accruals when firms are financially distressed, lending additional support to the 
signaling hypothesis.  
 I perform several sensitivity analyses to bolster the inference that discretionary accruals of 
financially distressed firms increase earnings quality. First, I re-estimate the standard persistence 
regressions and explicitly control for “normal” accruals. If I truly capture discretionary accruals, 
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and not just general accruals, only the slope on discretionary accruals – and not the slope on 
normal accruals – should increase for financially distressed firms. Indeed, I find that the slope of 
normal accruals is not significantly different for financially distressed firms. Second, I re-
estimate discretionary accruals substituting gross profit growth with employee growth and 
revenue growth (one at a time) for the subsamples for which these data points are available. I 
consistently find that discretionary accruals contribute relatively more to earnings persistence in 
financially distressed firms. When using employee growth I further consistently find that 
discretionary accruals predict cash flows relatively more in financially distressed firms. 
However, when using revenue growth, I do not find that discretionary accruals predict cash 
flows relatively better. With this growth proxy the difference is not significant. Although this 
latter result weakens the inference of signaling, the findings are still highly inconsistent with the 
opportunism hypothesis, because discretionary accruals of financially distressed firms do not 
contribute to lower informativeness of earnings about future cash flows.  
 Collectively, I interpret the empirical evidence as highly inconsistent with the opportunism 
hypothesis, because discretionary accruals of financially distressed firms contain relatively high 
predictive power on future performance and future cash flows – an effect that is driven by 
income-increasing discretionary accruals – and lenders seem to value this information more 
when firms are financially distressed. By contrast, on balance I interpret the collective empirical 
evidence as consistent with the signaling hypothesis, where financially distressed firms use 
accruals to signal firm prospects and thus improve earnings quality.  
 I point out that in my tests accounting discretion is estimated, not empirically observed, and 
the information value of discretionary accruals of financially distressed firms is estimated 
relative to non-distressed firms. Thus, my inferences are subject to the standard caveats 
regarding measurement error, and the potential alternative story that the control group (non-
distressed firms) on average use discretion opportunistically, which however is inconsistent with 
prior research on discretion exercised in non-opportunistic settings (Badertscher et al. 2012). 
With this caveat in mind, the contributions of this paper are threefold. First, this paper broadens 
the scope of research on earnings management in financially distressed firms, by showing that 
financially distressed firms use their discretion to signal private information rather than 
opportunistically hide poor performance. Second, this paper makes a contribution to the 
literature on earnings persistence and the informativeness of current earnings about future cash 
flows. Specifically, in broad samples without any specific setting prior literature consistently 
finds that accruals (in some papers discretionary accruals) carry information about future 
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performance, however less than other components of earnings (Allen et al. 2013; Richardson et 
al. 2006; Richardson and Sloan 2005; Dechow and Dichev 2002; Xie 2001; Subramanyam 
1996). In this paper, I replicate the findings of these papers in a broad sample, but provide 
empirical evidence that this relation does not extend to financially distressed firms, and thus 
firm financial distress is an important determinant of accrual informativeness. Third, this paper 
makes a contribution to the literature on discretionary accruals and earnings management. 
Whereas much prior research use discretionary accruals as a proxy for opportunistic earnings 
management or earnings quality
2
, my results suggest that when firms experience financial 
distress discretionary accruals serve as a tool to signal private information on firm prospects.  
 The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: The next section discusses related research 
and develops empirical predictions. Setting, sample and research strategy are outlined in section 
3. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.  RELATED RESEARCH AND EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS 
2.1 Two widely held views on discretion in financial reporting  
 Contracting costs arise due to information asymmetries in a principal-agent relationship 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Watts and Zimmerman 1979; Watts 
and Zimmerman 1990) and include agency costs, information costs, and renegotiation costs. 
Financial reporting represents one remedy to alleviate such information asymmetries. Firm 
insiders are allowed discretion in financial reporting because they presumably hold superior 
insider information, and disclosing such information through financial reporting help mitigate 
information asymmetries and lower contracting costs. By contrast, firm insiders can use their 
discretion to opportunistically attempt to fool stakeholders, and thereby increase own wealth at 
the cost of for example lenders. Based on these thoughts, two widely held views exist in the 
accounting literature regarding discretion in financial reporting (Beaver et al. 2012; Badertscher 
et al. 2012; Beaver 2002; Dechow 1994)
3. The first view, which I refer to here as the “signaling 
                                                 
2
 For example, in a comprehensive literature review Dechow et al. (2010) conclude that “almost one hundred papers 
in our database use abnormal accruals generated from an accruals model as a measure of earnings quality.” (p 358, 
footnote 22). 
3
 I note that Badertscher et al (2012) list three widely held views. Badertscher et al. describe the opportunistic view 
as the scenario where firm managers make discretionary choices to fool investors and extract rents, and the 
contracting view as the scenario where firm managers make discretionary choices to influence contracting 
outcomes, such as bonus payments and debt covenants. Both the opportunistic view and the contracting view lead 
to the prediction that firm managers make accounting choices that obfuscate the ability of financial statements to 
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hypothesis”, is that discretionary accounting choices are made to reveal private information and 
thereby alleviate information asymmetries. The second view, which I refer to here as the 
“opportunism hypothesis”, is that discretionary accounting choices are made to obfuscate true 
economic performance and thereby extract rents.  
 Empirical evidence exists and suggests that in many cases discretionary accounting choices 
provide useful information about firm prospects. For example, Badertscher et al. (2012) find that 
discretionary accounting choices provide information value about future cash flows in cases 
where discretionary accounting choices are not used to opportunistically meet-or-beat analyst 
forecasts, and Linck et al. (2013) find that financially constrained firms
4
 use discretionary 
accruals to ease constraints and invest in projects that improve future performance. In broad 
samples researchers find that discretionary accruals map into future earnings, cash flows, and 
stock returns, however to a lower extend than other components of earnings (Allen et al. 2013; 
Dechow and Dichev 2002; Xie 2001; Subramanyam 1996). Further, Ha and Thomas (2019) find 
that classification shifting (from core to non-core earnings) generally increases earnings 
predictability, and that this effect is stronger when uncertainty is high (for example, when the 
firm is more levered), suggesting that firms use accounting discretion to signal future 
performance, and especially so when information asymmetry is high. 
 Likewise, the opportunism hypothesis has motivated a large stream of literature. For 
example, Teoh et al. (1998b) and Teoh et al. (1998a) provide evidence on income-increasing 
earnings management during equity offerings that is associated with poor post-issue stock 
returns. Further, the opportunism hypothesis is used to explain income-increasing accounting 
choices when firms are close to debt covenant thresholds (Jha 2013; Dichev and Skinner 2002; 
DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994), during negative credit watch (Liu et al. 2018), and around bonus 
thresholds (Guidry et al. 1999).  
 
2.2 Financial reporting in financially distressed firms   
 Researchers investigating reporting choices in financially distressed firms generally link a 
measure of financial distress to a measure of a discretionary reporting choice. For example, prior 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
present a true and fair view of the underlying firm economics, and hence I pool the two views into one view, which 
I term the opportunism hypothesis. This approach is similar to Beaver (2002) and Beaver et al. (2012).  
4
 I point out that Linck et al. identify financially constrained firms based on a simple index of age and size, and 
hence their measure of “financial constraint” differs significantly from the measure “financial distress” used in this 
paper.  
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research finds that firms use discretion in the accrual estimation to increase earnings in most 
years preceding bankruptcy (Rosner 2003; Lara et al. 2009; Charitou et al. 2007), during 
macroeconomic financial distress (Trombetta and Imperatore 2014), and to avoid debt covenant 
violations (Jha 2013; Dichev and Skinner 2002; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). By contrast, 
several other studies observe a negative relation between debt and discretionary accruals  
(Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos 2017; Lee et al. 2007; DeFond and Park 1997; Becker et al. 
1998).  
 However, with a notable exception being Choi et al. (2011) who find that discretionary 
accruals were less information relevant during the Asian financial crisis in 1997-78, neither of 
these studies test the earnings quality implications of discretionary accrual choices.  
 
2.3 Empirical predictions 
 Which of the two views on discretion in financial reporting on average is dominating in 
financially distressed firms depends on the expected benefits and expected costs associated with 
opportunistic earnings management and truthful reporting, respectively.  
 Supporting the opportunism hypothesis, the expected benefits of opportunistic earnings 
management are rather obvious: Bankruptcy costs are high, and in the case that managers 
believe that they can successfully fool capital suppliers the avoidance of bankruptcy costs 
provides a clear incentive to manage earnings. For example, based on a US sample of small 
closely held firms Campbell (1997) estimates the average direct bankruptcy costs at 8.5% of 
total assets. Further, Eckbo and Thorburn (2003) and Eckbo et al. (2016) find that CEOs of 
bankrupt firms suffer large income losses following firm bankruptcy.  
 The costs mitigating opportunistic behavior include psychic costs, perceived legal risks, 
auditor risks, and reputational risks (see e.g. Fischer and Verrecchia 2000). For example, 
detected earnings management has severe implications for managers’ future careers (Desai et al. 
2006; Karpoff et al. 2008). The costs of managing earnings are particularly high in financially 
distressed firms because they are subject to increased scrutiny and outside attention, both from 
lenders (Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos 2017; Rodríguez-Pérez and van Hemmen 2010) and 
auditors (Nelson et al. 2002). Further, supporting the signaling hypothesis, a financially 
distressed firm may report conservatively to signal to its stakeholders acknowledgement of the 
firm’s financial troubles, and thereby improve its position in contractual (for example loan) 
renegotiations (DeAngelo et al. 1994; Jaggi and Lee 2002).  
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 As both views on discretion in financial reporting have merit, the overall relation between 
earnings quality and the accrual discretion exercised in financial reporting is an empirical 
question. Each of the two opposing views induces the following distinct and testable empirical 
predictions. The signaling hypothesis leads to the prediction that discretionary accrual choices of 
financially distressed firms, relative to non-distressed firms, to a similar or higher extent 
contribute to earnings quality. The opportunism hypothesis leads to the prediction that 
discretionary accrual choices of financially distressed firms, relative to non-distressed firms, 
deteriorate earnings quality.  
 
3.  SETTING, DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Private firms 
 Financial reporting of financially distressed firms is likely driven by debt incentives. Lenders 
care about downside risk rather than upside potential (Jiang 2008), and lenders are therefore 
likely to apply increased monitoring, attention, and scrutiny to financially distressed firms. From 
the borrowing firm’s perspective, lenders are important in this setting because they have the 
ability to demanding accelerated debt payments and file for bankruptcy proceedings on behalf of 
the borrowing firm. To better isolate how financially distressed firms alter their reported 
earnings due to asymmetries between lenders and the firm, rather than between owners and 
managers, I construct a large dataset with financial statement data on private firms. Private firms 
are excellent for investigating lender-firm agency problems, because they are typically 
characterized by centralized ownership, greater managerial ownership, and low ownership 
turnover (Chen et al. 2011).  
 In this setting, although managers can communicate privately with lenders, financial 
statements are considered the single most used source of information in the lending decision 
(Agarwal and Hauswald 2010; Donelson et al. 2017). Additionally, Ball (2013) argues that 
financial statements are important as they serve as a verifying mechanism enhancing the 
credibility of managers’ private information disclosure.  
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 Further, investigating private firms comes with an unintended yet beneficial benefit in the 
sense that private firms are economically dominant in most countries
5
, and yet little is known 
about private firms’ financial reporting (Hope 2015; Chen et al. 2011).  
 
3.2 Danish setting 
 I extract financial statement data for a comprehensive sample of Danish limited liability 
firms. I use a one-country sample to avoid cross-country performance variation in discretionary 
accrual models (see Peek et al. 2013), and to fix the institutional and regulatory setting for all 
sample firms. Using Danish firms comes with the following data benefits: (1) As in most of the 
European Union Danish firms are mandated to publish their financial reports, and therefore 
financial statement data are available. (2) Data for estimating discretionary accruals are 
available through the EXPERIAN database. These detailed data are (practically) not available 
from the ORBIS database used extensively by other accounting research papers on private firms 
(Bernard 2016; Gassen and Fülbier 2015)
6
. (3) Firm coverage is high, because regulation has 
required since 1930 all limited liability firms to file financial statements with the relevant 
authority. The Danish Business Authority, who is currently responsible for companies’ financial 
reporting, made the reports available for outsiders in 1998. Further, the requirement is strongly 
enforced (unlike for example Germany (Bernard 2016)), as non-reporting causes enforced 
closure by the Danish Business Authority
7
. (4) Bankruptcy data covering all limited liability 
firms are readily available covering many years back in time.  
 
3.3 Sample 
 The final dataset is comprised of three separate datasets that are merged via unique firm 
identifiers. Firm financials are obtained from the ORBIS database. Complementary financial 
information on current accounts (allowing me to generate accruals) and report publication dates 
                                                 
5
 For example, in the OECD area SMEs (primarily private) constitute ~99% of all firms, representing 60% of 
employment and 50-60% of value added (OECD 2017).  
6
 For example, Burgstahler et al. (2006) who use the AMADEUS database to generate accruals (similar database to 
ORBIS, but covers only European firms). They use (Δtotal current liabilities - Δshort-term debt) when calculating 
working capital accruals from the liability side and assume that short-term debt equals zero if information on this 
variable is not available. In my dataset, drawn from the same source, this variable is missing for more than 99 
percent of all observations.  
7
 See https://erhvervsstyrelsen.dk/frister-forsinkelser-og-afgifter 
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(allowing me to observe the last report preceding bankruptcy filing) are obtained from 
EXPERIAN. Bankruptcy filings along with filing dates are hand collected from konkurs.dk
8
.  
 I merge the datasets and apply several screens in the identification of the final sample: I 
exclude (i) firms with total assets lower than DKK 10m (EUR 1.3m) to ensure that all financial 
statements are audited
9
, (ii) firms with total assets higher than DKK 323m
10
 (EUR 43m) to 
conform to the European Commission’s SME definition, (iii) publicly listed firms, (iv) financial 
reports not covering 12 months, (v) certain industries (financial, utilities, and state-owned) 
consistent with prior research, (vi) subsidiaries for which the parent company is identified in the 
dataset, and report on consolidated basis (to avoid double counting), (vii) observations with 
insufficient information to estimate Eq. (1) and Eq. (2). The sample selection procedure is listed 
in Table A.1. I note that the number of observations used for testing predictive power of 
discretionary accruals and other earnings components is lower than listed in the sample 
characteristics. This is because observations for year t+1 are not available for all year t 
observations. However, I cannot limit the sample to include only those observations where both 
year t and year t+1 observations are available, as all bankrupt firm-year observations would be 
excluded from the sample disabling me to estimating the probability of default model. All 
financial ratios are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile to accommodate for outliers.  
 The final sample covers 31,265 firms, representing 165,673 firm-years for the period 2003-
2015. The average annual bankruptcy rate in the sample equals 1.10 percent.  
 
3.4 Discretionary accruals estimation 
 I use discretionary accruals as a measure of discretion exercised in financial reporting. Larson 
et al. (2018) argue that barring some compelling reason to focus on working capital accruals 
alone, researchers should focus on comprehensive operating accruals, and therefore I use  
 
                                                 
8
 All Danish bankruptcies are made publicly available by the Danish Official Gazette (statstidende.dk). Konkurs.dk 
draws information from this information source. Data from konkurs.dk is cross-checked with data from Statistics 
Denmark. Konkurs.dk provides bankruptcy data on firm level, and Statistics Denmark provides summarized 
monthly bankruptcy data for the full economy. 
9
 The auditing exemption requirements are as follows: For two consecutive years the company cannot exceed two 
of the following three thresholds: (1) Total assets of DKK 4m, (2) operating revenue of DKK 8m, and (3) number 
of full time equivalent employees of 12. However, revenue and employee data are not available for the full sample, 
and hence I use a conservative (higher than the actual threshold) total asset restriction criteria. 
Formerly, the thresholds were even lower. The thresholds were increased in 2006, 2011, and 2013, respectively. 
10
 An international definition of SMEs does not exist. I use total asset constraint to define my SME sample, and use 
the thresholds set forward by the European Commission. DKK 323m approximately equals EUR 43m. I use a 
DKK/EUR rate of 7.5.  
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Table A.1: Sample identification 
Note Screen applied Observations 
dropped 
Sample size Decrease in 
sample size, 
% 
1 All firm-year observations, fiscal years 2003-2015  2,635,218  
 Keep financial reports with 12 months 106,237 2,528,981 4% 
 Remove observations with missing data on total assets 192,364 2,336,617 8% 
2 Keep firm-years with ta≥10m & ta≤323m 1,859,598 477,019 80% 
 Remove observations with missing data on net income 10 477,009 0% 
3 Remove certain industries 179,468 297,541 38% 
4 Remove subsidiaries 12,460 285,081 4% 
 Remove listed firms 436 284,645 0% 
  Keep observations with data available for estimation 118,972 165,673 42% 
This table shows the sample selection procedure. Notes: (1): The period 2003-2016 are the years for which bankruptcy data are available, and to 
allow one year’s lag between the fiscal year end and the bankruptcy filing, I restrict the period to include 2003-2015. (2) The lower cap aims to 
assure that all financial statements are audited, and the upper cap conforms to the SME definition of the European Commission. I note that the 
total asset criterion is only one of three to define a company as an SME, but – similar to the audit requirement discussion stated above – revenue 
and employee data are not available for all observations. (3): Consistent with prior accounting and finance research I exclude certain regulated 
industries (financials and utilities), and further exclude state-owned companies. (4) To avoid double counting I exclude subsidiaries. 
 
comprehensive operating accruals as my measure for accruals. In robustness tests I estimate 
discretionary working capital accruals, and results remain unchanged.  
 Inspired by Collins et al. (2017) I model normal and discretionary accruals as a non-linear 
function of growth and current profitability, and a linear function of lagged accruals and size. 
Further, I complement the model with current and lagged cash flows, because Allen et al. (2013) 
show that the component of normal accruals predicted by cash flows
11
 is the most persistent 
component of accruals, indicating that controlling for cash flows is important when dividing 
accruals into normal accruals and discretionary accruals. I do not include leaded cash flows in 
the model, because this would induce a mechanical bias between modelled accruals and future 
profitability/cash flows (Allen et al. 2013). If future cash flows are already controlled for when 
estimating discretionary accruals, discretionary accruals cannot contain information value about 
future cash flows. Because future cash flows are correlated with future profitability, a similar 
argument can be raised regarding future profitability. 
 I estimate Eq. (1) for each industry-year, classify growth and profitability measures into 
quintiles by industry-year (Collins et al. 2017), and require at least 30 observations per industry-
year. Discretionary accruals (DACC, hereinafter) are the residuals from estimating Eq. (1).   
                                                 
11
 In Table 5 of Allen et al., they term this component “MDDMATCH” and find that it to a very high extend maps 
into future earnings.  
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𝑂𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼1
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
+ ∑ 𝑅𝑂𝐴_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
5
𝑘 + ∑ ∆𝐺𝑃_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
5
𝑘   
+𝛽1𝑂𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
(1) 
Where OPACC is comprehensive operating accruals estimated using the balance sheet 
approach
12
 scaled by lagged assets, ROA is net income scaled by lagged assets, ΔGP is the 
change in gross profit scaled by lagged assets, and OPCF is comprehensive operating cash flows 
scaled by lagged assets, for firm i in year t. ROA_IND is an indicator variable that takes the 
value one if ROA in the industry-year belongs to the kth quintile, and zero otherwise. A similar 
procedure is used to define ΔGP_IND (see Collins et al. 2017). For completeness, in Table A.2 I 
report the regression coefficients using a pooled regression, where quintile indicators are 
generated per industry-year. 
 Data availability is constrained by exemption rules, as disclosure of revenue and cash flow 
statements is voluntary for most firms in the sample. Therefore I use gross profit growth as 
proxy for economic activity when estimating discretionary accruals. In untabulated analysis I 
estimate discretionary accruals for the 134,693 (28,089) firm-years with employee (revenue) 
data available, and find a high correlation of 0.93 (0.80) between the discretionary accruals 
estimated with gross profit growth and employee growth (revenue growth) respectively. In 
robustness tests I repeat all analyses using revenue growth and employee growth, respectively, 
for the subsamples in which the data are available.  
 
3.5 Financially distressed firms 
 I estimate a probability of default model to estimate the level of financial distress. I use 
Beaver et al.’s (2005) bankruptcy prediction model with certain modifications, and re-estimate 
the model coefficients. I adjust ROA for discretionary accruals to capture pre-managed earnings, 
add a measure of size (logarithm of total assets), and add a measure of current assets to current 
liabilities. Financial distress is estimated as the predicted values of Eq. (2).  
𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑂𝐴 − 𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶) 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +𝛽5 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝐴)𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
(2) 
   
                                                 
12
 I recognize the limitations by estimating accruals from the balance sheet approach, such as errors due to M&A 
activity or discontinuation of operations (Hribar and Collins 2002). However, the winsorizing procedure applied 
mitigates such concerns.  
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Table A.2: Discretionary accruals and probability of default estimation models 
 
Discretionary accrual model 
  
Probability of default model 
 (1)   (2) (3) 
 OPACC   BANKR 
(regression 
coefficients) 
BANKR 
(marginal effects) 
1/TA 6.5920
**
  ROA-DACC -4.215
***
 -0.043
***
 
 (2.14)   (-9.55) (-9.56) 
   TLTA 2.771
***
 0.028
***
 
ROA_IND    (33.25) (33.87) 
   2 0.0827
***
  EBITDATL -1.155
***
 -0.012
***
 
 (16.74)   (-6.15) (-6.18) 
   3 0.1053
***
  Log(TA) -0.201
***
 -0.002
***
 
 (18.10)   (-5.43) (-5.50) 
   4 0.1375
***
  CACL -0.086
***
 -0.001
***
 
 (20.91)   (-2.88) (-2.90) 
   5 0.2520
***
     
 (27.19)     
ΔGP_IND      
   2 0.0212
***
     
 (18.25)     
   3 0.0210
***
     
 (17.47)     
   4 0.0255
***
     
 (27.06)     
   5 0.0550
***
     
 (37.37)     
OPACCt-1 0.1992
***
     
 (23.91)     
OPCFt-1 0.2250
***
     
 (25.89)     
OPCF -0.8818
***
     
 (-269.49)     
Intercept -0.1230
***
   -5.225
***
  
 (-16.05)   (-10.82)  
Industry FE YES   YES  
Year FE YES   YES  
N 165,673   165,673 165,673 
Adjust R. sq. 0.8478     
Pseudo R sq.    0.179 0.179 
AUROC    0.866 0.866 
Column (1) of this table shows the pooled regression of Eq (1). ROA_IND and ΔGP_IND are quintiles generated per industry-year. ROA_IND=1 
and GP_IND=1 are captured in the intercept. I point out that this regression table is reported only for completeness; DACC is estimated as the 
residuals from Eq. (1) estimated by industry-year. Column (2) shows the coefficients from the logistic regression of Eq. (2) used to estimate the 
probability of default. Column (3) shows the marginal effects of this regression at mean.  
Continuous variables are winsorized at the lower and upper 1% level. Variable definitions are listed in appendix. Standard errors are clustered by 
firm and year (Gow et al. 2010). t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * Represent significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively. 
 
Where BANKR is an indicator variable that takes the value one for the last firm-year observation 
preceding the bankruptcy filing, and zero otherwise, TLTA is total liabilities to total assets, 
EBITDATL is EBITDA to total liabilities, CACL is current assets to current liabilities, Log(TA) is 
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the logarithm of total assets, and INDUSTRY and YEAR are industry and year fixed effects. All 
variable definitions are listed in appendix. 
 I estimate Eq. (2) using logistic regression and cluster standard errors by firm and year. The 
coefficient estimates are displayed in Table A.2. Overall, the model has a good fit with AUROC 
of 0.866, higher than reported in for example Gupta et al. (2015) who also estimate a probability 
of default model for SMEs. Further, within each year, I rank and allocate firms into 10 equally 
sized portfolios (deciles) based on the estimated probability of default, and term these portfolios 
DISTRESS_1 … DISTRESS_10. In Table A.3, I show the number of bankruptcies per portfolio. 
The model captures 53.3% (74.3%) of all bankruptcies within the highest (the two highest) 
decile(s), which is considerably higher than for example Kalak and Hudson (2016), who also 
estimate a probability of default model for SMEs. A random guess would attribute 10% (20%) 
of bankruptcy firms to the highest (the two highest) decile(s).  
 
Table A.3: Bankruptcies per DISTRESS portfolio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
BANKR 0 1 Total Percent of total 
BANKR in decile 
DISTRESS_1 16,569 5 16,574 0.28% 
DISTRESS_2 16,550 16 16,566 0.88% 
DISTRESS_3 16,547 20 16,567 1.10% 
DISTRESS_4 16,540 28 16,568 1.55% 
DISTRESS_5 16,533 33 16,566 1.82% 
DISTRESS_6 16,482 86 16,568 4.75% 
DISTRESS_7 16,456 114 16,570 6.30% 
DISTRESS_8 16,402 163 16,565 9.01% 
DISTRESS_9 16,187 381 16,568 21.05% 
DISTRESS_10 15,597 964 16,561 53.26% 
Total 163,863 1,810 165,673  
This table shows the number of bankruptcies captured within each DISTRESS portfolio, where DISTRESS portfolio denotes the within-year 
probability of default decile. Column (1) shows the number of non-bankrupt firms within each DISTRESS portfolio. Column (2) shows the 
number of bankrupt firms within each DISTRESS portfolio. Column (3) shows the total number of observations within each portfolio. Column 
(4) shows the percentage of total bankrupt firms captured within each portfolio (DISTRESS_X / total number of bankrupt firms (1,810)).  
 
3.6 Do discretionary accruals contain information for financially distressed firms? 
 To test how discretionary accrual choices of financially distressed firms contribute to 
earnings quality I test the informativeness of current accruals about future profitability and 
future cash flows. The accrual literature often considers standard persistence regressions of the 
following form:  
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
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for firm i in year t, where ROA is net income scaled by total assets, CF is a measure of cash 
flows, typically operating cash flow, or a more comprehensive cash flow measure such as free 
cash flow or comprehensive operating cash flows, and ACCRUALS is a measure of accruals, 
typically working capital accruals, or a more comprehensive accrual measure such as total 
accruals, or comprehensive operating accruals (dependent on the cash flow measure used). 
Persistence refers to the coefficient slopes in Eq. (3). Researchers investigating the information 
value of current earnings about future cash flows typically use a similar design (Li 2019; 
Atwood et al. 2010; Barth et al. 2001). Further, researchers decompose the accrual component 
into “normal” accruals and discretionary accruals (see e. g. Allen et al. 2013; Xie 2001).  
 As noted by Lewellen and Resutek (2019) and Fairfield et al. (2003) an equivalent regression 
can be estimated substituting CF with ROA on the right hand side, yielding the following 
equation:  
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (4) 
In Eq. (4) the coefficient on γ2 captures the differential persistence of accruals relative to cash 
flows (i.e. γ2 = β1-β2). Following this setup, I generate the following two equations, where I 
substitute ACCRUALS on the right hand side with DACC (the residuals from estimating Eq. (1)), 
and in Eq. (6) I further substitute ROA with OPCF on the left hand side:  
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼0 + 𝛾1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (5) 
𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (6) 
I estimate Eq. (5) and Eq. (6) separately for distressed and non-distressed firms, respectively, 
and use the Wald test to compare the DACC slopes. This setup has an appealing attribute for 
addressing the research question stated in this paper. Absent managerial estimation errors and 
manipulation earnings persistence is expected to differ across the level of financial distress, 
because financially distressed firms typically have high earnings volatility and a high fraction of 
losses – attributes that have previously been linked to lower earnings persistence (Dichev and 
Tang 2009; Frankel and Litov 2009; Basu 1997). When estimating Eq. (3) type regressions one 
would expect that both the coefficient estimates of β1 and β2 would decrease with the level of 
financial distress. With Eq. (5) and Eq. (6) I benchmark DACC against other components of 
ROA for the same firm, and thus a firm serves as a control for itself through ROA-DACC, in the 
sense that ROA-DACC captures informativeness of current earnings absent manipulation 
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(assuming that ROA-DACC represents earnings as they would be absent manipulation). The 
coefficient estimate of γ2 thus captures the informativeness of DACC after controlling for 
current profitability.  
 The predictions of the opportunism hypothesis imply that the coefficient estimate of γ2 of 
financially distressed firms is lower than γ2 of non-distressed firms, because opportunistic 
manipulation represents a confounding component of earnings that should not carry information 
value about future earnings or cash flows. The predictions of the signaling hypothesis imply the 
opposite: that the coefficient estimate of γ2 of financially distressed firms is higher than or equal 
to γ2 of non-distressed firms.  
4. RESULTS
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 Summary statistics for all sample observations are listed in Table A.4. In Table A.5 I show 
the descriptive statistics for all non-bankrupt firms across each DISTRESS portfolio. I find that 
observations in the DISTRESS_9 portfolio have income-increasing discretionary accruals of 1.3 
percentage points, while observations in the DISTRESS_10 portfolio have income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals of 0.7 percentage points. To further test whether DISTRESS is related to 
discretionary accruals, I follow Chen et al. (2018) and estimate accruals with a one-step 
procedure. The results are tabulated in Table A.6, where firms with predicted probability of 
default below the within-year median (i.e. DISTRESS_1 through DISTRESS_5) serve as base  
Table A.4: Summary statistics, all observations 
count mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
OPACC 165,673 0.032 0.239 -0.649 -0.064 0.007 0.101 1.124 
DACC 165,673 -0.000 0.063 -0.234 -0.025 -0.000 0.024 0.255 
NACC 165,673 0.032 0.211 -0.542 -0.064 0.010 0.104 0.901 
OPCF 165,673 0.025 0.261 -1.095 -0.059 0.028 0.132 0.825 
ROA 165,673 0.058 0.141 -0.416 0.001 0.036 0.104 0.636 
TLTA 165,673 0.621 0.283 0.010 0.436 0.656 0.821 1.420 
EBITDATL 165,673 0.232 0.445 -1.226 0.046 0.135 0.314 2.457 
CACL 165,673 3.176 8.523 0.017 0.884 1.289 2.043 68.334 
CASHTA 165,673 0.093 0.147 0.000 0.002 0.025 0.118 0.727 
ΔGP 165,673 0.030 0.169 -0.462 -0.027 0.006 0.067 0.832 
mTA (DKK) 165,673 42.9 50.9 10.0 14.3 22.8 46.7 323.0 
mTA (EUR) 165,673 5.7 6.8 1.3 1.9 3.0 6.2 43.1 
Age 165,673 19.0 15.6 0.0 8.0 15.0 26.0 280.0 
CostDebt 134,666 0.046 0.039 0.001 0.023 0.039 0.057 0.300 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of all observations. Continuous variables are winsorized at the lower and upper 1% level. Variable 
definitions are listed in appendix. The number of observations with CostDebt data available is smaller than the other variables, because CostDebt 
data is not used in the final sample selection procedure, and CostDebt is restricted to include observations with CostDebt ∈ ]0.00 ; 0.30].  
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levels. From these estimations, the above observations prevail, however the magnitudes change 
slightly.   
Table A.6: DISTRESS and DACC: A one-step procedure 
(1) 
OPACC 
DISTRESS_6 0.0007 
(0.74) 
DISTRESS_7 0.0033
***
 
(3.31) 
DISTRESS_8 0.0077
***
 
(4.79) 
DISTRESS_9 0.0113
***
 
(5.49) 
DISTRESS_10 -0.0162
***
(-7.68)
N 154,651 
Adjust R. sq. 0.7638 
This table estimates the influence of DISTRESS portfolios on comprehensive operating accruals in a one-step procedure (Chen et al. 2018). 
DISTRESS_1 through DISTRESS_5 are base levels and are captured by the intercept.  
Continuous variables entering the estimation are winsorized at the lower and upper 1% level. Variable definitions are listed in appendix. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Gow et al. 2010). t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * Represent significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10, respectively. 
The reported estimation table is based on the following regression, where all beta coefficients are estimated, but only DISTRESS indicator 
coefficients are reported:  
𝑂𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 = 𝛼0,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼1
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
+ ∑ 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
10
𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽2,𝑘𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
5
𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽3,𝑘
5
𝑘 ∆𝐺𝑃𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡
+𝛽5𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽5,𝑘𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑘,𝑖,𝑡𝑘 + (𝛼𝑗
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗,𝑘𝑅𝑂𝐴_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
5
𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗,𝑘
5
𝑘 ∆𝐺𝑃_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗𝑂𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡−1 +
𝛽𝑗𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1) ∗ ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑘,𝑖,𝑡𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 Albeit the results suggest mixed evidence on the direction of discretionary accruals in 
financially distressed firms, I caution the reader that the results might appear mixed because of 
the estimation model. As argued by Collins et al. (2017) their modelling approach (which is 
adopted in this paper) might “throw the baby out with the bathwater”. They use an example 
where growth firms are more prone to managing earnings, and thus controlling for growth may 
partly throw the baby out with the bathwater when testing for earnings management. Further, 
they show that their modelling approach effectively does not produce discretionary accruals 
different from zero in two extreme portfolios based on probability of default (highest and lowest 
quintile). However, not controlling for characteristics such as profitability, which is also used to 
model the probability of default will falsely classify a part of nondiscretionary accruals as 
discretionary accruals. Additionally, the objective of this paper is not to provide evidence on the 
direction of discretionary accruals choices, but rather its influence on earnings quality.  
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4.2 Do discretionary accruals contain information for financially distressed firms? 
 First, for completeness, I estimate Eq. (5) and Eq. (6) separately for each DISTRESS portfolio 
and present the results in Table A.7. In Panel A, I show the results for earnings persistence. 
Relative to current profitability, measured as net income to total assets, discretionary accruals 
are less persistent and the coefficient is rather stable for the DISTRESS_2 through DISTRESS_6 
portfolios. For the DISTRESS_7 to DISTRESS_10 portfolios, the discretionary accrual 
component seems to become stickier. A similar observation is made in Panel B, where I 
investigate the predictive ability about future cash flows. The effect is strongest for the 
DISTRESS_7 and the DISTRESS_8 portfolios. These tables are reported purely for transparency, 
and the differences are formerly tested in the following.  
 In Table A.8 I estimate Eq. (5) and Eq. (6) for the firms in the DISTRESS_10 (DISTRESS_9 
and DISTRESS_10) portfolios, relative to firms not in this portfolio (these portfolios), and use 
the Wald test to test the differences in DACC slopes. In Panel A, I consistently find that DACC 
of financially distressed firms predicts future profitability better than DACC of non-distressed 
firms. In Panel B, I find a similar result in predicting future cash flows, but only when I compare 
the DISTRESS_9 and DISTRESS_10 portfolios collectively to other portfolios. When comparing 
the DISTRESS_10 to other portfolios, the difference in DACC slopes is not significant.  
 The opportunism hypothesis predicts that financially distressed firms use their discretion 
opportunistically, and that DACC of those firms should represent an accounting distortion that 
should not represent information about future profitability or cash flows. The results are not 
consistent with the opportunism hypothesis, because in most specifications DACC of financially 
distressed firms increases earnings quality. The results are consistent with the signaling 
hypothesis, where financially distressed firms use discretionary accruals to signal private 
information on firm prospects.  
4.3 Additional tests 
4.3.1 Dividing the sample by income-increasing/income-decreasing accruals 
 To further explore the dynamics of discretionary reporting in financially distressed firms I 
divide the sample by income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary accruals, 
respectively. If firm managers opportunistically manage accruals to increase earnings, I expect 
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Table A.8: Comparison of earnings persistence and informativeness about future cash flows 
Panel A 
Eq. (5): Earnings persistence 
Sample: DISTRESS_1 
through 
DISTRESS_9 
DISTRESS_10  DISTRESS_1 
through 
DISTRESS_8 
DISTRESS_9 and 
DISTRESS_10 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 ROAt+1 ROAt+1  ROAt+1 ROAt+1 
ROA 0.585
***
 0.483
***
  0.580
***
 0.497
***
 
 (28.04) (13.21)  (27.43) (17.74) 
DACC -0.204
***
 0.016  -0.205
***
 -0.016 
 (-18.54) (0.42)  (-16.96) (-0.59) 
Intercept 0.010
**
 0.048
***
  0.010
**
 0.025
***
 
 (2.02) (5.18)  (2.03) (3.11) 
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
N 111,336 9,104  100,370 20,070 
Adjust. R sq. 0.371 0.191  0.365 0.207 
 
Wald test of difference between DACC coefficient estimates 
 H0: DACC(2)-DACC(1)=0  H0: DACC(4)-DACC(3)=0 
Chi
2
 44.766
***
  66.890
***
 
p-value 0.000  0.000 
 
Panel B 
Eq. (6): Informativeness about future cash flows 
Sample: DISTRESS_1 
through 
DISTRESS_9 
DISTRESS_10  DISTRESS_1 
through 
DISTRESS_8 
DISTRESS_9 and 
DISTRESS_10 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 OPCFt+1 OPCFt+1  OPCFt+1 OPCFt+1 
ROA 0.443
***
 0.568
***
  0.438
***
 0.519
***
 
 (22.80) (11.18)  (22.60) (21.91) 
DACC 0.075
***
 0.164
**
  0.064
***
 0.209
***
 
 (5.40) (2.50)  (4.72) (4.20) 
Intercept -0.030
***
 0.040  -0.029
***
 -0.009 
 (-4.83) (1.13)  (-4.50) (-0.46) 
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
N 111,336 9,104  100,370 20,070 
Adjust. R sq. 0.082 0.094  0.083 0.082 
 
Wald test of difference between DACC coefficient estimates 
 H0: DACC(2)-DACC(1)=0  H0: DACC(4)-DACC(3)=0 
Chi
2
  2.039  10.558
***
 
p-value 0.153  0.001 
This table shows the difference in DACC coefficient estimates between distressed firms and non-distressed firms. Bankrupt firms are excluded. 
Industry and year fixed effects are estimated but not reported. Continuous variables entering the estimations are winsorized at the lower and 
upper 1% level. Variable definitions are listed in appendix. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Gow et al. 2010). t statistics in 
parentheses. ***, **, * Represent significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively. 
 
that income-increasing discretionary accruals of financially distressed firms to a lower extent 
map into future profitability and cash flows. In contrast, if firm managers use discretionary 
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accruals to increase earnings and signal good firm prospects, I expect that income-increasing 
discretionary accruals map into future profitability to a high extent.  
 In Table A.9 I show the results of the earnings persistence regressions (Eq. (5)). In Panel A I 
report the results when discretionary accruals are income-increasing, and find that income-
increasing discretionary accruals of financially distressed firms are more persistent than those of 
non-distressed firms. In Panel B I report the results when discretionary accruals are income-
decreasing, and find that the persistence of discretionary accruals is not different for financially 
distressed firms relative to non-distressed firms.  
 In Table A.10 I tabulate the results regarding future cash flows (Eq. (6)). Panel A reports the 
results when discretionary accruals are income-increasing, and provide similar insights as the 
earnings persistence regressions: income-increasing discretionary accruals of financially 
distressed firms are more informative about future cash flows than those of non-distressed firms. 
In Panel B I report the results for the sample where discretionary accruals are negative. When 
comparing the DISTRESS_10 portfolio to other portfolios, I observe no significant difference in 
the DACC slope. However, when I pool the DISTRESS_10 and DISTRESS_9 observations, and 
benchmark them against other portfolios, I find that the DACC slope is significantly higher.   
 Collectively, these tests provide consistent evidence that the effect observed in the main 
analysis is mainly driven by income-increasing discretionary accruals. This finding is highly 
inconsistent with the opportunism hypothesis, which predicts the exact opposite. However, this 
finding lends strong support to the signaling hypothesis, where financially distressed firms with 
good firm prospects use discretionary accruals to signal this information.  
 
4.3.2 How do lenders price discretionary accruals?  
 In the following, I explore how lenders use discretionary accruals in the determination of an 
important aspect of a lending contract: the cost of debt, measured here as the interest expense 
scaled by debt. Conventional research on accounting quality and the cost of debt generally finds 
that lenders price protect their investment against borrower firms’ discretionary accounting 
choices (Bharath et al. 2008; Francis et al. 2005; Vander Bauwhede et al. 2015)
13
. If lenders  
 
                                                 
13
 I note however that the results obtained here are not directly comparable to Bharath et al. (2008), Francis et al. 
(2005), and Vander Bauwhede et al. (2015), because I use signed abnormal accruals, whereas Bharath et al (2008) 
and  Bauwhede et al. (2015) use unsigned abnormal accruals, and Francis et al. (2005) use the standard deviation of 
abnormal accruals. 
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Table A.9: Comparison of earnings persistence, per income-increasing/income-decreasing DACC 
Panel A 
Eq. (5): Earnings persistence. Income-increasing DACC (DACC>=0) 
Sample: DISTRESS_1 
through 
DISTRESS_9 
DISTRESS_10  DISTRESS_1 
through 
DISTRESS_8 
DISTRESS_9 and 
DISTRESS_10 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 ROAt+1 ROAt+1  ROAt+1 ROAt+1 
ROA 0.619
***
 0.404
***
  0.628
***
 0.426
***
 
 (29.21) (13.28)  (29.53) (18.05) 
DACC -0.349
***
 0.007  -0.386
***
 -0.027 
 (-7.43) (0.11)  (-7.52) (-0.61) 
Intercept 0.013
***
 0.015
*
  0.012
***
 0.012
**
 
 (2.78) (1.74)  (2.92) (2.17) 
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
N 54,240 5,411  47,233 12,418 
Adjust. R sq. 0.414 0.091  0.416 0.112 
 
Wald test of difference between DACC coefficient estimates 
 H0: DACC(2)-DACC(1)=0  H0: DACC(4)-DACC(3)=0 
Chi
2
 46.641
***
  87.939
***
 
p-value 0.000  0.000 
 
Panel B 
Eq. (5): Earnings persistence. Income-decreasing DACC (DACC<0) 
Sample: DISTRESS_1 
through 
DISTRESS_9 
DISTRESS_10  DISTRESS_1 
through 
DISTRESS_8 
DISTRESS_9 and 
DISTRESS_10 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 ROAt+1 ROAt+1  ROAt+1 ROAt+1 
ROA 0.577
***
 0.611
***
  0.567
***
 0.567
***
 
 (17.83) (11.27)  (15.99) (16.42) 
DACC -0.135
**
 -0.148
*
  -0.138
**
 -0.115
*
 
 (-2.19) (-1.77)  (-2.12) (-1.87) 
Intercept 0.013
***
 0.094
***
  0.013
***
 0.046
***
 
 (3.34) (4.37)  (3.43) (2.94) 
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
N 57,096 3,693  53,137 7,652 
Adjust. R sq. 0.321 0.208  0.309 0.257 
 
Wald test of difference between DACC coefficient estimates 
 H0: DACC(2)-DACC(1)=0  H0: DACC(4)-DACC(3)=0 
Chi
2
  0.027  0.144 
p-value 0.869  0.705 
This table shows the difference in DACC coefficient estimates between distressed firms and non-distressed firms, contingent on DACC being 
positive (Panel A) or negative (Panel B). Bankrupt firms are excluded. Industry and year fixed effects are estimated but not reported. Continuous 
variables entering the estimations are winsorized at the lower and upper 1% level. Variable definitions are listed in appendix. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm and year (Gow et al. 2010). t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * Represent significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, 
respectively. 
 
view the discretionary accrual component of earnings as an accounting distortion, controlling  
for current ROA I expect a positive relation between discretionary accruals and cost of debt, 
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Table A.10: Comparison of informativeness about future cash flows, per income-increasing/income-decreasing DACC 
Panel A 
Eq. (6): Informativeness about future cash flows. Income-increasing DACC (DACC>=0) 
Sample: DISTRESS_1 
through 
DISTRESS_9 
DISTRESS_10  DISTRESS_1 
through 
DISTRESS_8 
DISTRESS_9 and 
DISTRESS_10 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 OPCFt+1 OPCFt+1  OPCFt+1 OPCFt+1 
ROA 0.481
***
 0.511
***
  0.490
***
 0.500
***
 
 (22.36) (6.30)  (22.91) (9.95) 
DACC -0.167
***
 0.048  -0.193
***
 0.018 
 (-6.04) (0.49)  (-5.48) (0.21) 
Intercept -0.024
***
 0.042  -0.024
***
 0.005 
 (-3.67) (1.31)  (-3.51) (0.24) 
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
N 54,240 5,411  47,233 12,418 
Adjust. R sq. 0.103 0.037  0.110 0.036 
 
Wald test of difference between DACC coefficient estimates 
 H0: DACC(2)-DACC(1)=0  H0: DACC(4)-DACC(3)=0 
Chi
2
 4.082
**
  6.845
***
 
p-value 0.043  0.009 
 
Panel B 
Eq. (6): Informativeness about future cash flows. Income-decreasing DACC (DACC<0) 
Sample: DISTRESS_1 
through 
DISTRESS_9 
DISTRESS_10  DISTRESS_1 
through 
DISTRESS_8 
DISTRESS_9 and 
DISTRESS_10 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 OPCFt+1 OPCFt+1  OPCFt+1 OPCFt+1 
ROA 0.465
***
 0.523
***
  0.452
***
 0.374
***
 
 (18.29) (5.14)  (14.93) (7.04) 
DACC 0.221
***
 0.301
**
  0.188
***
 0.510
***
 
 (4.18) (2.06)  (3.45) (4.28) 
Intercept -0.025
***
 0.044  -0.024
***
 -0.021 
 (-3.67) (0.85)  (-3.44) (-0.65) 
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
N 57,096 3,693  53,137 7,652 
Adjust. R sq. 0.063 0.111  0.058 0.116 
 
Wald test of difference between DACC coefficient estimates 
 H0: DACC(2)-DACC(1)=0  H0: DACC(4)-DACC(3)=0 
Chi
2
  0.278  7.878
***
 
p-value 0.598  0.005 
This table shows the difference in DACC coefficient estimates between distressed firms and non-distressed firms, contingent being positive 
(Panel A) or negative (Panel B). Bankrupt firms are excluded. Industry and year fixed effects are estimated but not reported. Continuous 
variables entering the estimations are winsorized at the lower and upper 1% level. Variable definitions are listed in appendix. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm and year (Gow et al. 2010). t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * Represent significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, 
respectively. 
 
because lenders price protect themselves against the borrowing firm’s discretion exercised. In 
contrast, if financially distressed firms use discretionary accruals to signal private information 
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and lenders are able to unravel the information content of the signal, I expect discretionary 
accruals of financially distressed firms to be more negatively related to the cost of debt, relative 
to non-distressed firms. That is, I expect lenders to price the discretionary accrual component of 
earnings to a higher extent.  
 To investigate this, I re-estimate Eq. (5) substituting ROA with cost of debt (CostDebt)
14
 on 
the left-hand side. Further, I add to the right hand side controls for negative income (NEGROA), 
total liabilities to total assets (TLTA), size (Log(TA)), the standard deviation of ROA (StdROA), 
asset composition, measured as tangible fixed assets to total assets (PPE), and cash to total 
assets (CashTA). I report the regression results in Table A.11. For the non-distressed firms 
(column 1 and 3) I find that signed DACC is associated with increased cost of debt, consistent 
with the notion that lenders price protect their investment against borrowers’ accounting 
discretion. However, for financially distressed firms this relation reverses. In column 2 and 4 I 
find that DACC of financially distressed firms is negatively associated with future cost of debt. 
The Wald test shows that the difference in coefficient estimates between non-distressed and 
distressed firms is highly significant. The results suggest that lenders view discretionary accrual 
choices of financially distressed firms as informative about firm prospects, and lend further 
support for the signaling hypothesis.  
 
4.3.3 Are discretionary accruals really discretionary?  
 One general concern about discretionary accruals is the extent to which the estimation is 
successful in dividing accruals into innate (or “normal”) accruals and discretionary (or 
“abnormal”) accruals (Ball 2013; Basu 2013; Jackson 2018). This leads to a concern that 
discretionary accruals capture a portion of normal accruals, and hence the results I obtain are not 
driven by firms’ discretionary accrual choices. If the estimate of discretionary accruals truly 
captures the discretionary component of accruals and this component of earnings is the driver of 
the results, I would expect only the slope on discretionary accruals – and not the slope on 
normal accruals – to increase for financially distressed firms. To address this concern, I re-
estimate Eq. (5) and Eq. (6) and add to the right side of the equations normal accruals (NACC), 
i.e. the predicted values from estimating Eq. (1).  
 
                                                 
14
 I approximate interest bearing debt as total liabilities net of trade payables because interest bearing debt is rarely 
specified in the data. The cost of debt is calculated as financial expenses divided by interest bearing debt. CostDebt 
is defined in appendix. 
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Table A.11: Lenders' response to discretionary accruals 
Eq. (5) where CostDebt replaces ROA on the left-hand side, and with additional CostDebt related controls 
Sample: DISTRESS_1 
through 
DISTRESS_9 
DISTRESS_10  DISTRESS_1 
through 
DISTRESS_8 
DISTRESS_9 and 
DISTRESS_10 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 CostDebtt+1 CostDebtt+1  CostDebtt+1 CostDebtt+1 
ROA -0.022
***
 -0.010  -0.021
***
 -0.013
*
 
 (-7.93) (-1.35)  (-7.39) (-1.78) 
DACC 0.023
***
 -0.026
***
  0.023
***
 -0.020
**
 
 (6.00) (-4.12)  (5.69) (-2.48) 
NegROA 0.005
***
 0.001  0.005
***
 0.001 
 (6.27) (0.75)  (5.79) (1.41) 
TLTA -0.006
***
 -0.004  -0.008
***
 -0.002 
 (-3.37) (-1.38)  (-4.38) (-0.83) 
Log(TA) -0.001
***
 -0.002
**
  -0.001
**
 -0.001
***
 
 (-3.33) (-2.42)  (-2.46) (-2.86) 
StdROA 0.015
***
 0.004  0.016
***
 0.003 
 (5.50) (1.50)  (5.10) (1.25) 
PPE -0.008
***
 0.002  -0.009
***
 0.001 
 (-4.68) (0.98)  (-4.95) (0.49) 
CashTA -0.018
***
 -0.035
***
  -0.017
***
 -0.034
***
 
 (-8.99) (-6.49)  (-8.89) (-7.30) 
Intercept 0.069
***
 0.069
***
  0.068
***
 0.070
***
 
 (17.94) (8.12)  (17.07) (9.19) 
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
N 87,455 7,760  78,207 17,008 
Adjust. R sq. 0.054 0.057  0.054 0.061 
 
Wald test of difference between DACC coefficient estimates 
 H0: DACC(2)-DACC(1)=0  H0: DACC(4)-DACC(3)=0 
Chi
2
 33.689
***
  39.248
***
 
p-value 0.000  0.000 
This table shows how lenders use DACC when setting prices. Bankrupt firms are excluded. Industry and year fixed effects are estimated but not 
reported. Continuous variables entering the estimations are winsorized at the lower and upper 1% level. Variable definitions are listed in 
appendix. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Gow et al. 2010). t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * Represent significance levels at 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively. 
 
 I report the results in Table A.12. In Panel A, I show the results of estimating earnings 
persistence regressions (Eq. (5)), and find that DACC of financially distressed firms predicts 
future profitability better than DACC of non-distressed firms, consistent with the main analysis. 
I find no significant difference in the NACC slopes comparing financially distressed firms with 
non-distressed firms. In Panel B, I show the results of estimating the informativeness of current 
earnings components about future cash flows. When comparing the most financially distressed 
firms in the DISTRESS_10 portfolio to firms not in this portfolio (column 1 and 2) I do not find 
a significant difference in the DACC slopes, consistent with the main analysis. However, when 
comparing the firms in the DISTRESS_10 and DISTRESS_9 portfolios to firms not in these  
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Table A.12: Comparison of DACC and NACC coefficient estimates between distressed and non-distressed firms 
Panel A 
Eq. (5) with NACC added on the right hand-side 
Sample: DISTRESS_1 
through 
DISTRESS_9 
DISTRESS_10  DISTRESS_1 
through 
DISTRESS_8 
DISTRESS_9 and 
DISTRESS_10 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 ROAt+1 ROAt+1  ROAt+1 ROAt+1 
ROA 0.586
***
 0.465
***
  0.581
***
 0.487
***
 
 (28.17) (11.75)  (27.60) (17.37) 
DACC -0.200
***
 0.033  -0.202
***
 -0.004 
 (-17.86) (0.80)  (-16.30) (-0.16) 
NACC -0.018
***
 -0.019
**
  -0.019
***
 -0.016
***
 
 (-7.09) (-2.55)  (-6.63) (-3.84) 
Intercept 0.011
**
 0.049
***
  0.011
**
 0.026
***
 
 (2.27) (5.08)  (2.31) (3.19) 
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
N 111,336 9,104  100,370 20,070 
Adjust. R sq. 0.371 0.191  0.366 0.208 
 
Wald test of difference between DACC coefficient estimates 
 H0: DACC(2)-DACC(1)=0  H0: DACC(4)-DACC(3)=0 
Chi
2
 46.844*
**
  71.255
***
 
p-value 0.000  0.000 
 
Wald test of difference between NACC coefficient estimates 
  
 H0: NACC(2)-NACC(1)=0  H0: NACC(4)-NACC(3)=0 
Chi
2
 0.001  0.496 
p-value 0.975  0.481 
 
Panel B 
Eq. (6) with NACC added on the right hand-side 
Sample: DISTRESS_1 
through 
DISTRESS_9 
DISTRESS_10  DISTRESS_1 
through 
DISTRESS_8 
DISTRESS_9 and 
DISTRESS_10 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 OPCFt+1 OPCF+1  OPCFt+1 OPCFt+1 
ROA 0.440
***
 0.593
***
  0.435
***
 0.540
***
 
 (21.88) (11.29)  (21.79) (20.05) 
DACC 0.066
***
 0.140
**
  0.058
***
 0.184
***
 
 (4.93) (2.55)  (4.49) (4.02) 
NACC 0.049
***
 0.026  0.048
***
 0.036
*
 
 (3.29) (0.89)  (3.31) (1.74) 
Intercept -0.032
***
 0.040  -0.031
***
 -0.010 
 (-5.44) (1.12)  (-5.10) (-0.50) 
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
N 111,336 9,104  100,370 20,070 
Adjust. R sq. 0.084 0.094  0.085 0.083 
 
Wald test of difference between DACC coefficient estimates 
 H0: DACC(2)-DACC(1)=0  H0: DACC(4)-DACC(3)=0 
Chi
2
  1.358  7.877
***
 
p-value 0.244  0.005 
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Wald test of difference between NACC coefficient estimates 
 H0: NACC(2)-NACC(1)=0  H0: NACC(4)-NACC(3)=0 
Chi
2
  2.360  1.392 
p-value 0.124  0.238 
This table shows the difference in DACC and NACC coefficient estimates between distressed firms and non-distressed firms. Bankrupt firms are 
excluded. Industry and year fixed effects are estimated but not reported. Continuous variables entering the estimations are winsorized at the 
lower and upper 1% level. Variable definitions are listed in appendix. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Gow et al. 2010). t 
statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * Represent significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively. 
 
portfolios (column 3 and 4), I find that DACC is more informative for financially distressed 
firms. As with the earnings persistence regressions, I find no difference in the predictive ability 
of NACC. Collectively, prior results are not driven by normal accruals (i.e. the slope on NACC) 
alleviating a potential concern that DACC captures differences in the informativeness of normal 
accruals.  
 
4.3.4 Alternative accrual and growth proxies 
 In untabulated tests, I re-estimate discretionary accruals (Eq. (1)) substituting comprehensive 
accruals (OPACC) with working capital accruals (WCACC) and substituting comprehensive 
operating cash flows (OPCF) with cash flows from operations (OCF). Further, I use these 
estimates of discretionary accruals to re-estimate the probability of default model (Eq. (2)), 
earnings persistence regressions (Eq. (5)), and informativeness about future cash flow 
regressions (Eq. (6)). In these regressions, prior conclusions remain unchanged. I consistently 
find that discretionary accruals contain more information about future profitability and future 
cash flows for financially distressed firms, than for non-distressed firms
15
.  
 Further, in untabulated tests, I re-estimate discretionary accruals (Eq. (1)) substituting gross 
profit growth with employee growth and revenue growth, respectively, and use these estimates 
of discretionary accruals to re-estimate the probability of default model (Eq. (2)), earnings 
persistence regressions (Eq. (5)), and informativeness about future cash flow regressions (Eq. 
(6)). When I use employee growth instead of gross profit growth, I obtain similar results as the 
main analysis, i.e. discretionary accruals contain more information about future profitability and 
future cash flows for financially distressed firms, than for non-distressed firms
16
. When I use 
                                                 
15
 As with the main analysis, when I compare the slope on DACC of the DISTRESS_10 firms to other firms, the 
difference in DACC persistence is not significant. 
16
 In these estimations, when I compare the slope on DACC of the DISTRESS_10 firms to other firms, the 
difference in DACC is marginally significant with a p-value of 5.1%. This result is different than the main analysis, 
and provides stronger evidence for the signaling hypothesis. 
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revenue growth instead of gross profit growth, I find that DACC of financially distressed firms 
is more informative about future profitability, but do not find any significant difference in 
DACC slopes about future cash flows. The lack of results about future cash flows is likely 
driven by a much smaller sample size: Because revenue data are not available for the vast 
majority of the observations the sample size decreases by 78%. However, the results are still 
inconsistent with the opportunism hypothesis, because DACC does not contain less information 
about future cash flows for financially distressed firms relative to non-distressed firms. 
 On balance, I interpret these robustness tests as evidence showing that any prior conclusions 
are not driven by the choice of accruals (comprehensive operating accruals) or choice of growth 
proxy (growth in gross profit).  
 
4.3.5 Within firm comparison 
 To address a potential concern that financially distressed firms are inherently different from 
non-distressed firms, I re-estimate Eq. (5) and Eq. (6), where I restrict the sample to include 
only firms that (1) at one point in time was defined as financially distressed and (2) at one point 
in time was defined as non-distressed. With this approach, I can compare the informativeness of 
discretionary accruals of the same firm, at different levels of financial distress. In Table A.14 
(appendix) I show the regression result. I consistently find that DACC of those firms are more 
informative about future profitability when they are financially distressed, relative to when the 
same firms are non-distressed. I find no significant difference in the DACC slope when 
predicting future cash flows.  
 
5.  CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 This paper investigates financially distressed firms’ use of discretionary accrual choices and 
its implications on earnings quality. The motivation for this study relies on the notion that 
understanding the properties and information value of accruals is arguably one of the most 
important objectives of accounting research (Richardson et al. 2006), and that prior research has 
simply provided evidence on the direction of accounting choices in financially distressed firms, 
however has not tested the implications for earnings quality. In this paper, I find that 
discretionary accruals of financially distressed firms contain high information value about future 
profitability and future cash flows, relative to non-distressed firms. The results are driven by 
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income-increasing discretionary accruals, and lenders seem to value the information of 
discretionary accruals more when firms are financially distressed. On balance, I interpret the 
evidence as consistent with a signaling hypothesis, where financially distressed firms use 
discretionary accruals to signal their superior private information to firm stakeholders and 
thereby alleviate information asymmetries.   
 Despite the consistency of the results across various robustness tests, I caution the reader to 
interpret the findings with care. The results depend on my ability to distinguish accruals arising 
due to managerial discretion from innate accruals. However, (1) Collins et al. (2017) argue and 
provide empirical evidence that estimating accruals as a piecewise linear function of growth and 
profitability is a simple and efficient way to control for non-linear effects that ameliorates the 
misspecification problems raised in prior literature (see e.g. Ball 2013), and (2) I show that the 
results are driven by discretionary accruals, whereas the slope on normal accruals does not differ 
across financially distressed and non-distressed firms, respectively. Further, the results depend 
on my ability to identify financially distressed firms. However, the fit statistics discussed in 
section 3 suggest that the bankruptcy prediction model has a good fit, also compared to other 
bankruptcy prediction models developed earlier on a comparable dataset.  
 This paper does not examine if financially distressed firms substitute accrual earnings 
management with real earnings management, as suggested by recent research (Anagnostopoulou 
and Tsekrekos 2017; Campa and Camacho-Miñano 2015). Aside from the fact that the data 
required for estimating common real earnings management measures are not available, I find it 
dubious that cost-decreasing real transactions (for example “abnormally low” discretionary 
expenses – which are expenses not explained by revenue level or revenue changes) are due to 
opportunistic motivations in financially distressed firms. Such behavior may just as well reflect 
management’s objective to cutting costs and survive.  
 In the light of the limitations mentioned above, the contributions of this paper are threefold. 
Prior research extensively examines the relation between financial distress proxies and proxies 
for discretionary accounting choices, and makes conclusions based on the directional 
relationship observed. However, without formally testing the implications of such accounting 
choices on accounting quality, such interpretations seem premature. The results of this paper 
thus shed light on financially distressed firm managers’ underlying motivation for adjusting 
reported earnings, and suggest that accounting flexibility is used to signal private information, 
rather than hiding poor performance.  
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 Beyond the obvious contributions to the literature on discretionary accounting choices in 
financially distressed firms, the results make a contribution to the earnings persistence literature. 
I replicate the findings of prior studies (Allen et al. 2013; Richardson et al. 2006; Richardson 
and Sloan 2005; Dechow and Dichev 2002; Xie 2001; Subramanyam 1996) and find that 
accruals, and especially discretionary accruals, are less persistent in a broad sample. However, 
this relation does not extend to financially distressed firms, and thus financial distress is an 
important determinant of the persistence of the discretionary accrual component.  
 Lastly, the results contribute to the literature on earnings management. Whereas much prior 
research use discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings quality or earnings management
17
 
(which by definition is opportunistic), my results suggest that when firms experience financial 
distress discretionary accruals represent an important tool for firm managers to signal their 
private information on firm prospects.  
  
                                                 
17
 For example, in a comprehensive literature review Dechow et al. (2010) conclude that “almost one hundred 
papers in our database use abnormal accruals generated from an accruals model as a measure of earnings quality.” 
(p 358, footnote 22). 
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7.  APPENDIX  
Table A.13: Variable definitions 
Variable Measure of Definition 
 
Firm-specific 
  
ROA Return on assets 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
  
ΔGP Growth in gross profit 
(revenue data not 
available for the 
majority of 
observations)  
𝛥𝐺𝑃 =
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑡−1
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
 
OPACC Comprehensive 
operating accruals 
(both current and non-
current operating 
accruals) 
 
𝑂𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐶 =
𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑡 − 𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑡−1
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
 
Where  
NOA=Net operating Assets=OA-OL 
 
Where 
OA = Operating Assets  
= total assets 
-cash and cash equivalents 
-properties held for sale 
-receivables from closely held parties 
 
OL = Operating Liabilities 
= total liabilities 
-long term interest bearing debt 
-current part of mortgage 
-current part of bank debt 
-liabilities to closely related parties 
-dividends if included in current liabilities 
OPCF Comprehensive 
operating cash flow 
𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 − (𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑡 − 𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
 
 
DACC and NACC Discretionary and 
“normal” 
comprehensive 
operating accruals 
DACC:  
Residuals from estimating the following regression per industry-
year (requiring at least 30 observations per industry-year) Eq. (1): 
 
𝑂𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐶 = 𝛼0,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼1
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
+ ∑ 𝑅𝑂𝐴_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
5
𝑘 + ∑ ∆𝐺𝑃_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
5
𝑘   
+𝛽1𝑂𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
  
Where ROA_IND and GP_IND are within industry-year quintiles. 
See Collins et al. (2017) 
 
NACC:  
Predicted values from Eq. (1).  
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TA Total assets  
Log(TA) Logarithm of total 
assets 
 
TLTA Total liabilities to total 
assets 
𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡
  
EBITDATL EBITDA to total 
liabilities 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐿 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡
 
CACL Current assets to 
current liabilities 
𝐶𝐴𝐶𝐿
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡
 
P(def) Probability of default Predicted values of the following function (equation (2)):  
 
𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑂𝐴 − 𝐷𝐴) 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽3𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 log(𝑇𝐴)𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 +
∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
 
The model is a modified version of Beaver et al. (2005) and is 
estimated using logistic regression.  
DISTRESS Indicator for within 
year probability of 
default decile (10 
portfolios) 
DISTRESS_1=1 if p(def) belongs to the 1
st
 within-year ranked 
decile 
DISTRESS_2=1 if p(def) belongs to the 2
nd
 within-year ranked 
decile 
…  
DISTRESS_10=1 if p(def) belongs to the 10
th
 within-year ranked 
decile 
 
Bankruptcy 
indicator 
  
BANKR Indicator for the last 
annual report 
published preceding 
bankruptcy 
BANKR is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the annual 
report is the last report published preceding the bankruptcy filing, 
and zero otherwise 
 
Alternative accrual 
and cash flow 
proxies  
  
WCACCR Working capital 
accruals 
𝑊𝐶𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅 =
𝑁𝑊𝐶𝑡 − 𝑁𝑊𝐶𝑡−1
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
 
Where  
NWC=Net Working Capital=WCA-WCL 
Where 
WCA=Working Capital Assets 
=Current assets 
-cash and cash equivalents 
-properties held for sale 
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-receivables from closely related parties 
 
WCL=Working Capital Liabilities 
=Current liabilities 
-current part of mortgage 
-current part of bank debt 
-liabilities to closely related parties 
-dividends if included in current liabilities 
OCF Operating cash flow 
𝑂𝐶𝐹 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − (𝑁𝑊𝐶𝑡 − 𝑁𝑊𝐶𝑡−1) + 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡
 
 
Alternative growth 
variables 
  
ΔREV Growth in revenue 
(available only for a 
small fraction of the 
sample)  
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉 =
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑡 − 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑡−1
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
 
ΔEMPL Growth in employees 
(growth measure that 
cannot be manipulated 
with discretion in 
financial reporting) 
∆𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿 =
𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑡 − 𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑡−1
𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑡−1
 
Where EMPL = full time equivalent number of employees 
employed during the year.  
Cost of debt and 
controls 
 
 
CostDebt Cost of debt Financial expenses to average debt net of trade payables.  
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 =
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
(𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡 + 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡−1)/2
 
Where  
Debt=Total Liabilities – Trade Payables 
NegROA Indicator for negative 
income 
NegROA is an indicator variable that takes the value one if 
ROA<0, and zero otherwise.  
StdROA Smoothness of 
earnings 
Standard deviation of ROA. Calculated using the five most recent 
years’ data, requiring at least three years’ observations.  
PPE Asset composition, 
tangible fixed assets to 
total assets 
𝑃𝑃𝐸 =
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡
 
CashTA Asset composition 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑇𝐴 =
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡
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Table A.14: Within firm comparison 
Panel A 
Eq. (5): Earnings persistence 
Sample: DISTRESS_1 
through 
DISTRESS_9 
DISTRESS_10  DISTRESS_1 
through 
DISTRESS_8 
DISTRESS_9 and 
DISTRESS_10 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 ROAt+1 ROAt+1  ROAt+1 ROAt+1 
ROA 0.531
***
 0.433
***
  0.490
***
 0.450
***
 
 (33.12) (12.99)  (33.53) (16.43) 
DACC -0.151
***
 0.033  -0.189
***
 -0.015 
 (-7.30) (0.85)  (-12.28) (-0.49) 
Intercept -0.031
***
 0.060
***
  -0.011
*
 0.038
***
 
 (-4.11) (5.71)  (-1.94) (4.13) 
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
N 21,158 7,754  30,955 15,854 
Adjust. R sq. 0.264 0.165  0.247 0.173 
 
Wald test of difference between DACC coefficient estimates 
 H0: DACC(2)-DACC(1)=0  H0: DACC(4)-DACC(3)=0 
Chi
2
 16.799
***
  28.947
***
 
p-value 0.000  0.000 
 
Panel B 
Eq. (6): Informativeness about future cash flows 
Sample: DISTRESS_1 
through 
DISTRESS_9 
DISTRESS_10  DISTRESS_1 
through 
DISTRESS_8 
DISTRESS_9 and 
DISTRESS_10 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 OPCFt+1 OPCFt+1  OPCFt+1 OPCFt+1 
ROA 0.345
***
 0.508
***
  0.306
***
 0.479
***
 
 (15.03) (9.00)  (17.62) (17.95) 
DACC 0.269
***
 0.207
***
  0.177
***
 0.227
***
 
 (7.47) (2.86)  (5.23) (4.21) 
Intercept -0.090
***
 0.058  -0.052
***
 0.007 
 (-6.70) (1.53)  (-6.13) (0.43) 
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
N 21,158 7,754  30,955 15,854 
Adjust. R sq. 0.052 0.087  0.041 0.075 
 
Wald test of difference between DACC coefficient estimates 
 H0: DACC(2)-DACC(1)=0  H0: DACC(4)-DACC(3)=0 
Chi
2
  0.573  0.704 
p-value 0.449  0.401 
This table shows the difference in DACC coefficient within firms. The sample includes firms that at one point in time was financially distressed, 
and at another time was not financially distressed. Bankrupt firms are excluded. Industry and year fixed effects are estimated but not reported. 
Continuous variables entering the estimations are winsorized at the lower and upper 1% level. Variable definitions are listed in appendix. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Gow et al. 2010). t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * Represent significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10, respectively. 
  
90 
 
B.  PAPER 2 
 
Owner-managers’ income shifting and cost of debt benefits 
 
 
Morten Nicklas Bigler Jensen 
Copenhagen Business School | Department of Accounting | mojen.acc@cbs.dk 
 
Jeppe Christoffersen 
Copenhagen Business School | Department of Accounting | jc.acc@cbs.dk 
 
Thomas Plenborg 
Copenhagen Business School | Department of Accounting | tp.acc@cbs.dk 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper explores the causes and consequences of earnings 
management in owner-managed firms. We identify an institutional setting in which 
the owner-manager has discretion to shift income from salary to dividends and 
hence increase reported earnings, at almost no direct cost due to approximate tax 
neutrality between the two income streams. We find that income shifting is 
associated with the magnitude of debt, is more likely when a firm issues debt in the 
following year, and induce firm benefits in terms of lower cost of debt. These 
relations are stronger in magnitude around the zero earnings benchmark. Our 
findings extend the earnings management literature by documenting opportunistic 
behavior and economic consequences in firms with weak manager-shareholder 
agency conflicts.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 In recent years, accounting researchers have increasingly shown interest in earnings 
management outside of the traditional widely held public firm setting for which data is most 
readily available. Specifically a good number of researchers have turned their attention to 
widely-held private firms and narrowly held public and private firms. Most significantly settings 
in which management holds significant equity stakes have received the attention of researchers 
(e.g. Ghosh and Tang 2015; Haw et al. 2014; Srinidhi et al. 2014; Gopalan and Jayaraman 2012; 
Ali et al. 2007; Wang 2006). The attention is well-deserved given the prominence of such 
companies in the global economy combined with the agency aspects related to the resulting 
governance structures. Specifically the typical agency I problems, of managers acting in their 
own interest at the expense of owners, are diminished in such insider-controlled firms but only 
to give room for agency II problems of managers acting in the interest of the insiders at the 
expense of minority owners and other stakeholders (e.g. lenders) (Ali et al. 2007; Gopalan and 
Jayaraman 2012; Villalonga and Amit 2006).  
 In this paper, we significantly extend research on earnings management in insider-controlled 
firms. We do so in the rather pervasive but, to our knowledge, never researched context of 
owner-managed firms; firms which are fully owned by a single individual who is also the CEO 
of the company. The absence of non-manager owners presents interesting earnings management 
perspectives. On the one hand, the owner-manager has no equity-related incentives to manage 
earnings (except in the rare cases of an upcoming M&A or IPO). On the other hand, she can act 
in her own interest and manage earnings to improve accounting performance presented to the 
bank, without any constraints put upon her by either controlling or non-controlling shareholders. 
We develop hypotheses centered on what we consider fundamental overall questions pertaining 
to this setting: Absent equity-related earnings management incentives and scrutiny, does the 
propensity to use earnings management then depend on the firm’s use of debt and can the 
owner-manager in fact mislead the bank and achieve cost of debt benefits?  
 In the development of our hypotheses we draw on and extend recent research on (particularly 
small) commercial lending (Berger et al. 2017; Donelson et al. 2017; Minnis and Sutherland 
2017; Cassar et al. 2015). An important argument distilled from this literature is that while 
banks do have an interest in monitoring the accounting quality of any engagement, the 
likelihood that they will do so in smaller engagements is limited, where the costs of scrutinizing 
the accounts often outweigh the perceived benefits. Thus in the context of small business loans, 
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the owner-manager may in fact be able to achieve cost of debt benefits from managing earnings 
which in turn provides a strong incentive for doing so. We therefore present two main 
hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that owner-managers manage earnings, and have a higher 
propensity for doing so the larger the magnitude of debt (at least for relatively modest debt 
magnitudes). Second, we hypothesize that in engagements which are considered small by the 
bank (typical of owner-managed firms) earnings management will have a good chance of 
escaping bank officers’ scrutiny and result in lower cost of debt. 
 Then we draw on and extend the literature on earnings discontinuities and develop and test 
hypotheses on the contingencies of the two main hypotheses on the earnings benchmarks of zero 
earnings and last year’s earnings (e.g. Burgstahler and Chuk 2017; Dechow et al. 2010; 
Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). We argue that the relations predicted in the main hypotheses 
increase in magnitude around the two benchmarks and particularly so for the zero earnings 
benchmark which prior studies find is the most relevant benchmark in the debt setting where 
lenders care about downside risk rather than upside potential (Jiang 2008). While our earnings 
discontinuity hypotheses go beyond the overall research questions on earnings management use 
and implications, we find that they add credence to our overall conjectures. That is, we are able 
to develop, and find support for, specific hypotheses that are in accordance with phenomena that 
are well described in the accounting literature (e.g. Burgstahler and Chuk 2017; Jacob and 
Jorgensen 2007)
1
, which testifies to the robustness of our main arguments. 
 We address, refine and test the above main arguments and hypotheses in a unique 
institutional (Danish) setting in which marginal tax rates of labor income and capital taxes are 
approximately neutral at the marginal level. We exploit this setting and identify earnings 
management as the scenario in which a firm manager lowers her salary by a significant amount 
(at least 5 percent) and increases dividends to at least offset the after-tax salary decrease, and 
term this behavior “salary-dividend earnings management” (SDEM, hereafter). By shifting the 
personal income channel from labor income to dividends the firm’s reported earnings and the 
return on assets increase, and the balance sheet remains largely unaffected. At the same time, 
and crucial for our earnings management identification, the after-tax compensation of the 
manager is largely unaffected due to approximate tax neutrality. This allows us to directly 
                                                 
1
 While seminal papers on the phenomenon (e.g. Burgstahler and Dichev 1997) have been contested in some critical 
contributions (Gilliam et al. 2015; Durtschi and Easton 2009; Durtschi and Easton 2005), the criticism relates more 
to the empirical identification and measurement of the phenomenon than its actual existence and related theoretical 
arguments. In our hypotheses we rely on the prior findings that meeting benchmarks provide firms cost of debt 
benefits both for public debt (Jiang 2008) and private debt (Chin et al. 2018).  
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observe incidences of earnings management, enabling us to avoid reliance on the much 
criticized residuals-based abnormal accruals earnings management measures (Ball 2013; Basu 
2013; Jackson 2018; Dichev et al. 2013). Further, in our Danish setting (i) owner-managed 
(limited liability) companies are required to produce accrual based financial reports, (ii) owner-
managers of small firms (with a relatively high ratio of owner-manager salaries to net earnings) 
have a very potent means of managing earnings as they can alternate at own discretion with 
almost no direct cost between receiving compensation either as salaries or dividends, and (iii) 
researchers can obtain access to proprietary panel data on financial reports as well as managers’ 
salaries received from their company.  
 Using a dataset with more than 98,000 firm-years for the period 2001-2015, we first 
demonstrate that SDEM is used and on average increases return on assets by 1.8 percentage 
points. Subsequently we test our first main hypothesis by regressing the indicator variable 
SDEM on a variable measuring the magnitude of debt (debt to total assets), its squared term, and 
control for measures approximating the capacity for earnings management. We find, in line with 
the hypothesis, that when the magnitude of debt is low and moderate an increase in debt is 
associated with increased propensity to use SDEM. However, when the magnitude of debt is 
high, a further increase in debt is associated with decreased propensity to use SDEM. Further, 
we find that the propensity to use SDEM is higher when the firm raises new debt capital in the 
following year.  
 Both from determinant regressions where we include indicators for salary adjusted earnings 
being just below a benchmark, and from graphically plotting the incidence of SDEM by bins of 
salary adjusted earnings, we find that owner-managers are more likely to use SDEM when 
salary adjusted earnings fall just below zero, but not when salary adjusted earnings changes fall 
just below zero. The findings give great confidence in the theoretical predictions and our 
interpretation of SDEM being earnings management. 
 Next, we explore the association between SDEM and future cost of debt to test our second 
main hypothesis. We use financial expenses scaled by average total liabilities net of trade 
payables to proxy for cost of debt (comparable approaches used by Francis et al. 2005; Minnis 
2011; Gassen and Fülbier 2015; Vander Bauwhede et al. 2015). We regress cost of debt in 
period t+1 and t+2 on a current measure of SDEM and a broad range of controls. We find that 
firms that use SDEM in year t experience lower year t+1 (t+2) cost of debt of 18 bps (32 bps), 
corresponding to 4 percent (7 percent) of the unconditional mean cost of debt in the sample. The 
magnitude increases significantly (approximately triples) when firms use SDEM to transform a 
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pre-managed loss into a reported profit; these firms experience lower one-year-ahead cost of 
debt of 68 bps, or about 15 percent lower cost of debt compared to the unconditional sample 
mean. We find limited evidence that firms using SDEM to avoid earnings decreases obtain 
incremental cost of debt benefits. The findings are in line with our predictions that particularly 
the zero earnings benchmark is important in a debt context. 
 Inferences regarding SDEM and the cost of debt benefits are robust to a battery of sensitivity 
tests, including alternative explanations of our findings; e.g. owner-managers using earnings 
management to signal future earnings (Bartov et al. 2002; Badertscher et al. 2012; Kasznik and 
McNichols 2002; Gunny 2010), contemporaneous income-increasing accrual earnings 
management (Burgstahler and Chuk 2017), and owner-managers obtaining cost of debt benefits 
because of their personal wealth or other personal characteristics, as well as alternative 
econometric estimations including propensity score matching (Shipman et al. 2017) and an 
instrumental variables approach (Bharath et al. 2008; Minnis 2011). 
 Our main contribution to the earnings management literature and the commercial lending 
literature is the theoretical and empirical demonstration that severe self-serving behavior can 
arise in owner-managed business settings where banks form the most significant capital supplier 
governance mechanism; one that indeed appears somewhat inadequate. An observation related 
to this is that in widely held firms the governing body (the shareholders) has the power to 
replace the self-serving manager while in the owner-managed firm the self-serving owner-
manager can replace the governing body (the bank), particularly in a competitive banking 
environment.  
 Implications for banks and other users of financial reports (such as suppliers, customers and 
potential investors) are significant and in fact rather obvious: they should be aware that the 
governance mechanisms in owner-managed firms, which constitute a great proportion of the 
global economy, are relatively poor which may significantly decrease earnings quality and the 
extent to which the financials can be relied upon.  
 The regulatory implications are almost equally obvious as the findings raise the question of 
how financial disclosures enable stakeholders to discover and compensate for owner-managers’ 
self-serving behavior. This study specifically suggests a need for disclosing owner-manager 
salaries or significant salary changes. However, a wider interpretation of this study calls for 
regulators to consider whether current frameworks and standards sufficiently reflect that 
information prepared to meet shareholders’ needs cannot per se be assumed to meet the 
information needs of other users.  
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 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews related literature 
and develops hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the setting, reviews data and presents the research 
design. Section 4 presents results and sensitivity tests, and section 5 discusses limitations and 
concludes.  
 
2.  HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT AND RELATED RESEARCH 
2.1 The influence of debt on SDEM  
 In settings with public equity capital markets earnings management incentives are widely 
researched, and most research designs investigate earnings management arising from agency 
conflicts between owners (shareholders) and managers (see review by Dechow et al. 2010). 
However, such agency conflicts are practically absent in owner-managed firms, in which agency 
conflicts arise between the owner-manager and other firm stakeholders, such as lenders; banks 
being the most significant source of capital (OECD 2017a)
2
. Thus the presence and magnitude 
of debt is expected to influence the financial reporting decisions of owner-managed firms.  
 In our setting, the owner-manager is approximately indifferent between labor income and 
dividends because taxation of labor income and capital income (at the personal level taxed as 
corporate income and dividend income) is largely aligned. While dividends are disclosed in the 
annual report, manager salary, however, is not. To the extent that the owner-manager expects 
that the bank will not require salary data (private information) the owner-manager has incentive 
to use SDEM. We expect the owner-manager’s propensity to use SDEM to increase in the 
magnitude of debt, because the benefits in the form of lower expected interest rates are higher, 
and because lenders are not expected to unravel the owner-manager’s use of SDEM when their 
debt investment is not at stake. 
 However, this effect is expected to reverse when debt is high, because financially risky firms 
(i.e. firms with high magnitudes of debt) are subject to lender scrutiny due to increased agency 
costs between firm owners and lenders (Haw et al. 2014), which is expected to increase 
borrower firms’ perceived risk of managing earnings and mitigate their propensity to manage 
earnings. Further, the capacity for using SDEM is limited when debt is high because equity is 
                                                 
2
 This relation is even more pronounced in European firms compared to US firms.  
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low, and hence paying dividends is associated with litigation risk
3
 and risk of breaching capital 
based debt covenants.  
H1: The relationship between the magnitude of debt and the propensity to use 
salary-dividend earnings management has an inverted u-shape. 
 
2.2 Consequences of SDEM for the cost of debt 
 Financial statements and their quality are important factors in the lending decision. For 
example, Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) use a dataset on loan applications and outcomes from 
private SME firms, provided by a major US small-business lender, and find that 70-80 percent 
of the bank’s score of (potential) borrowers is based on hard information. Donelson et al. (2017) 
survey 492 US lending officers and provide similar insights: they find that their survey 
respondents make credit decisions “more on the basis of financial statements than on the soft 
information provided by relationship lending” (p 2053). Further, prior research has found that 
attributes of private firms’ financial statements, such as audit status (audit vs. non-audited), 
reporting format (accrual-based vs. cash flow based), earnings smoothness, and earnings quality, 
influence firms’ credit access and cost of debt (Minnis 2011; Allee and Yohn 2009; Gassen and 
Fülbier 2015; Vander Bauwhede et al. 2015). Income and cash flow statement items (i.e. items 
that are influenced by SDEM) are considered important for lenders because they function as 
debt covenant trip wires (Dyreng et al. 2017; Christensen and Nikolaev 2012) and feed into 
banks’ credit scoring models4.  
 Although banks have the ability and an obvious interest in monitoring financial statement 
quality, the costs associated with scrutiny of financial reports limit banks’ capacity of carefully 
looking into each borrower firm’s financials. In our setting (explained in detail in section 3) all 
limited liability firms are mandated to publish financial reports. With easy access to financial 
statement data lenders’ processing costs of financial statement data are very low (Kaya and 
                                                 
3
 Legally, dividends cannot be paid if it leaves the company without adequate financial resources (see: 
https://www.ret-raad.dk/blog/hvornaar-maa-man-udlodde-udbytte-i-et-selskab). Further, dividend payments may 
lead to debt covenant violations, or attract lenders’ attention.   
4
 We are not aware of any research that specifically aims to uncover banks’ credit scoring models. However, from 
our interviews (discussed later) we learn that such data feed into the credit scoring models of all interviewee banks. 
Further providing indirect evidence, (1) Kraft (2015) shows that Moody’s use and adjust both profitability and cash 
flow measures in their credit rating process, and (2) profitability/cash flow measures are standard variables in 
probability of default models (Beaver et al. 2005; Shumway 2001).  
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Pronobis 2016)
5
, and thus the relative cost of obtaining and analyzing soft and other private 
information is high, which might lead to fixation on reported numbers or information disclosed 
in the annual report. The cost of scrutiny is particularly pronounced in small (for the bank) 
loans, typical for owner-managed firms. For example, Donelson et al. (2017) use a survey 
design of commercial lenders and find that financial statement quality is viewed as significantly 
less important when loan officers are dealing with small loans compared to those dealing with 
large loans.  
 In a broader context, prior research provides evidence on the variation in banks’ demand for 
information: Banks are less likely to (1) request financial statements after loan origination when 
borrower credit risk is very low or very high (Minnis and Sutherland 2017), (2) demand high-
quality (audited) financial reports in regions and industries in which the bank has more loan-
exposure because concentration fosters lending expertise (Berger et al. 2017), and (3) collect 
financial statements during periods of economic growth (Lisowsky et al. 2017).  
 We infer from this literature stream that, in a small business loan context, the demand for 
financial statement information and applied scrutiny varies between borrowers, and expect that 
this lack of consistent scrutiny
6, bundled with lenders’ reliance on published financial statements 
(and the information in those) allows opportunistic borrower firm managers to on average 
extract rents from lenders. That is, to the extent that lenders rely on reported financials we 
expect firms using SDEM to obtain cost of debt benefits. 
H2: Firms engaging in salary-dividend earnings management obtain lower future 
cost of debt 
 
2.3 Moderating effects: meeting or beating benchmarks 
 An extensive amount of evidence documents discontinuities in earnings distributions 
(Burgstahler and Chuk 2017; Dechow et al. 2010; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). These 
earnings discontinuities are observed around certain earnings benchmarks, such as zero 
earnings, last year’s earnings, and expected earnings.  
                                                 
5
 Currently, financial statement data are available in XBRL format easily available at cvr.dk. Further, from our 
interviews (as discussed later) we learn that several banks indeed extract borrower firms’ financial statement data 
from central databases.  
6
 From informal interviews with lending officers we learn that banks systematically gather “soft” information that 
they use in estimating credit scoring models and in their lending decision (for example management quality). 
Manager salary, however, is not a piece of information that is collected systematically by any of the interviewees. 
Further, banks rely on internally generated credit scoring models rather than external credit ratings, at least for 
smaller entities.  
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 Both analytical (Dye 2002; Guttman et al. 2006) and empirical research (Barth et al. 1999; 
Bartov et al. 2002) provide evidence on the benefits of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks. 
Exploring non-equity related benchmark beating, Coppens and Peek (2005) plot earnings 
distributions for private firms (where equity incentives are less pronounced) and find evidence 
for a discontinuity around zero earnings (loss avoidance) but not around zero earnings changes 
(decrease avoidance), and Jiang (2008) finds that US public firms meeting or beating earnings 
benchmarks – zero earnings, last year’s earnings, and expected earnings – obtain higher credit 
ratings and lower initial bond spreads (i.e. cost of debt benefits)
7
, supporting the view that 
lenders use heuristic benchmarks in their credit evaluation. Jiang finds that the effect is strongest 
when firms beat the zero earnings benchmark because lenders care about downside risk rather 
than upside potential.  
 For those reasons, we expect the H1 and H2 hypothesized relationships to be moderated 
around earnings benchmarks. First, we expect firms with pre-managed earnings just below a 
benchmark to have a high propensity to use SDEM. Second, we expect firms transforming pre-
managed earnings below a benchmark to reported earnings above a benchmark to incrementally 
benefit from earnings management. As lenders care about downside risk rather than upside 
potential (Jiang 2008) we expect the effects to be stronger for the zero earnings benchmark than 
for the last year’s earnings benchmark.  
H3: The propensity to use salary-dividend earnings management increases when 
pre-managed earnings are just below earnings benchmarks  
H4: Firms using salary-dividend earnings management to meet or beat earnings 
benchmarks obtain lower future cost of debt than other firms using salary-dividend 
earnings management 
H5: The H3 and H4 hypothesized effects are stronger for the zero earnings 
benchmark than the last year’s earnings benchmark  
 
                                                 
7
 Chin et al. (2018) provide evidence on the private loan term benefits (both price and non-price) obtained by firms 
meeting or beating analyst forecasts.  
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3.  SETTING, DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Owner-managed firms and institutional setting 
 Private firms represent the majority of the economy in most Western countries. In the OECD 
area SMEs (primarily private firms) constitute ~99% of all firms, representing 60% of 
employment and 50-60% of value added (OECD 2017b)
8
. Most private firms are operated by a 
manager, who is also the owner of the company
9
. The nature of the arising agency conflicts 
from such ownership structure comprises an interesting setting to investigate earnings 
management practices.  
 We address our research questions in a Danish setting, which provides several benefits: (i) 
marginal tax rates of labor income and capital taxes are approximately neutral at the marginal 
level
10
 (ii) owner-managed (limited liability) companies are mandated to produce accrual based 
financial reports, and thus the choice between cash flow and accrual based reporting is not 
influencing our results (Allee and Yohn 2009). (iii) Owner-managers of small firms (with a 
relatively high ratio of owner-manager salaries to net earnings) have a very potent means of 
managing earnings as they at own discretion can alternate between receiving compensation 
either as salaries or dividends. (iv) We have access to proprietary panel data on the salary that 
firm managers receive from their firm and their total income in Denmark. Most importantly, 
through manager-firm links we are able to merge data on managers with financial data of the 
firms they manage. The dataset allows us to directly observe incidences of earnings 
management and avoid reliance on criticized residuals-based abnormal accruals measures (Ball 
2013; Basu 2013; Jackson 2018; Dichev et al. 2013). 
                                                 
8
 On the importance of private firms see also Minnis (2011) and Hope et al. (2017).  
9
 According to the US census “Survey of small business owners (SBO)” 65% of SBOs’ primary function is 
“managing day-to-day operations”.  
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2012/econ/2012-sbo.html#par_reference_25  primary functions in 
business  “Percent of number of owners of respondent firms with or without paid employees”. Bennedsen and 
Nielsen (2015) find that 81% of controlling business owners in Denmark is also the firm’s manager.  
10
 (1-corporate_tax) * (1-dividend_tax) ~ (1-labor_income_tax) at marginal levels. In the Danish setting the tax 
neutrality is prioritized and recognized in the design of the tax system, and is termed “the major shareholder 
problem” (translated from Danish). For example, already in 1993 the tax reform proposed “homogenous taxation of 
different sorts of income streams to negate tax arbitrage”  
(https://www.skm.dk/aktuelt/temaer/1994-skatteomlaegningen, translated from Danish).  
Currently, the major shareholder problem is mentioned in the “Tax economic statement 2017” and solved by 
approximate tax neutrality (http://www.skm.dk/media/1516299/samlet_sr17_25-08-17.pdf, p 39). Additionally, 
health insurance is part of the tax payment and does not disturb the choice between salary and dividends.  
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3.2 Data sources 
 The final dataset is comprised of three separate datasets, which we match through unique 
personal identifiers (CPR numbers
11
) and unique firm identifiers (CVR numbers
12
) to link
individuals (managers and owners) to the firms in which they work. Firm financials: From the 
ORBIS database, managed by Bureau Van Dijk, we obtain annual report data of all firms 
incorporated in Denmark for the period 1998-2016. From EXPERIAN, we obtain enriched line 
item accounting data on current assets and current liabilities enabling us to compute accruals
13
.
Firm managers and ownership data: We acquire data from The Danish Business Authority on 
firm managers and ownership data
14
. Manager salary: Through our researcher access provided
by Statistics Denmark we obtain confidential data on firm-managers’ salary, only available to 
researchers.  
 We merge the three datasets and apply several screens in the identification of the final 
sample: We exclude (1) financial reports not covering 12 months, (2) hobby firms with total 
assets below DKK 1m (~EUR 134t), (3) firms with total assets above DKK 75m (~EUR 10m), 
because managers are expected to be able to influence earnings of relatively small firms, (4) 
CEO turnover related years, because owner-managers cannot use SDEM in these years, (5) 
extreme observations, potentially due to mergers or acquisitions that we cannot observe, (6) 
firm-year observations with insufficient data to calculate the SDEM measure, (7) certain 
industries (financial, utilities, and state-owned) consistent with prior research, (8) subsidiaries, 
to avoid double counting of firms, (9) listed firms, (10) firm-year observations with missing data 
to estimate Eq. (1) and Eq. (2), and (11) firms that are not owner-managed. The screening 
procedure is outlined in Table B.1.  
11
 All persons born or residing in Denmark are assigned unique individual national identification numbers. CPR 
numbers are private information. In Denmark, CPR-numbers are used by banks, employers when paying salary, 
governmental bodies, etc., enabling us to merge information on individuals from a wide variety of sources. 
12
 All legal business entities in Denmark are assigned a unique CVR-number. CVR numbers are publicly disclosed. 
13
 Non-current line items required for accrual estimation are available in the ORBIS dataset 
14
 Data from the Danish Business Authority are publicly available at cvr.dk. We acquire a machine readable dataset 
and have it delivered through Statistics Denmark’s “Researcher Service”. By doing so, executive and ownership 
data are delivered with proprietary CPR numbers, which are anonymization by a proprietary key held by Statistics 
Denmark. Because CPR numbers are anonymized and coded by Statistics Denmark with a similar key across all 
datasets, we are able to generate a dataset on individuals including the salary they receive from their company, their 
personal wealth, their educational level, their criminal record, their gender, their age, their residence municipality, 
as well as other information. Importantly, we can link these data to the company in which the individual works, and 
to the financials of that company. In appendix, we describe how we identify the CEO when several managers are 
filed with the Danish Business Authority. The majority of CEO observations (around 90%) are identified directly 
through unique CEO identifiers.   
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Table B.1: Sample selection 
Note Screen applied Observations 
dropped 
Sample size Decrease in 
sample size, 
% 
Firm-years with employer-employee link 1,013,945 
Keep financial reports with 12 months 308,515 705,430 30% 
1 Keep firm-years with ta>1m 161,429 544,001 23% 
2 Keep firm-years with ta<75m 43,671 500,330 8% 
3 Remove CEO turnover years 66,275 434,055 13% 
4 Remove extreme variables 65,816 368,239 15% 
5 Keep observations with data available to 
calculate SDEM 
116,071 252,168 32% 
6 Remove certain industries 21,378 230,790 8% 
7 Remove subsidiaries 2,218 228,572 1% 
Remove listed firms 32 228,540 0% 
Keep observations with variables available for 
estimating Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) 
96,018 132,522 42% 
Keep owner-managed firms 34,017 98,505 26% 
This table shows the sample selection procedure. Notes: (1) We exclude observations with less than DKK 1m in total assets to remove small 
hobby companies. (2) We expect that managers are able to influence earnings of relatively small firms. (3) We remove CEO turnover related 
observations for the years t-1 through t+1, where year t is a CEO turnover year, because we cannot observe SDEM for these years (we compare 
year on year salary and dividend changes). (4) In addition to winsorizing procedures, we apply several screens to avoid regressions being 
influenced by extreme outliers potentially due to M&A activities. We remove the following: negative equity, ROA<-0.5, ROA>0.8, changes in 
gross profit scaled by lagged assets >1 (growth), changes in gross profit scaled by lagged assets <1 (growth), CEO salary to total assets>1, and 
CEO salary> DKK3m (EUR 0.4m) which is higher than the 99th percentile. (5): The data include dividend changes from year t-1 to year t, 
dividend changes from year t to year t+1, and salary changes from year t-1 to year t. (6) Consistent with prior accounting and finance research 
we exclude certain regulated industries (financials and utilities), and further exclude state-owned companies. (7) To avoid double counting we 
exclude subsidiaries.  
3.3 Key variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
 In the following we discuss the key measures used throughout the paper. We show 
descriptive statistics in Table B.2, and summarize variable definitions in Table B.11 (appendix). 
The variable selection process is based on prior research on the characteristics of earnings 
management firms and on covariates associated with cost of debt. Obviously, we cannot include 
in our analysis market-based variables.  
3.3.1 Owner-managers 
 As outlined above we limit the sample to owner-managers. We identify owner-managers in 
the following way: First, we use the data on ownership that we obtain from the Danish Business 
Authority. We create ultimate ownership percentages through direct links (individual owns 
company) and indirect links (individual owns company X that owns company Y that owns 
company Z…). From these data, we identify an owner-manager as a person that owns at least  
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95% of the company
15
 and is the CEO. For the firm-year observations where ownership data are
missing
16
, the current CEO is identified as an owner-manager if she was also a CEO on the date
the firm was founded.  
3.3.2 Salary-dividend earnings management (SDEM) 
 We define the event of earnings management as an indicator variable SDEM taking the value 
one if (1) the owner-manager decreases her salary significantly (at least by 5 percent and at least 
by DKK 10t
17
 (EUR 1.3t)), (2) the salary decrease does not shift the owner-manager’s marginal
labor income to a lower tax bracket
18
, and (3) the owner-manager contemporarily increases
dividends to at least offset the after-tax salary decrease, and zero otherwise. Marginal tax rates 
for labor income vs. capital income along with a numerical example are presented in appendix.  
 Dividends can be distributed as ordinary dividends when the annual report is approved for 
publication (i.e. dividends related to the income of year t are distributed in year t+1 when the 
annual report is published) or as extraordinary dividends (i.e. dividends related to the income of 
year t are distributed during year t). Therefore, we allow the manager to pay out the dividends 
either during the fiscal year of the salary decrease or in the following year. We estimate 
dividends from balance sheet and income statement items.  
 We observe SDEM in around 8 percent of the firm-year observations, and find that SDEM on 
average increases earnings scaled by assets by 1.8 percentage points. Further, we observe that 
managers partly reverse their salary decreases from SDEM years in the following year: For all 
SDEM observations we observe an average salary change of -16% in the SDEM year followed 
by an average salary increase by 8% in the following year. Further, in Figure B.1 we show the 
development of salary/TA and dividend/TA for SDEM firms and their propensity score matched 
15
We use 95% rather than 100% because of potential rounding of ownership stakes. Further, we assess this 
identification as conservative, because other ownership structures which assimilate the owner-manager structure are 
excluded. These quasi owner-manager ownership structures include married couples owning a business together, 
family members owning a business together, or even close friends owning a business together. 
16
 In December 2014 new regulation was enforced which required firm owners to file ownership data with the 
Danish Business Authority, with a retrospective effect, meaning that managers had to disclose the starting date of 
their ownership. Hence, the ownership data which we acquire from the Danish Business Authority is limited in 
coverage back in time. 
17
 We impose 5% and a monetary amount to define a significant salary decrease. Comparable approaches (as well 
as a similar cutoff of 5%) are used in the literature to define significant R&D jumps (Eberhart et al. 2004; Dube 
2019).  
18
 We have data on (1) the managers’ income from the firm, and (2) the manager’s total taxable labor income from 
Denmark. The cases where the owner-manager lowers her salary from the firm so that the marginal labor income 
(of total taxable labor income) is shifted to a lower labor income tax bracket are probably due to tax optimization 
rather than earnings management, and therefore we do not include those cases in the SDEM definition. 
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Figure B.1: Salary and dividend changes (scaled by total assets) by SDEM firms and their matched peers 
 
This figure shows the level of salary (salary/TA) and dividend (dividend/TA) preceding, during, and following the SDEM year for SDEM firms 
and the matching year for matching firms. Year t=0 (x-axis) refers to the SDEM year for SDEM firms, and the matching year for control firms. 
Control firms are matched with propensity score matching, as described later in the paper. Descriptive statistics of the two propensity score 
matched samples are presented in Table B.9.  
 
peers
19
. In this figure, we observe partly reversal of both salary and dividends following the 
SDEM year
20
. However both salary and dividends remain on a higher level following the SDEM 
year than in the years before the SDEM year.   
 
3.3.3 Magnitude of debt and Cost of debt  
 Data coverage on actual interest bearing debt (or bank debt) is very limited in our dataset, 
and therefore we proxy it by calculating total liabilities net of trade payables. We scale by assets 
and term this measure DebtTA. Similarly, the actual interest rate on debt is not provided in the 
dataset, so we proxy it as financial expenses divided by average total liabilities net of trade 
payables, and term this measure CostDebt. The procedure of estimating the cost of debt as 
financial expenses scaled by debt is comparable to that in related studies (Francis et al. 2005; 
Minnis 2011; Gassen and Fülbier 2015; Vander Bauwhede et al. 2015). However, we differ 
from those studies in that we scale financial expenses by debt net of trade payables and not bank 
debt due to data limitations. We acknowledge that our approach contains significant noise and 
truncate the CostDebt construct at 0 percent and 30 percent to avoid extreme observations from 
                                                 
19
 We discuss how we propensity score match in section 3, and show the results of the matching in Table B.9.  
20
 Recall that dividend increases are allowed both for year t and year t+1 for the SDEM definition, and therefore the 
dividend reversal happens in year t+2.  
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a noisy measure blurring our results (see e.g. Gassen and Fülbier 2015)
21
. We observe an 
average CostDebt of 0.044, which is lower than observed in comparable studies
22
. The 
difference is likely due to our definition of debt and thus CostDebt is probably understated. 
However, empirical estimations in section 4 give confidence that CostDebt, although a noisy 
measure, is a valid proxy of the variations in the true (and for us unobservable) cost of debt.  
 
3.3.4 Earnings measures and earnings benchmarks:  
 We make two overall adjustments to earnings and cash flows. First, we compute earnings and 
cash flows net of salary changes (variable names are added with the term “netsalary”), which 
proxy the performance signal the manager receives before making the decision to use SDEM. 
We use these measures to estimate the propensity to use SDEM. Second, we generate pre-
managed earnings and cash flows: these measures adjust for salary changes (variable names are 
added with the term “premanaged”), but only when observations are identified as SDEM 
observations. We use these measures when we (i) investigate the impact of SDEM on future cost 
of debt, controlling for the underlying performance (i.e. pre-managed), and (ii) to identify the 
incidences in which the owner-manager uses SDEM to transform losses (earnings decreases) 
into profits (earnings increases).  
 
3.4 Research design 
3.4.1 The influence of debt on SDEM:  
 The following model estimates characteristics associated with SDEM and is used to test H1 
and H3. As hypothesized in section 2, we expect the propensity to use SDEM and debt to have 
an inverted U-shape relation, and expect an increased propensity to use SDEM just below 
certain earnings benchmarks. We control for variables measuring capacity of SDEM and costs 
of earnings management (Chen et al. 2018; Jung et al. 2013).  
𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
(1) 
                                                 
21
 Gassen and Fülbier (2015) cut their interest rate measure at 0 and 20 percent. Our results – both magnitudes and 
significance levels – are practically unchanged when we winsorize observations at these levels [untabulated].  
22
 For example Minnis (2011) observe average interest rates of 7.3 percent, and Gassen and Fülbier (2015) report 
average interest rates of 8.9 percent.  
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Where i denotes the firm and t denotes the fiscal year. SmallLoss (SmallDecrease) is an 
indicator variable that takes the value one if netsalaryROA (ΔnetsalaryROA) ∈[-0.02;0[, and 
zero otherwise. β2 is excluded when testing H1. SmallLoss and SmallDecrease are used to test 
H3. CONTROLS include netsalaryROA, ΔnetsalaryROA, netsalaryOPCF, CashTA, SalaryTA, 
and logTA. INDUSTRY and YEAR are industry and year fixed effects, respectively. All variables 
are defined in appendix.  
 
3.4.2 Consequences of SDEM on the cost of debt:  
 To investigate if SDEM induces cost of debt benefits, we estimate several different 
estimation models including pooled OLS (main analysis), propensity score matching (both with 
levels regressions and difference-in-difference regressions), and an endogenous choice model. 
Surveying prior research we identify several measures associated with the cost of debt 31F
23
.  
 In the main analysis we estimate the following model with pooled OLS. We include industry 
and year indicators and cluster standard errors by firm and year to account for both cross-
sectional and serial correlation in residuals (Gow et al. 2010)
24
.  
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑖(𝑡+𝑓) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑 𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡  
+𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
(2) 
Where i denotes the firm, t denotes the fiscal year, and f indicates the time horizon of cost of 
debt (1=one-year ahead cost of debt, 2=two-years-ahead cost of debt). LossAvoid 
(DecreaseAvoid) is an indicator variable that takes the value one if premanagedROA<0 
(ΔpremanagedROA<0) and reportedROA≥0 (ΔreportedROA≥0), and zero otherwise. β2 is 
excluded when testing H2. LossAvoid and DecreaseAvoid are used to test H4. Controls include 
neg_premanagedROA, premanagedROA (and their interaction), TLTA
25
, logTA, 
premanagedOPCF, StdROA
26
, CashTA, and PPE. All variables are defined in appendix. In 
                                                 
23
 E.g. Bauwhede et al.  (2015), Gassen and Fülbier (2015), Bharath et al. (2008), Jiang (2008), and Francis et al. 
(2005). We do not calculate interest coverage and current ratio (see Minnis 2011). The information content of 
interest coverage is limited when the numerator (EBIT or EBITDA) is negative. Current ratio is a measure of asset 
composition, and we employ alternative estimates of asset compositions. In untabulated analyses we replace our 
control variables with the variables used by Minnis (2011) and results are practically unchanged, both inferences 
and magnitudes.  
24
 Results are unchanged when using Fama MacBeth regression with Newey-West standard errors [untabulated].  
25
 We use TLTA rather than DebtTA as lenders are expected to include all debt when assessing the risk of borrower 
firms. 
26
 The standard deviation of ROA is also used by for example Francis et al. (2005) and Jiang (2008).  
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robustness tests, we additionally use propensity score matching and an endogenous choice 
model.  
 
4.  RESULTS 
4.1 The influence of debt on SDEM 
 In the following we explore the variables associated with SDEM by estimating Eq. (1). We 
report the estimation results in Table B.3. The slope on DebtTA is positive and the slope on 
DebtTA
2
 is negative: Our interpretation is that, consistent with H1, the propensity to use SDEM 
is increasing with debt when debt is low or moderate, and decreasing with debt when debt is 
high. In Figure B.2 we plot the marginal effects of DebtTA on the propensity to use SDEM, and 
find that debt has a positive effect on the propensity to use SDEM until DebtTA~0.35.  
 Next, we test H3: First, in Figure B.3, Panel A (Panel B), we plot the percentage of 
observations that use SDEM by netsalaryROA (ΔnetsalaryROA) bins. In Panel A we observe a 
peak in the prevalence of SDEM just below the zero-earnings benchmark, but not in Panel B just 
below the last year’s earnings benchmark. Next, we include the indicator variables SmallLoss 
and SmallDecrease (one at a time) in regressions. The estimation tables regarding SmallLoss 
(SmallDecrease) are displayed in column 3 and 4 (column 5 and 6) of Table B.3, and provide 
support for the interpretation of the figures above. The probability of using SDEM increases by 
1.6 percentage points, or about 20 percent of the unconditional mean of SDEM (0.0163/0.0819), 
when the manager receives an earnings signal before the SDEM decision that is just below zero. 
This evidence provides further support for H3, however only for the zero earnings benchmark.  
 As an additional test, in column (7) and (8) we test if firms are more likely to use SDEM 
when they are about to raise new debt. We find that the issuance of new debt
27
 in the following 
year is associated with an increased propensity to use SDEM of 1.3 percentage points, or about 
16% of the unconditional mean of SDEM (0.0133/0.0819). Although not a formal hypothesis, 
the finding that firms are more likely to use SDEM preceding new finance issues bolsters our 
confidence in SDEM being earnings management. The table also reveals that the propensity to 
use SDEM is (as expected) increasing in the control variables proxying capacity to use SDEM 
(netsalaryROA, netsalaryOPCF, SalaryTA, and CashTA). The use of SDEM loads positively on 
                                                 
27
 We define the variable NewDebt as an indicator variable that takes the value one if the change in debt (total 
liabilities minus trade payables) scaled by lagged assets is higher than 0.05, and zero otherwise.  
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Table B.3: Covariates associated with salary dividend earnings management 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 SDEM SDEM SDEM SDEM SDEM SDEM SDEM SDEM 
 Coeff. Marg. 
effect 
Coeff. Marg. 
effect 
Coeff. Marg. 
effect 
Coeff. Marg. 
effect 
DebtTA 0.7351***  0.7596***  0.7316***  0.6889***  
 (3.09)  (3.18)  (3.08)  (2.89)  
DebtTA2 -1.1330***  -1.1685***  -1.1288***  -1.0597***  
 (-4.45)  (-4.57)  (-4.43)  (-4.16)  
SmallLoss   0.2190*** 0.0163***     
   (4.71) (4.70)     
SmallDecrease     -0.0601* -0.0045*   
     (-1.75) (-1.76)   
NewDebtt+1       0.1791
*** 0.0133*** 
       (6.55) (6.57) 
netsalaryROA 0.4822*** 0.0358*** 0.5613*** 0.0417*** 0.4737*** 0.0352*** 0.4278** 0.0317** 
 (2.78) (2.78) (3.40) (3.41) (2.76) (2.76) (2.42) (2.42) 
ΔnetsalaryROA -0.8142*** -0.0604*** -0.8301*** -0.0616*** -0.8159*** -0.0606*** -0.7801*** -0.0579*** 
 (-4.66) (-4.67) (-4.78) (-4.79) (-4.67) (-4.68) (-4.45) (-4.46) 
netsalaryOPCF 0.3779*** 0.0281*** 0.3767*** 0.0280*** 0.3782*** 0.0281*** 0.3929*** 0.0292*** 
 (4.43) (4.43) (4.41) (4.42) (4.43) (4.44) (4.53) (4.54) 
CashTAt-1 0.2370
*** 0.0176*** 0.2392*** 0.0178*** 0.2366*** 0.0176*** 0.2681*** 0.0199*** 
 (2.98) (2.98) (3.00) (3.01) (2.98) (2.98) (3.33) (3.33) 
SalaryTAt-1 1.5389
*** 0.1142*** 1.5413*** 0.1144*** 1.5336*** 0.1138*** 1.5215*** 0.1129*** 
 (6.66) (6.68) (6.66) (6.68) (6.65) (6.67) (6.63) (6.65) 
logTA 0.2996*** 0.0222*** 0.3001*** 0.0223*** 0.3007*** 0.0223*** 0.3005*** 0.0223*** 
 (9.98) (10.07) (10.05) (10.14) (9.98) (10.07) (10.03) (10.12) 
Intercept -5.5367***  -5.5606***  -5.5376***  -5.5876***  
 (-22.07)  (-22.35)  (-22.07)  (-22.41)  
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 98,505 98,505 98,505 98,505 98,505 98,505 98,505 98,505 
Pseudo R. sq. 0.0204 0.0204 0.0207 0.0207 0.0204 0.0204 0.0213 0.0213 
AUROC 0.6106 0.6106 0.6117 0.6117 0.6108 0.6108 0.6135 0.6135 
SDEM 
prevalence 
0.0819 0.0819 0.0819 0.0819 
This table shows the determinants of SDEM. Both coefficients from the logistic regression and marginal effects are displayed. SDEM is an 
indicator of salary dividend earnings management. DebtTA is total liabilities net of trade payables scaled by assets. SmallLoss is an indicator that 
takes the value one if netsalaryROA∈[-0.02;0[, and zero otherwise. SmallDecrease is an indicator that takes the value one if ΔnetsalaryROA∈[-
0.02;0[, and zero otherwise. NewDebt is an indicator that takes the value one if (debtt-debtt-1)/TAt-1>0.05, and zero otherwise. The remaining 
variables are defined in appendix. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Gow et al. 2010). t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * 
Represent significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively (two-tailed test). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 
percent level. 
 
firm size as measured by logTA, possibly because larger firms have more equity enabling them 
to pay dividends (and use SDEM).  
 
4.2 Consequences of SDEM for the cost of debt 
 Now, we turn to analyze the cost of debt consequences of SDEM. In Table B.4 we estimate 
Eq. (2) with pooled OLS. The columns 1 through 3 (4 through 6) show the effect on one-year-
ahead (two-years-ahead) cost of debt. We observe, consistent with H2, that the SDEM indicator 
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Figure B.2: The effect of debt on propensity to engage in salary dividend earnings management 
 
This figure shows the relation between debt and propensity to use SDEM. The graph shows the marginal effect (using the delta method) from the 
logistic estimation of Eq. (1).   
 
Figure B.3: SDEM observations (%) by ROA [earnings (net of salary changes) scaled by assets] and ΔROA [earnings 
changes (net of salary changes) scaled by assets] 
 
Panel A:   Panel B: 
  
This figure shows the percentage of firm-year observations that use SDEM (y-axis) per netsalaryROA or ΔnetsalaryROA bin (x-axis). Panel A 
shows the mean SDEM per salaryROA, i.e. ROA adjusted for the owner-manager’s salary changes. Panel B shows the mean SDEM per 
ΔnetsalaryROA, i.e. the change in net income adjusted for the owner-manager’s salary changes, scaled by lagged assets. The analysis is 
restricted to include netsalaryROA (ΔnetsalaryROA) in the interval [-10 ; 10] percent.  
 
is negatively associated with cost of debt: In firm-years in which the owner-manager uses 
SDEM the firm obtains lower one-year-ahead cost of debt of about 18 bps
28
 (column 1), or 
about 4 percent lower than the unconditional sample mean (0.0018/0.0443). When we look more 
                                                 
28
 The magnitudes reported here are probably biased downwards because of the noisy measure of interest bearing 
debt and hence the CostDebt measure. That is, the true magnitude (in bps) of the SDEM effect on cost of debt 
might be even higher than reported here. 
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carefully into the underlying data, we find that the effect is driven both by a decrease in 
financial expenses (numerator of CostDebt) and an increase in debt (denominator of CostDebt) 
in year t+1 relative to year t. SDEM firms experience a median year-on-year change in financial 
expenses of -2.8 percent and a median year-on-year change in debt of 2.2 percent.  
 The indicator LossAvoid is the subsample of SDEM observations in which managers use 
SDEM to transform a pre-managed loss into a reported profit, and the coefficient reflects the 
incremental benefit obtained when SDEM is used to avoid reporting a loss: For these 
observations the magnitude is much higher at about 68 bps (0.0014+0.0054), corresponding to a 
decrease in CostDebt of 15 percent relative to the sample mean (0.0068/0.0443). We believe this 
magnitude is highly significant in economic terms. Additionally we find some evidence that 
firms that transform pre-managed earnings decreases into earnings increases obtain an additional 
cost of debt benefit. However, the effect is only marginally significant (p-value ~0.052, two-
tailed test). These results provide support for H4, especially for firms that use SDEM to avoid 
reporting a loss.  
 All other variables relate to future cost of debt in predictable ways and increase confidence in 
the noisy measure of cost of debt. Future cost of debt loads negatively on current profitability 
measures. Notably, in column (1) through (3) we observe a positive neg_premanagedROA 
coefficient of 0.047-0.500, which indicates that loss firms experience higher cost of debt of 
about 47-50 bps relative to profit firms, corresponding to approx. 11 percent of the average cost 
of debt in the sample. We point out that the slope on LossAvoid is practically similar in 
magnitude to the slope on neg_premanagedROA, indicating that firms that use SDEM to 
transform a pre-managed loss into a reported profit effectively avoid the penalizing effect of loss 
reporting.  
 Further, the negative relation between premanagedROA and CostDebt is attenuated when 
premanagedROA is negative (slope on premanagedROA*neg_premanagedROA is positive
29
). 
Collectively, the results suggest that loss firms are immediately penalized with a higher cost of 
debt when missing the arbitrary zero earnings benchmark, but that the magnitude of the loss 
matters to a lower extend, emphasizing the importance to firms of avoiding negative earnings 
reports (see e.g. Jiang 2008). In untabulated analyses we do not find such a result for negative 
earnings changes.  
                                                 
29
 An F-test of the coefficients of premanagedROA (-0.0335, column 1) and  
premanagedROA*neg_premanagedROA (0.0180, column 1) shows that the slope is still significantly different from 
zero when earnings are negative.  
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Table B.4: Salary Dividend Earnings Management and future Cost of Debt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CostDebtt+1 CostDebtt+1 CostDebtt+1 CostDebtt+2 CostDebtt+2 CostDebtt+2 
SDEM -0.0018
***
 -0.0014
***
 -0.0016
***
 -0.0032
***
 -0.0031
***
 -0.0032
***
 
 (-4.17) (-3.41) (-3.38) (-7.95) (-8.55) (-8.23) 
LossAvoid  -0.0054
***
   -0.0013  
  (-3.66)   (-0.86)  
DecreaseAvoid   -0.0028
*
   0.0006 
   (-1.94)   (0.46) 
premanagedROA -0.0335
***
 -0.0335
***
 -0.0335
***
 -0.0223
***
 -0.0223
***
 -0.0223
***
 
 (-11.38) (-11.38) (-11.40) (-8.43) (-8.43) (-8.43) 
neg_premanagedROA 0.0047
***
 0.0050
***
 0.0047
***
 0.0040
***
 0.0040
***
 0.0040
***
 
 (10.20) (10.63) (10.20) (6.64) (6.79) (6.64) 
premanagedROA 
*neg_premanagedROA  
0.0180
***
 0.0197
***
 0.0181
***
 0.0171
***
 0.0175
***
 0.0171
***
 
 (2.70) (3.02) (2.71) (3.43) (3.56) (3.43) 
TLTA 0.0072
***
 0.0072
***
 0.0072
***
 0.0121
***
 0.0121
***
 0.0121
***
 
 (3.17) (3.16) (3.17) (5.06) (5.05) (5.06) 
logTA -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0006
**
 -0.0006
**
 -0.0006
**
 
 (-0.40) (-0.42) (-0.41) (-2.28) (-2.29) (-2.27) 
premanagedOPCF -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0034
*
 -0.0034
*
 -0.0034
*
 
 (-0.88) (-0.89) (-0.88) (-1.67) (-1.67) (-1.67) 
StdROA 0.0186
***
 0.0186
***
 0.0185
***
 0.0131
***
 0.0131
***
 0.0131
***
 
 (5.52) (5.52) (5.52) (5.33) (5.34) (5.33) 
PPE -0.0037
**
 -0.0037
**
 -0.0037
**
 -0.0037
**
 -0.0037
**
 -0.0037
**
 
 (-2.51) (-2.53) (-2.51) (-2.54) (-2.54) (-2.54) 
CashTA -0.0242
***
 -0.0242
***
 -0.0242
***
 -0.0194
***
 -0.0194
***
 -0.0194
***
 
 (-10.47) (-10.49) (-10.47) (-7.44) (-7.44) (-7.45) 
Intercept 0.0578
***
 0.0578
***
 0.0578
***
 0.0526
***
 0.0526
***
 0.0526
***
 
 (15.66) (15.70) (15.69) (18.77) (18.77) (18.76) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 98,505 98,505 98,505 81,361 81,361 81,361 
Adjust R. sq. 0.0878 0.0879 0.0879 0.0807 0.0807 0.0807 
Average CostDebt 0.0443 0.0443 0.0443 0.0438 0.0438 0.0438 
This table shows the OLS regression of future cost of debt on SDEM and other controls. CostDebt is financial expenses scaled by average 
liabilities net of trade payables. SDEM is an indicator of salary dividend earnings management. LossAvoid indicates that firms use SDEM to 
avoid reporting losses. DecreaseAvoid indicates that firms use SDEM to avoid reporting earnings decreases. The remaining variables are defined 
in appendix. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Gow et al. 2010). t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * Represent significance levels 
at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively (two-tailed test). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent level. 
 
 
 Further, future cost of debt loads positively on current TLTA (leverage)
30
 and StdROA 
(earnings volatility)
31
. Future cost of debt also decreases in the level of cash and in the portion 
of tangible fixed assets.  
 
                                                 
30
 This finding is partly consistent with prior research: for example, Minnis (2011) observe a negative relation 
between leverage and cost of debt in their main analysis [table 7], but find a positive relation when using an 
alternative profitability measure (in the regression) with lower correlation to leverage [footnote 24]. In a similar 
vein, Francis et al. (2005) find a negative relation in their main analysis [table 2], but find a positive relation when 
truncating their (noisy) cost of debt measure at the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles [footnote 5]. 
31
 Consistent with prior papers linking current firm attributes to future cost of debt (see e.g. Jiang 2008; Francis et 
al. 2005). 
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4.3 Alternative explanations 
 In the following we make several attempts to test the robustness of the consequences of 
SDEM, by addressing alternative explanations for our findings. We control for future 
performance, control for discretionary accruals, control for personal characteristics including 
wealth of the owner-manager, and attempt to rule out tax optimization driving the results. 
 
4.3.1 Controlling for future performance:  
 Prior research on earnings management provides evidence that managers in some situations 
manage earnings to signal future performance or manage expectations (Bartov et al. 2002; 
Badertscher et al. 2012), and thus the lower observed future cost of debt could be due to superior 
future performance of earnings management firms (Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Gunny 2010). 
Although these alternative explanations do not fit well with the opportunistic nature of SDEM, 
we re-estimate Eq. (2) and include a variable of the average ROA for year t+1 and t+2 
[FutureROAt+1;t+2] and report the results in Table B.5. The slopes on SDEM and LossAvoid 
remain statistically significant, and the DecreaseAvoid slope becomes insignificant. The 
magnitude of SDEM on one-year-ahead cost of debt decreases to 12 bps (vs. 18 bps in the main 
analysis), and the magnitude of LossAvoid decreases to 55 bps (vs. 68 bps in the main analysis) 
but both remain statistically significant. As expected, FutureROAt+1;t+2 is negatively related to 
future cost of debt. The results suggest that prior conclusions are not driven by superior future 
performance of SDEM firms. Also, we observe correlations between SDEM and ROAt+1 
(ROAt+2) at low levels of 0.063 (0.049), and correlations between SDEM and ΔROAt+1 
(ΔROAt+2) at negative levels of -0.002 (-0.016) which fits poorly with a signaling explanation.  
 
4.3.2 Controlling for discretionary accruals:  
 Prior research often uses discretionary accruals as a measure of earnings quality (Dechow et 
al. 2010)37F
32
 or as a measure of earnings management (for a recent example, see Liu et al. 2018). 
SDEM firms might obtain lower cost of debt because of accrual earnings management or higher 
accounting quality, and therefore we re-estimate Eq. (2) and add four different measures of 
discretionary accruals to the right-hand side of the equation (one at a time). We describe the 
accrual estimation process and show accrual estimation tables in appendix. The results from 
                                                 
32
 For example, Dechow et al. (2010) note that “almost one hundred papers in [their] database use ‘abnormal’ 
accruals generated from an accruals model as a measure of earnings quality.” (footnote 22, p 358)  
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Table B.5: Salary Dividend Earnings Management and future Cost of Debt, controlling for future performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CostDebtt+1 CostDebtt+1 CostDebtt+1 CostDebtt+2 CostDebtt+2 CostDebtt+2 
SDEM -0.0012
***
 -0.0009
**
 -0.0010
**
 -0.0020
***
 -0.0021
***
 -0.0021
***
 
 (-2.79) (-2.07) (-2.28) (-5.69) (-6.18) (-6.12) 
LossAvoid  -0.0046
***
   0.0004  
  (-3.32)   (0.31)  
DecreaseAvoid   -0.0020   0.0016 
   (-1.52)   (1.20) 
FutureROAt+1;t+2 -0.0413
***
 -0.0413
***
 -0.0413
***
 -0.0602
***
 -0.0602
***
 -0.0602
***
 
 (-12.53) (-12.50) (-12.52) (-14.07) (-14.09) (-14.07) 
premanagedROA -0.0171
***
 -0.0172
***
 -0.0172
***
 0.0043 0.0043 0.0043 
 (-5.95) (-5.97) (-5.95) (1.20) (1.21) (1.21) 
neg_premanagedROA 0.0041
***
 0.0043
***
 0.0041
***
 0.0032
***
 0.0032
***
 0.0032
***
 
 (8.80) (9.11) (8.79) (5.16) (5.19) (5.17) 
premanagedROA 
*neg_premanagedROA  
0.0054 0.0070 0.0055 -0.0052 -0.0054 -0.0053 
 (0.79) (1.05) (0.80) (-0.96) (-0.99) (-0.97) 
TLTA 0.0067
***
 0.0067
***
 0.0067
***
 0.0117
***
 0.0117
***
 0.0117
***
 
 (2.68) (2.67) (2.68) (4.86) (4.86) (4.86) 
logTA -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0006
**
 -0.0006
**
 -0.0006
**
 
 (-0.08) (-0.10) (-0.09) (-2.08) (-2.08) (-2.06) 
premanagedOPCF 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0022 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (-1.19) (-1.19) (-1.19) 
StdROA 0.0205
***
 0.0205
***
 0.0204
***
 0.0134
***
 0.0134
***
 0.0134
***
 
 (6.57) (6.57) (6.58) (5.61) (5.61) (5.61) 
PPE -0.0038
**
 -0.0038
**
 -0.0038
**
 -0.0048
***
 -0.0048
***
 -0.0048
***
 
 (-2.54) (-2.55) (-2.54) (-3.24) (-3.24) (-3.24) 
CashTA -0.0231
***
 -0.0231
***
 -0.0231
***
 -0.0172
***
 -0.0172
***
 -0.0172
***
 
 (-8.84) (-8.85) (-8.84) (-6.66) (-6.66) (-6.66) 
Intercept 0.0581
***
 0.0582
***
 0.0582
***
 0.0534
***
 0.0534
***
 0.0534
***
 
 (14.93) (14.96) (14.95) (18.34) (18.33) (18.31) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 88,418 88,418 88,418 80,470 80,470 80,470 
Adjust R. sq. 0.0992 0.0992 0.0992 0.1050 0.1050 0.1050 
Average CostDebt 0.0443 0.0443 0.0443 0.0438 0.0438 0.0438 
This table shows the OLS regression of future cost of debt on SDEM and other controls. CostDebt is financial expenses scaled by average 
liabilities net of trade payables. SDEM is an indicator of salary dividend earnings management. LossAvoid indicates that firms use SDEM to 
avoid reporting losses. DecreaseAvoid indicates that firms use SDEM to avoid reporting earnings decreases. FutureROAt+1;t+2 is the average 
return on assets (ROA) for the years t+1 and t+2.The remaining variables are defined in appendix. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year 
(Gow et al. 2010). t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * Represent significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively (two-tailed test). All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent level. 
 
the regressions controlling for discretionary accruals are presented in Table B.6. To preserve 
space control variables are estimated but not reported. We observe that the magnitude of SDEM 
generally increases when controlling for discretionary accruals (both signed and unsigned).  
 The coefficients of the four DACC measures are interesting themselves: We find that DACC 
is positively associated with future cost of debt 38F, both when we use signed (accrual earnings 
management) and unsigned (accrual quality) DACC. This is particularly intriguing, as the 
summary statistics presented in Table B.2 suggest that SDEM firms contemporarily use accrual 
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Table B.6: Salary Dividend Earnings Management and future Cost of Debt, controlling for discretionary accruals 
Panel A: activity proxy=gross profit growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CostDebtt+1 CostDebtt+1 CostDebtt+1 CostDebtt+1 CostDebtt+1 CostDebtt+1 
SDEM -0.0021
***
 -0.0017
***
 -0.0019
***
 -0.0019
***
 -0.0015
***
 -0.0017
***
 
 (-5.31) (-4.09) (-4.16) (-4.39) (-3.37) (-3.48) 
LossAvoid  -0.0071
***
   -0.0067
***
  
  (-3.85)   (-3.65)  
DecreaseAvoid   -0.0028
*
   -0.0024 
   (-1.65)   (-1.43) 
DACCGP 0.0297
***
 0.0299
***
 0.0298
***
    
 (5.56) (5.60) (5.57)    
ABS_DACCGP    0.0217
***
 0.0216
***
 0.0217
***
 
    (4.42) (4.40) (4.42) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 80,699 80,699 80,699 80,699 80,699 80,699 
Adjust R. sq. 0.0913 0.0915 0.0913 0.0902 0.0904 0.0903 
 
Panel B: activity proxy=employee growth 
SDEM -0.0021
***
 -0.0017
***
 -0.0019
***
 -0.0019
***
 -0.0014
***
 -0.0017
***
 
 (-4.69) (-3.40) (-3.83) (-4.02) (-2.91) (-3.31) 
LossAvoid  -0.0075
***
   -0.0068
***
  
  (-4.39)   (-4.18)  
DecreaseAvoid   -0.0029
*
   -0.0022 
   (-1.70)   (-1.35) 
DACCEMPL 0.0482
***
 0.0484
***
 0.0483
***
    
 (7.67) (7.73) (7.68)    
ABS_DACCEMPL    0.0141
***
 0.0139
***
 0.0140
***
 
    (2.86) (2.82) (2.85) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 80,006 80,006 80,006 80,006 80,006 80,006 
Adjust R. sq. 0.0932 0.0934 0.0932 0.0899 0.0901 0.0899 
This table shows the OLS regression of future cost of debt on SDEM and other controls. CostDebt is financial expenses scaled by average 
liabilities net of trade payables. SDEM is an indicator of salary dividend earnings management. LossAvoid indicates that firms use SDEM to 
avoid reporting losses. DecreaseAvoid indicates that firms use SDEM to avoid reporting earnings decreases. DACC reflects discretionary 
accruals with two different growth proxies, where GP refers to gross profit growth and EMPL refers to employee growth. ABS_DACC is 
absolute values. The discretionary accrual estimation procedure is outlined in appendix. Controls include premanagedROA, 
neg_premanagedROA, premanagedROA*neg_premanagedROA, TLTA, logTA, premanagedOPCF, StdROA, PPE, and CashTA. The variables 
are defined in appendix. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Gow et al. 2010). t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * Represent 
significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively (two-tailed test). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent level. 
 
earnings management to increase earnings
33
. We interpret this important result in the following 
way: lenders are able to estimate accrual earnings management and the accrual quality of 
borrowers and compensate themselves for informational risks by charging higher interest rates 
                                                 
33
 In untabulated tests, we find that discretionary accruals are particularly income-increasing in the SDEM year 
compared to surrounding years. We observe DACCGP (DACCEG) of 0.01%, 1.2%, and 0.3% (0.2%, 1.0%, and 
0.4%) for the years t-1, t, and t+1, respectively, where year t is the SDEM year. 
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(consistent with Bharath et al. 2008; Francis et al. 2005; Vander Bauwhede et al. 2015). 
However, lenders on average do not unravel and detect SDEM and hence firms using SDEM are 
able to mislead lenders and obtain benefits in the form of lower future interest rates. 
 
4.3.3 Controlling for the owner-manager’s personal characteristics 
 We control for personal characteristics of the owner-manager, because such characteristics 
might matter for the loan decision. We re-estimate Eq. (2) and add to the right-hand side 
controls for the owner-manager’s personal wealth34, age of the owner-manager, presence of a 
criminal record, gender, and educational level. We present the results in Table B.7, and find that 
prior results remain practically unchanged (both magnitudes and levels of statistical 
significance). Interestingly, we find that the firm’s cost of debt is negatively related to the 
owner-manager’s personal wealth and age. Owner-managers with a criminal record experience 
higher cost of debt.  
 
4.3.4 Isolating non-tax driven SDEM 
 The SDEM measure relies on an assumption of approximate tax neutrality between salary 
and dividends, which is true when both the salary and dividends are taxed in the highest tax 
bracket. That is, only labor income that is shifted from the highest income tax bracket to 
dividend income in the highest tax bracket is approximate tax neutral
35
. In the following we 
generate the indicator variable SDEM_tax that takes the value one if SDEM=1, the owner-
manager’s marginal salary falls in the highest tax bracket (after the salary decrease), and the 
marginal dividend falls in the highest tax bracket (after the dividend increase)
36
, and zero 
otherwise. We report the results of estimating Eq. (2) substituting SDEM with SDEM_tax in 
Table B.8 and observe that any prior findings remain unchanged. Thus, we find it very unlikely 
that SDEM and the related implications are driven by tax optimization incentives.  
 
 
                                                 
34
 To calculate the personal wealth of an individual, we calculate personal equity and scale it with total assets of the 
firm.  
35
 As noted in section 3 in all prior analyses we exclude observations where the owner-manager moves from a high 
labor income tax bracket to a lower labor income tax bracket by shifting income from salary to dividends. Further, a 
shift from salary to dividends is costly when the owner-managers pays labor tax in the lowest tax bracket, because 
the tax rate of [tax on dividends + company tax] is higher than the labor tax rate in the lowest tax bracket.  
36
 Married owner-managers can use their spouses’ tax allowance for dividend income. We have data on marriage, 
and therefore factor this into the identification of when the owner-manager pays dividends that fall in the highest 
dividend tax bracket.  
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Table B.7: Salary Dividend Earnings Management and future Cost of Debt, controlling for personal characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CostDebtt+1 CostDebtt+1 CostDebtt+1 CostDebtt+2 CostDebtt+2 CostDebtt+2 
SDEM -0.0016
***
 -0.0013
***
 -0.0014
***
 -0.0030
***
 -0.0030
***
 -0.0031
***
 
 (-3.91) (-3.12) (-3.17) (-7.63) (-8.24) (-7.92) 
LossAvoid  -0.0054
***
   -0.0012  
  (-3.73)   (-0.80)  
DecreaseAvoid   -0.0028
*
   0.0007 
   (-1.93)   (0.51) 
PersEquityTA -0.0027
***
 -0.0027
***
 -0.0027
***
 -0.0032
***
 -0.0032
***
 -0.0032
***
 
 (-6.15) (-6.13) (-6.14) (-6.02) (-6.02) (-6.03) 
Log(age) -0.0047
**
 -0.0047
**
 -0.0047
**
 -0.0036
*
 -0.0036
*
 -0.0036
*
 
 (-2.34) (-2.35) (-2.34) (-1.83) (-1.84) (-1.83) 
Criminal 0.0024
***
 0.0024
***
 0.0024
***
 0.0022
***
 0.0022
***
 0.0022
***
 
 (3.98) (3.98) (3.97) (3.51) (3.51) (3.51) 
Female 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 
 (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.81) (0.81) (0.81) 
HighEduc -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 
 (-1.35) (-1.33) (-1.34) (-1.16) (-1.15) (-1.16) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 98,371 98,371 98,371 81,267 81,267 81,267 
Adjust R. sq. 0.0909 0.0910 0.0909 0.0842 0.0842 0.0842 
Average CostDebt 0.0443 0.0443 0.0443 0.0438 0.0438 0.0438 
This table shows the OLS regression of future cost of debt on SDEM, personal characteristics of the owner-manager, and other controls. 
CostDebt is financial expenses scaled by average liabilities net of trade payables. SDEM is an indicator of salary dividend earnings management. 
LossAvoid indicates that firms use SDEM to avoid reporting losses. DecreaseAvoid indicates that firms use SDEM to avoid reporting earnings 
decreases. PersEquityTA is the personal equity (i.e. personal assets, such as real estate, bank deposits, etc. minus personal debt, such as 
mortgage, student debt, and other debt to any financial institution) scaled by the total assets of the owner-manager’s firm. Log(age) is the 
logarithm of the owner-manager’s age. Criminal is an indicator that takes the value one if the owner-manager has a criminal record (we exclude 
traffic related offences, such as parking or speeding tickets in the definition), and zero otherwise. Female is an indicator that takes the value one 
if the owner-manager is a woman, and zero otherwise. HighEduc is an indicator that takes the value one if the owner-manager has a high 
education (bachelor, master, or PhD level), and zero otherwise. Controls include premanagedROA, neg_premanagedROA, 
premanagedROA*neg_premanagedROA, TLTA, logTA, premanagedOPCF, StdROA, PPE, and CashTA. Variables are defined in appendix. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Gow et al. 2010). t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * Represent significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10, respectively (two-tailed test). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent level. 
 
4.4 Alternative econometric estimations 
 In the following we make several attempts to test the robustness of the consequences of 
SDEM, by estimating the effect of SDEM with different econometric designs. We use 
propensity score matching, and estimate an endogenous choice model. 
 
4.4.1 Propensity score matching:  
 We use propensity score matching to alleviate concerns about functional form bias, by 
balancing potentially confounding or misspecified covariates between treatment groups 
(Shipman et al. 2017). We identify firm-years in which managers use SDEM to increase  
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Table B.8: Salary Dividend Earnings Management and future Cost of Debt, when marginal labor income and marginal 
dividend fall in the highest tax bracket 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CostDebtt+1 CostDebtt+1 CostDebtt+1 CostDebtt+2 CostDebtt+2 CostDebtt+2 
SDEM_tax -0.0028
***
 -0.0024
***
 -0.0026
***
 -0.0038
***
 -0.0036
***
 -0.0039
***
 
 (-6.88) (-5.54) (-6.14) (-8.72) (-8.87) (-9.18) 
LossAvoid_tax  -0.0070
***
   -0.0037
**
  
  (-3.74)   (-2.23)  
DecreaseAvoid_tax   -0.0030
*
   0.0005 
   (-1.78)   (0.26) 
premanagedROA -0.0334
***
 -0.0334
***
 -0.0334
***
 -0.0224
***
 -0.0224
***
 -0.0224
***
 
 (-11.39) (-11.41) (-11.39) (-8.42) (-8.43) (-8.43) 
neg_premanagedROA 0.0047
***
 0.0049
***
 0.0047
***
 0.0038
***
 0.0039
***
 0.0038
***
 
 (10.32) (10.54) (10.31) (6.45) (6.68) (6.45) 
premanagedROA 
*neg_premanagedROA  
0.0177
***
 0.0193
***
 0.0178
***
 0.0161
***
 0.0170
***
 0.0161
***
 
 (2.63) (2.93) (2.65) (3.25) (3.44) (3.26) 
TLTA 0.0072
***
 0.0072
***
 0.0072
***
 0.0121
***
 0.0121
***
 0.0121
***
 
 (3.17) (3.16) (3.17) (5.05) (5.05) (5.05) 
logTA -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0006
**
 -0.0006
**
 -0.0006
**
 
 (-0.34) (-0.35) (-0.35) (-2.19) (-2.21) (-2.19) 
premanagedOPCF -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0033
*
 -0.0034
*
 -0.0033
*
 
 (-0.88) (-0.89) (-0.88) (-1.66) (-1.66) (-1.66) 
StdROA 0.0186
***
 0.0186
***
 0.0186
***
 0.0131
***
 0.0131
***
 0.0131
***
 
 (5.55) (5.55) (5.55) (5.36) (5.37) (5.35) 
PPE -0.0037
**
 -0.0037
**
 -0.0037
**
 -0.0037
**
 -0.0037
**
 -0.0037
**
 
 (-2.54) (-2.56) (-2.54) (-2.57) (-2.57) (-2.57) 
CashTA -0.0242
***
 -0.0242
***
 -0.0242
***
 -0.0194
***
 -0.0194
***
 -0.0194
***
 
 (-10.46) (-10.48) (-10.47) (-7.44) (-7.43) (-7.44) 
Intercept 0.0577
***
 0.0577
***
 0.0577
***
 0.0525
***
 0.0525
***
 0.0524
***
 
 (15.62) (15.67) (15.65) (18.81) (18.80) (18.78) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 98,505 98,505 98,505 81,361 81,361 81,361 
Adjust R. sq. 0.0880 0.0881 0.0880 0.0808 0.0808 0.0808 
This table shows the OLS regression of future cost of debt on SDEM_tax and other controls. SDEM_tax is an indicator that takes the value one if 
SDEM=1, the owner-manager’s marginal labor income falls in the highest tax bracket, and the owner-manager’s marginal dividend income falls 
in the highest tax bracket, and zero otherwise. Married owner-managers can use their spouses’ tax allowances for dividend income, which we 
factor this into the identification of when the owner-manager pays dividends that fall in the highest dividend tax bracket. LossAvoid_tax is an 
indicator that takes the value one if LossAvoid=1 and SDEM_tax=1, and zero otherwise. DecreaseAvoid_tax is an indicator that takes the value 
one if DecreaseAvoid=1 and SDEM_tax=1, and zero otherwise. premanagedROA, neg_premanagedROA, and premanagedOPCF are re-defined 
with the SDEM_tax indicator instead of the SDEM indicator. The remaining variables are defined in appendix. Standard errors are clustered by 
firm and year (Gow et al. 2010). t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * Represent significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively (two-
tailed test). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent level. 
 
earnings, and match them with a portfolio of non-SDEM firms 32F
37
. Specifically we match on the 
variables used earlier to estimate the propensity to use SDEM (Eq. (1)) and in addition include 
current CostDebt. We locate matches within the same fiscal year and industry, require non-
                                                 
37
 For matching firms we require that they do not use SDEM for the years t-2 through t+2, where t is the SDEM 
year of treatment firms (and thus the year the matching portfolio is generated).  
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missing CostDebt observations for the years t-2 through t+2 where t is the SDEM (matching) 
year, use a tight caliper of 0.005, 1-1 matching, and match without replacement. 
 After the matching procedure, the difference between the predicted probability of SDEM is 
<0.001 (p-value=1.000) indicating successful matching. For the treated sample we find support 
(i.e. a match) for 5,820 of 5,902 firm-year observations, for which the data are available. 
Descriptive statistics on the two matched samples are presented in Table B.9, Panel A, along 
with the difference in means of the matching variables. SDEM firms have lower ΔsalaryTA of 
1.8 percentage points, indicating that SDEM firms relative to control firms use SDEM to 
increase ROA by 1.8 percentage points. Importantly, current year’s cost of debt does not differ 
between the two samples. This finding is important: since the cost of debt in year t is not 
different between the two samples, future differences must be due to current changes affecting 
the sample firms’ cost of debt.  
 Because SDEM firms have slightly higher netsalaryROA and slightly lower SalaryTA, in the 
second stage we include all matching variables to remove any remaining differences between 
the two samples (Shipman et al. 2017) and present the results in Panel B of Table B.9. In 
column (1) and (2) we observe that SDEM is (still) significantly related to future cost of debt 
with slightly lower magnitudes: firms using SDEM in year t obtain lower cost of debt in year 
t+1 (t+2) of 14 bps (24 bps) (vs. 18 bps and 32 bps in the main analysis, respectively). 
Additionally, in column (3) we show the results of difference-in-difference estimation, and find 
that SDEM firms experience a decrease in the cost of debt from year t to year t+1 of 27 bps 
relative to the control firms (i.e. the difference in difference), captured by the slope on 
TREATED*POST.  
 Additionally, in Figure B.4 we plot the cost of debt for the two samples for the years t-2 
through t+2 and observe that the cost of debt are converging for the two samples preceding the 
SDEM year, whereas the cost of debt diverges following the SDEM year. Collectively, the 
results from the propensity score matching analysis provide compelling support for our prior 
conclusions.  
 Next, we replicate the above propensity score matching procedure for the firms using SDEM 
to avoid reporting a loss, but make some important changes: We match loss avoidance firms’ 
pre-managed ROA with non-SDEM firms’ reported ROA, and require non-SDEM firms’ 
reported ROA to be below zero. That is, firms in the treated sample are firms with pre-managed 
earnings below zero, but reported earnings above zero (LossAvoid=1), and firms in the control 
sample have reported earnings below zero. In untabulated analyses, we find that LossAvoid is 
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Table B.9: Propensity score matching: Treated sample (SDEM) vs. control sample (PSM matched) 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics        
 Treated (SDEM) Control (MATCH) Treated-Control 
 N mean p50 N mean p50 Diff t-value 
[diff] 
Match 
var? 
netsalaryROA 5,820 0.081 0.058 5,820 0.076 0.056 0.005
**
 (2.36) YES 
ΔnetsalaryROA 5,820 0.003 0.001 5,820 0.001 0.001 0.003 (1.37) YES 
DebtTA 5,820 0.490 0.497 5,820 0.488 0.492 0.003 (0.70) YES 
logTA 5,820 8.774 8.695 5,820 8.756 8.694 0.018 (0.96) YES 
netsalaryOPCF 5,820 0.065 0.058 5,820 0.060 0.054 0.004 (1.09) YES 
SalaryTAt-1 5,820 0.108 0.080 5,820 0.112 0.076 -0.004
**
 (-2.04) YES 
CashTAt-1 5,820 0.127 0.057 5,820 0.124 0.049 0.003 (0.91) YES 
Employees 5,762 13.506 9.000 5,757 13.680 8.000 -0.174 (-0.60) NO 
ΔSalaryTA 5,820 -0.016 -0.010 5,820 0.002 0.001 -0.018*** (-49.17) EM† 
CostDebtt 5,820 0.044 0.038 5,820 0.044 0.040 -0.000 (-0.14) YES 
N       11,640   
 
Panel B: Regressions 
   
 Pooled OLS regressions DiD regression 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 CostDebtt+1 CostDebtt+2 CostDebtt+1 
SDEM -0.0014
***
 -0.0024
***
  
 (-2.63) (-3.37)  
TREATED*POST   -0.0027
***
 
   (-4.37) 
TREATED   0.0014
***
 
   (3.67) 
POST   0.0010 
   (1.57) 
premanagedROA -0.0117
**
 -0.0130
**
 -0.0112
**
 
 (-2.11) (-2.38) (-2.24) 
ΔpremanagedROA 0.0043 0.0071 0.0061 
 (0.87) (1.19) (1.22) 
DebtTA -0.0281
***
 -0.0300
***
 -0.0320
***
 
 (-3.25) (-3.90) (-5.33) 
DebtTA
2 
0.0262
***
 0.0279
***
 0.0300
***
 
 (3.38) (4.08) (6.26) 
logTA -0.0004 0.0005 -0.0004 
 (-1.32) (1.36) (-1.03) 
netsalaryOPCF -0.0095
***
 -0.0073
***
 -0.0089
***
 
 (-5.71) (-5.31) (-5.80) 
SalaryTAt-1 -0.0039 0.0055 -0.0027 
 (-1.40) (1.45) (-0.76) 
CashTAt-1 -0.0122
***
 -0.0143
***
 -0.0129
***
 
 (-5.29) (-4.68) (-7.27) 
CostDebtt 0.5303
***
 0.4207
***
 0.5104
***
 
 (9.98) (9.58) (9.63) 
Intercept 0.0334
***
 0.0300
***
 0.0340
***
 
 (7.32) (6.78) (9.58) 
N 11,640 11,640 19,454 
This table shows the results of propensity score matching. Panel A shows descriptive statistics per SDEM firms and propensity score matched 
controls. Panel B shows the results from regressing CostDebt for the year t+1 (t+2) on SDEM and matching variables in column (1) (column 
(2)). Column (3) shows the results of a difference-in-difference estimation using the matched sample and the control sample. TREATED is an 
indicator that takes the value one for the SDEM year t and t-1, and zero otherwise. POST is an indicator that takes the value one for the SDEM 
year t and matched firm-year t, and zero otherwise. The remaining variables are defined in appendix. In Panel B Standard errors are clustered by 
firm and year (Gow et al. 2010). t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * Represent significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively (two-
tailed test). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent level. Beyond the variables listed above, treated observations are 
matched with control observations within the same industry and fiscal year. 
†ΔSalaryTA is magnitude of SDEM and is hence not used as matching variable.  
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Figure B.4: Cost of debt over time: Sample of SDEM observations vs. PSM matched control sample 
 
This figure shows the development in the cost of debt between a sample of SDEM firms and a propensity score matched control sample. Year 
t=0 (x-axis) refers to the SDEM year for SDEM firms, and the matching year for control firms. Control firms are matched with propensity score 
matching. Descriptive statistics of the two propensity score matched samples are presented in Table B.9.  
 
associated with lower one-year-ahead cost of debt of 66 bps (p-value=0.015, two-tailed test), 
and a difference-in-difference estimator of 56 bps. However, the difference-in-difference 
estimator is insignificant at conventional levels (p-value=0.18, two-tailed test), which is likely 
because of the low sample size covering only 362 matched pairs (724 firm-years). 
 
4.4.2 Addressing endogeneity:  
 To further corroborate causality between SDEM and future cost of debt we employ an 
endogenous switching model. Essentially, the decision to use SDEM is a firm-level choice (i.e. 
is not randomly distributed) and is potentially endogenously determined with the cost of debt. 
We use an endogenous binary-variable model, where in the first stage the choice to use SDEM 
(the propensity to use SDEM) is modelled, and in the second stage the impact of SDEM on 
future cost of debt is estimated
38
. The first stage is estimated using Eq. (1) (SDEM as a function 
of DebtTA and controls) extended with an instrumental variable, and the second stage is 
estimated using Eq. (2) (CostDebtt+1 as a function of SDEM and controls). The approach we 
employ has similarities to the techniques used by Bharath et el. (2008) and Minnis (2011), but is 
more constrained as we do not allow covariates to vary between the group of SDEM firms and 
the group of other firms. The model is composed of an equation for the outcome CostDebtt+1 
and an equation for the endogenous treatment SDEM33F,  
                                                 
38
 We estimate the model using the stata command etregress 
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𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡+1 =  𝛿𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡̂ + 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  (3) 
𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 =  {
1, if 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 > 0
0, otherwise                                                           
  
 
The instrument we use – a variable that is related to the earnings management decision, but is 
not directly related to the cost of debt variable – is intended to proxy the probability that a 
manager has knowledge about managing earnings through SDEM. For this, we use the variable 
ShareOfSDEM; the share of managers within the same municipality that use SDEM. We require 
at least 50 identified firm-managers (the denominator) per municipality-year.  
 The results of both the first stage (Panel B) and second stage (Panel A) of the estimation are 
presented in Table B.10. The instrument we use, ShareOfSDEM, is highly significant in 
predicting SDEM. When using this estimation technique the impact of SDEM on future cost of 
debt increases in magnitude: the magnitude of SDEM increases to 35 bps (vs. 18 bps in the 
main analysis). In these regressions, the indicator LossAvoid is only marginally significant. This 
result is likely influenced by the fact that SDEM is instrumented, whereas LossAvoid (a 
subcategory of SDEM observations) is not.  
 
4.5 Interview evidence 
 To this end, we have provided a battery of empirical evidence supporting our hypothesis that 
SDEM firms are able to obtain cost of debt benefits. To explore the channel through which firms 
are able to obtain cost of debt benefits, we conduct interviews with four of the five Danish 
“systematic important” banks and thus our interviews cover a very large share of the Danish 
loan market. We provide descriptive information as well as an interview guide and notes from 
the interviews in appendix.  
 From these interviews we learn the following key points, largely supporting our findings: (1) 
Banks to a large extent rely on financial statements and reported numbers. Financial statements 
contribute to about 70-80% of the credit score. Some banks extract financial statement 
information from central databases, and some manually enters the information based on publicly 
available reports. Both sources contain accounting information as reported. (2) Banks can and 
do adjust reported numbers. Adjustments typically happen on the balance sheet, and lenders 
typically look for changes in accounting standards or unexplained changes in working capital. 
(3) Banks collect private information such as revenue data and EBITDA data (which are not 
always publicly disclosed in the annual report), and soft information such as assessments of  
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Table B.10: Endogenous choice model 
 
Panel A: Second Stage 
   
 (1) (2) (3) 
 CostDebtt+1 CostDebtt+1 CostDebtt+1 
𝐒𝐃𝐄?̂? -0.0035
***
 -0.0033
***
 -0.0035
***
 
 (-4.65) (-4.23) (-4.52) 
LossAvoid  -0.0029
*
  
  (-1.73)  
DecreaseAvoid   -0.0002 
   (-0.17) 
premanagedROA -0.0169
***
 -0.0169
***
 -0.0169
***
 
 (-11.30) (-11.31) (-11.29) 
neg_premanagedROA 0.0016
***
 0.0017
***
 0.0016
***
 
 (4.05) (4.35) (4.06) 
premanagedROA 
*neg_premanagedROA 
0.0176
***
 0.0188
***
 0.0176
***
 
 (3.72) (3.92) (3.72) 
DebtTA
 
-0.0038
***
 -0.0038
***
 -0.0038
***
 
 (-5.70) (-5.72) (-5.70) 
logTA -0.0002
*
 -0.0002
*
 -0.0002
*
 
 (-1.81) (-1.86) (-1.82) 
premanagedOPCF -0.0014
**
 -0.0014
**
 -0.0014
**
 
 (-2.21) (-2.22) (-2.21) 
StdROA 0.0085
***
 0.0085
***
 0.0085
***
 
 (5.41) (5.41) (5.41) 
PPE -0.0023
***
 -0.0023
***
 -0.0023
***
 
 (-4.86) (-4.88) (-4.86) 
CashTA -0.0142
***
 -0.0142
***
 -0.0142
***
 
 (-16.64) (-16.64) (-16.64) 
CostDebtt 0.5096
***
 0.5096
***
 0.5096
***
 
 (68.16) (68.15) (68.16) 
Intercept 0.0350
***
 0.0350
***
 0.0350
***
 
 (20.76) (20.77) (20.76) 
Industry FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
    
Panel B: First Stage    
 (4) (5) (6) 
 SDEM SDEM SDEM 
ShareOfSDEM 6.4639
***
 6.4573
***
 6.4663
***
 
 (21.61) (21.60) (21.63) 
SmallLoss  0.1239
***
  
  (4.72)  
SmallDecrease   -0.0399
*
 
   (-1.91) 
DebtTA 0.2958
*
 0.3095
**
 0.2939
*
 
 (1.95) (2.03) (1.93) 
DebtTA
2
 -0.4899
***
 -0.5094
***
 -0.4875
***
 
 (-3.22) (-3.34) (-3.20) 
netsalaryROA 0.2468
***
 0.2929
***
 0.2416
***
 
 (3.18) (3.75) (3.12) 
ΔnetsalaryROA -0.4137*** -0.4209*** -0.4155*** 
 (-5.42) (-5.50) (-5.45) 
netsalaryOPCF 0.1879
***
 0.1869
***
 0.1881
***
 
 (5.49) (5.46) (5.50) 
CashTAt-1 0.1231
***
 0.1239
***
 0.1228
***
 
 (2.85) (2.87) (2.84) 
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SalaryTAt-1 0.7200
***
 0.7222
***
 0.7168
***
 
 (7.92) (7.94) (7.88) 
logTA 0.1468
***
 0.1471
***
 0.1476
***
 
 (15.37) (15.38) (15.45) 
Intercept -3.2545
***
 -3.2769
***
 -3.2552
***
 
 (-27.74) (-27.93) (-27.74) 
Industry FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
N 81,819 81,819 81,819 
This table shows both the first and second stage of the endogenous choice model estimation.  
First stage: ShareOfSDEM is the instrument, and is the percentage of firms within the owner-manager’s residential municipality that use SDEM, 
and is calculated per municipality year. SDEM is an indicator of salary dividend earnings management. SmallLoss is an indicator that takes the 
value one if netsalaryROA∈[-0.02;0[, and zero otherwise. SmallDecrease is an indicator that takes the value one if ΔnetsalaryROA∈[-0.02;0[, 
and zero otherwise. The remaining variables are defined in appendix.  
Second stage: SDEM̂ is the instrumented SDEM variable from the first stage. CostDebt is financial expenses scaled by average liabilities net of 
trade payables.  LossAvoid indicates that firms use SDEM to avoid reporting losses. DecreaseAvoid indicates that firms use SDEM to avoid 
reporting earnings decreases. The remaining variables are defined in appendix.  
Standard errors are clustered by firm. t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * Represent significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively 
(two-tailed test). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent level. 
 
management quality, market position, supply chain, customers, suppliers, and other general 
risks. However, no bank indicated that salary was consistently collected. (4) Banks are 
concerned about owner-managers paying an abnormally high salary and hence squeeze dry the 
company, rather than owner-managers using salary strategically to influence reported earnings. 
(5) Salary and dividend levels are not really a concern if the borrower firm’s performance is 
good. (6) Credit scoring models of banks “penalize” firms with negative income. (7) The 
majority the banks agree that SDEM could induce benefits in the form of cost of debt. Further, 
Danish banks rely on internally developed credit scoring models rather than ratings provided by 
rating agencies, at least for small engagements.  
 
5.  LIMITATIONS, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 Limitations 
5.1.1 Potential omitted variables:  
 Prior literature identifies several variables as significant factors influencing a firm’s loan 
interest expense, which are unavailable for the sample firms. Such variables include loan terms, 
collateral, distance to the bank, length of bank relationship, and audit (including quality of 
audit). We point out, however, that potential omitted variables driving our results must correlate 
positively with SDEM and negatively with cost of debt. Also, alternative stories must explain 
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the changes in cost of debt that we observe when we use propensity score matching and 
difference-in-difference estimations.  
 The presence of an audit as an explanation for the results does not seem plausible. For 
example, Minnis (2011) finds that firms with audited financial statements obtain lower cost of 
debt, and Becker et al. (1998) and Caramanis and Lennox (2008) document a negative relation 
between audit and earnings management. If audited financial statements drive the results we 
observe, the choice to audit must coincide with the year in which the firm uses SDEM, which 
seems counterintuitive to prior research.  
 
5.1.2 Limitations of the SDEM measure:  
 Albeit we view SDEM as a novel and direct way of identifying earnings management in 
owner-managed firms, and find that the prevalence of SDEM is higher around the zero earnings 
benchmark and preceding new debt issuance (i.e. events that prior research links to earnings 
management) we acknowledge several limitations of the SDEM measure: (1) We do not take 
into account the potential impact of non-salary expenses, such as social security contributions. 
However, in Denmark healthcare is available to everybody and is not paid as a separate 
insurance (independent on your tax contribution/salary) and other social security contribution 
are low compared to most other countries
39
, and are often not linearly linked to the salary level. 
(2) We do not take into account the timing of tax payments: Tax related to firm losses are not 
paid out immediately but are carried forward to offset future firm income. Further, we cannot 
observe whether managers pay out dividends to their private account or pay out dividends to 
their holding company. In the latter case the owner-manager can shift the tax burden to future 
years. Albeit timing issues exist, the effective tax rate over time is not changed.  (3) Due to data 
limitations we estimate dividends from changes in equity and income figures, and thus risk that 
dividend calculations are distorted by other comprehensive income such as fair value 
adjustments recognized directly on equity. (4) We observe only salary paid from the legal entity 
itself (the operational company) and hence we do not take into account in our analysis any 
salary paid from related (for example holding) companies. 
 
                                                 
39
 https://www.bdo.dk/en-gb/insights/tax-and-vat/danish-social-security-contributions  
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5.2 Discussion and conclusion 
 In this paper we investigate earnings management practices in owner-managed firms: a 
setting in which manager-shareholder agency conflicts are practically absent, but in which 
agency conflicts between the owner-manager and lenders are severe. We use a novel measure of 
earnings management (when owner-managers shift income from salary to dividends) and exploit 
a unique Danish setting in which owner-managers have discretion to shift income at no or at 
only marginal direct cost, and where researchers can gain access to salary data.  
 We use this setting to generate a novel earnings management measure, the SDEM measure, 
and find that owner-managed firms indeed use earnings management, and are able to obtain cost 
of debt benefits by doing so. Further, such behavior is strengthened when pre-managed earnings 
are just below zero, and firms using SDEM to transform a loss into a reported profit almost 
triple their SDEM induced cost of debt benefit.  
 We contribute to the earnings management literature and the commercial lending literature by 
addressing the severe agency conflicts arising between firm managers and lenders when the 
firm-manager is also the owner of the firm, and by showing that these agency conflicts influence 
the financial reporting of owner-managed firms. Despite these rather obvious agency conflicts, 
we show that owner-managers are on average successful in misleading even sophisticated 
investors (i.e. the bank) and obtain cost of debt benefits. This finding applies only to 
sophisticated earnings management (SDEM, where owner-salary levels are not publicly 
available) but not to accrual earnings management.  
 We also extend the earnings management literature by introducing a novel measure of 
earnings management particularly relevant for small, private firms. Although not applicable in 
all countries, we show in appendix that tax alignment is present in several large OECD 
countries, such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Spain, Germany, and Norway. Also, we 
make a contribution to the literature on earnings discontinuities, by providing evidence on 
owner-managed firms’ use of earnings management to avoid negative earnings reports, but not 
to avoid earnings decreases, and that avoiding negative earnings reports (but that avoiding 
earnings decreases does not) provide economic benefits to the firm in the form of significantly 
lower interest rates.  
 Our findings have implications for banks and other users of financial reports (such as 
suppliers, customers, and potential investors) and are rather obvious: they should be aware of 
the severe lack of governance mechanisms in owner-managed firms and its diverted effects on 
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the financial reporting. The findings also have regulatory implications: For example, the 
conceptual framework of IASB states that the objective of financial reporting is to “provide 
financial information that is useful to users in making decisions relating to providing resources 
to the entity”40, and our findings raise the question to which extend owner-managed firms 
should disclose specific financial information, such as manager salary or significant salary 
changes.  
  
                                                 
40
 https://www.ifrs.org/-/media/project/conceptual-framework/fact-sheet-project-summary-and-feedback-
statement/conceptual-framework-project-summary.pdf  
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7.  APPENDIX 
Table B.11: Variable definitions 
Variable Measure of Definition 
 
Earnings 
management, 
earnings 
benchmarks, and 
earnings variables 
  
SDEM Indicator of earnings 
management 
SDEM is an indicator variable that takes the value one if (i) salary 
is cut by min. 5%, (ii) salary is cut by minimum 10,000 DKK, (iii) 
the salary decrease does not shift the owner-manager’s marginal 
labor income to a lower tax bracket, and (iv) 
[𝛥𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡  𝑜𝑟 𝛥𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡+1] are increased by min. 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 ∗ (1 − 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦), and zero otherwise.  
TA Total assets  
ROA 
 
 
 
netsalaryROA 
 
 
 
 
premanagedROA 
ROA as reported 
 
 
 
ROA before salary 
changes 
 
 
 
ROA adjusted for 
salary if SDEM=1 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
 
 
 
𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑅𝑂𝐴 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
 
 
 
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑂𝐴 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
  
𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑀 = 1 
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑂𝐴 = 𝑅𝑂𝐴  
ΔROA 
 
 
 
ΔnetsalaryROA 
 
 
 
 
ΔpremanagedROA 
Changes in ROA 
 
 
 
Changes in ROA 
before salary changes 
 
 
 
Changes in ROA 
adjusted for salary if 
SDEM=1 
𝛥𝑅𝑂𝐴 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
 
 
 
𝛥𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑅𝑂𝐴 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 − ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
 
 
 
𝛥𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑂𝐴
=
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 − ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
  
𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑀 = 1 
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝛥𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑂𝐴 = 𝛥𝑅𝑂𝐴  
LossAvoid Indicator of beating 
the zero earnings 
benchmark by using 
SDEM 
LossAvoid is an indicator variable that takes the value one if 
premanagedROA<0 and reportedROA≥0, and zero otherwise.  
DecreaseAvoid Indicator of beating 
the last year’s 
earnings benchmark 
by using EM 
DecreaseAvoid is an indicator variable that takes the value one if 
ΔpremanagedROA<0 and ΔreportedROA≥0, and zero otherwise. 
SalaryTA Potential for SDEM 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑇𝐴 =
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
 
ΔSalaryTA Impact of SDEM on 
ROA 
𝛥𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑇𝐴 =
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
 
SmallLoss Indicator of small pre-
managed loss 
SmallLoss is an indicator that takes the value one if  
netsalaryROA∈[-0.02;0[, and zero otherwise 
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SmallDecrease Indicator of small pre-
managed earnings 
decrease 
SmallDecrease is an indicator that takes the value one if  
ΔnetsalaryROA∈[-0.02;0[, and zero otherwise 
 
Cost of debt and 
leverage variables 
  
DebtTA Debt to total assets 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑇𝐴 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 − 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝐴
 
 
TLTA Total liabilities to 
total assets 
𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝐴
 
CostDebt Cost of debt Financial expenses to average debt net of trade payables.  
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 =
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
(𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡 + 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡−1)/2
 
Where  
Debt=Total Liabilities – Trade Payables 
NewDebt Indicator that the firm 
raises new debt in the 
following year 
The calculation is based on the debt used to define DebtTA and 
CostDebt.  
 
𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 = 1 𝑖𝑓 
(𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡−1)
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
> 0.05 
else, NewDebt = 0 
 
Components of 
ROA 
  
NOA Net operating assets 
(the “magnitude” of 
accrual-related line 
items) 
 
𝑁𝑂𝐴 =
𝑁𝑂𝐴_𝐵𝑆𝑡 − 𝑁𝑂𝐴_𝐵𝑆𝑡−1
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
 
 
Where 
NOA_BS is Net Operating Assets before scaling 
𝑁𝑂𝐴_𝐵𝑆 = 𝑂𝐴 − 𝑂𝐿 
 
Where 
OA = Operating Assets  
= total assets 
-cash and cash equivalents 
-properties held for sale 
-receivables from closely held parties 
 
OL = Operating Liabilities 
= total liabilities 
-long term interest bearing debt 
-current part of mortgage 
-current part of bank debt 
-liabilities to closely related parties 
-dividends if included in current liabilities 
OPACC Operating accruals 
 
𝑂𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐶 =
𝑁𝑂𝐴_𝐵𝑆𝑡 − 𝑁𝑂𝐴_𝐵𝑆𝑡−1
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
 
Where 𝑁𝑂𝐴_𝐵𝑆 is NOA before scaling with total assets 
OPCF 
 
 
 
Operating cash flow 
(all cash flows 
generated from 
operating activities)  
𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 − (𝑁𝑂𝐴_𝐵𝑆𝑡 − 𝑁𝑂𝐴_𝐵𝑆𝑡−1)
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
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netsalaryOPCF 
 
 
 
 
premanagedOPCF 
 
OPCF before salary 
changes 
 
 
 
OPCF adjusted for 
salary if SDEM=1 
𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹 =
𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹_𝐵𝑆 − ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
 
Where 𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹_𝐵𝑆 is OPCF before scaling with total assets 
 
 
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹 =
𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹_𝐵𝑆 − ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
 
𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑀 = 1 
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹 = 𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹 
DACC Discretionary accruals  Residuals from the following estimation model 
𝑂𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽3𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽7𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽9𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡+2 +
𝛽10𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    
 
negOPCF is an indicator of negative OPCF.  
 
Growth is either:  
Gross profit growth: [ΔGP] 
𝛥𝐺𝑃 =
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑡−1
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
 
Or  
Employee growth [ΔEMPL] 
𝛥𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿 =
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑡−1
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑡−1
 
Where Employees is the number of full time equivalent 
employees. 
 
DACCGP refers to the residuals estimated with ΔGP.  
DACCEMPL refers to the residuals estimated with ΔEMPL. 
NACC Normal accruals The fitted values from the OPACC regression above.  
 
Control variables 
  
StdROA Smoothness of 
earnings 
Standard deviation of ROA. Calculated using the five most recent 
years’ data, requiring at least three years’ observations.  
PPE Asset composition Tangible fixed assets to total assets.  
CashTA Asset composition 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑇𝐴 =
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝐴
 
FutureROA[t+1;t+2] Future profitability Average of ROAt+1 and ROAt+2 
logTA Size  Logarithm of total assets.  
ShareOfSDEM Instrument: Share of 
managers using 
SDEM within the 
same municipality.  
Measure of 
“probability of having 
knowledge of SDEM” 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑓𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑚,𝑡
𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑀 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑚,𝑡
𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑚,𝑡
 
 
The number of SDEM observations within municipality m in time 
t, scaled by the total number of identified CEOs within 
municipality m in time t. 
 
Personals 
  
PersEquityTA Owner-manager’s 
personal equity scaled 
by total assets 
The variable proxies the wealth of the owner-manager on the 
individual level, and potential for personal collateral relative to 
the size of the company. 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑇𝐴 =
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑇𝐴
 
  
PersEquity=Personal Assets-Personal Liabilities 
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Where,  
Personal Assets include bank deposits, traded securities (shares, 
bonds, etc.), and cash value of property/house. Boat value, car 
value, and pensions are not included in the calculation.  
 
Personal Liabilities include all debt to financial institutions, 
including bank debt, debt to other financial institutions, study 
debt, and mortgage. Private debt (for example debt to parents) 
data are naturally not available.   
Age Owner-manager’s age  
Log(age) Logarithm of Age  
Criminal Owner-manager has a 
criminal record 
Criminal is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the 
owner-manager has a prior criminal record, and zero otherwise. 
Traffic-related offences (for example speeding tickets or parking 
tickets) are excluded from the definition. 
Female Owner-manager is 
female 
Female is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the 
owner-manager is female, and zero otherwise.  
HighEduc Owner-manager has a 
university education 
(Bachelor, Master, 
PhD)  
HighEduc is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the 
owner-manager holds either a bachelor’s degree, a master’s 
degree, or a PhD degree, and zero otherwise.  
 
Other constructs  
  
DIV Dividends 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − (∆𝑆𝐻𝐹 − ∆𝑆𝐻𝐶𝐴𝑃) 
Where  
SHF = shareholders’ funds (equity) 
SHCAP = share capital 
ΔGP Gross profit growth 
(activity level) 
𝛥𝐺𝑃 =
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑡−1
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
 
ΔEMPL Employee growth 
(activity level) 
𝛥𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿 =
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑡−1
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑡−1
 
 
Where Employees is measured as full time equivalents.  
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CEO identification strategy  
 Private firms are mandated to file to the Danish Business Authority the names, addresses and 
CPR-numbers (unique personal identification numbers) of the firm’s executive management, but 
are not mandated to state the specific roles of each management team member, i.e. sometimes 
the data do not reveal the CEO, CFO, etc. The majority (89.86%) of CEOs are identified 
because there is only one executive manager identified per firm-year. For the remaining non-
unique firm-year observations we identify the CEO as (numbers in parenthesis denote the 
percentage of observations identified through each step): (1) The executive who has filed with 
the Danish Business Authority his/her status as CEO (and not just “executive”) (1.46%), (2) the 
executive who has filed with the Danish Business Authority his/her status as “director” instead 
of “member of direction” (0.08%), (3) the executive with the most ownership (4.01%), (4) the 
executive with the highest salary (4.02%), (5) the executive with the highest position 
classification provided by Statistics Denmark
41
 (0.35%), (6) the executive with longest tenure 
(0.21%). Any remaining firms in which a single CEO is not yet identified are removed from the 
sample.  
 
Discretionary accruals estimation  
 We estimate discretionary accruals to proxy for discretionary earnings management and 
accrual quality. In the estimation we follow Larson et al. (2018) and implement minor 
adjustments.  
𝑂𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 × 𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽5𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 × 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡+1 +
𝛽9𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡+2 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
(4) 
Where i denotes the firm and t denotes the fiscal year. OPACC is total operating accruals, OPCF 
is total operating cash flow, and NOA is net operating assets. Growth is either the change in 
gross profit scaled by lagged assets [ΔGP] or the year on year percentage growth in employees 
[ΔEmpl]. negOPCF indicates negative OPCF and serves to control for asymmetric timeliness in 
recognition of good and bad news (Ball and Shivakumar 2006)
42
. We include lagged ROA to 
control for the impact of performance on the accrual process (Kothari et al. 2005). INDUSTRY 
                                                 
41
 We learn from discussions with Statistics Denmark representatives that their position classification data are low 
quality, and use only this approach as a last resort 
42
 Larson et al. (2018) use market-to-lagged-book values (which are obviously not available for private firms) to 
control for asymmetry in profit/loss recognition.   
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and YEAR indicator variables control for fixed effects. OPACC, OPCF and NOA are scaled by 
lagged assets.  
 We estimate Eq. (4) with OLS and use the residuals as measure of discretionary accruals. The 
results of this regression are listed in Table B.12. We note that that all coefficients are 
significant and with the expected sign (see Larson et al. 2018), and observe a high adjusted R
2
 of 
0.78-0.8529F
43
.  
 
Table B.12: Accrual estimation 
 (1) (2) 
 OPACC OPACC 
ΔGP 0.2488***  
 (30.34)  
ΔGP*NOAt-1
 
0.0306
***
  
 (3.06)  
ΔEmpl  0.0408*** 
  (15.09) 
ΔEmpl*NOAt-1  0.0133
***
 
  (3.07) 
OPCFt-2 0.0381
***
 0.0382
***
 
 (20.85) (12.58) 
OPCFt-1 0.0635
***
 0.0633
***
 
 (15.85) (14.44) 
OPCF -0.7686
***
 -0.6750
***
 
 (-108.65) (-57.44) 
OPCFt+1 0.0584
***
 0.0716
***
 
 (13.99) (12.66) 
OPCFt+2 0.0279
***
 0.0342
***
 
 (15.34) (13.07) 
ROAt-1 0.3609
***
 0.2681
***
 
 (29.25) (14.39) 
negOPCF -0.0043
***
 -0.0059
***
 
 (-3.39) (-4.17) 
negOPCF*OPCF -0.1617
***
 -0.2551
***
 
 (-21.25) (-28.36) 
Intercept 0.0189
***
 0.0228
***
 
 (4.76) (3.95) 
Industry FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
N 80,699 80,006 
Adjust R. sq. 0.8509 0.7882 
This table shows the OLS regression of operating accruals on variables that explain accruals. OPACC is total operating accruals. ΔGP is the 
change in gross profit scaled by lagged assets. ΔEmpl is the change in the number of full-time equivalent employees scaled by lagged number of 
employees. NOA is net operating assets. OPCF is cash flows calculated from the balance sheet approach including all line items related to 
operations, scaled by lagged assets. ROA is return on assets. negOPCF is an indicator variable for negative OPCF. Standard errors are clustered 
by firm and year (Gow et al. 2010). t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * Represent significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively (two-
tailed test). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent level. 
                                                 
43
 Larson et al. (2018) find that their determinants explain 38.5 percent of the variation in operating accruals (table 
5). The fit statistics we observe are likely affected by the inclusion of industry and year fixed effects.  
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Marginal tax rates over time, Denmark  
 
 
D
iv
id
e
n
d
 in
co
m
e
C
o
m
p
an
y 
ta
x
D
iv
id
e
n
d
 +
 c
o
m
p
an
y 
ta
x
Lo
w
e
st
 d
iv
id
e
n
d
 b
ra
ck
e
t 
(d
iv
id
e
n
d
)
H
ig
h
e
st
 d
iv
id
e
n
d
 b
ra
ck
e
t 
(d
iv
id
e
n
d
)
P
e
rc
e
n
t,
 t
ax
 b
ra
ck
e
t
Th
re
sh
o
ld
s 
(D
K
K
t)
P
e
rc
e
n
t,
 t
ax
 b
ra
ck
e
t
Th
re
sh
o
ld
s 
(D
K
K
t)
P
e
rc
e
n
t,
 t
ax
 b
ra
ck
e
t
La
b
o
r 
ta
x 
b
ra
ck
et
: 
La
b
o
r 
ta
x 
b
ra
ck
et
: 
Ye
ar
1
2
3
1 
to
 2
2 
to
 3
1
2
3
1 
to
 2
2 
to
 3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
20
18
39
.5
2%
56
.4
9%
49
8.
9
27
%
42
%
52
.9
22
.0
%
43
.1
%
54
.8
%
n
.a
.
-3
.5
%
13
.4
%
-1
5.
2%
1.
7%
20
17
40
.2
6%
56
.4
3%
47
9.
6
27
%
42
%
51
.7
22
.0
%
43
.1
%
54
.8
%
n
.a
.
-2
.8
%
 
-1
4.
5%
1.
7%
20
16
40
.3
0%
56
.4
4%
46
7.
3
27
%
42
%
50
.6
22
.0
%
43
.1
%
54
.8
%
n
.a
.
-2
.8
%
13
.4
%
-1
4.
5%
1.
7%
20
15
40
.2
9%
56
.4
5%
45
9.
2
27
%
42
%
49
.9
23
.5
%
44
.2
%
55
.6
%
n
.a
.
-3
.9
%
12
.3
%
-1
5.
3%
0.
8%
20
14
40
.1
1%
56
.2
2%
44
9.
1
27
%
42
%
49
.2
24
.5
%
44
.9
%
56
.2
%
n
.a
.
-4
.8
%
11
.3
%
-1
6.
1%
0.
0%
20
13
40
.2
6%
56
.2
3%
42
1
27
%
42
%
48
.3
25
.0
%
45
.3
%
56
.5
%
n
.a
.
-5
.0
%
11
.0
%
-1
6.
2%
-0
.3
%
20
12
40
.8
7%
56
.0
5%
38
9.
9
27
%
42
%
48
.3
25
.0
%
45
.3
%
56
.5
%
n
.a
.
-4
.4
%
10
.8
%
-1
5.
6%
-0
.4
%
20
11
40
.8
8%
56
.0
6%
38
9.
9
28
%
42
%
48
.3
25
.0
%
46
.0
%
56
.5
%
n
.a
.
-5
.1
%
10
.1
%
-1
5.
6%
-0
.4
%
20
10
40
.9
0%
56
.0
6%
38
9.
9
28
%
42
%
48
.3
25
.0
%
46
.0
%
56
.5
%
n
.a
.
-5
.1
%
10
.1
%
-1
5.
6%
-0
.4
%
20
09
42
.0
8%
57
.3
1%
62
.8
3%
34
7.
2
34
7.
2
28
%
43
%
45
%
48
.3
10
6.
1
25
.0
%
46
.0
%
57
.3
%
58
.8
%
-3
.9
%
11
.3
%
16
.8
%
-1
5.
2%
0.
1%
4.
1%
20
08
42
.5
6%
49
.4
2%
62
.9
6%
27
9.
8
33
5.
8
28
%
43
%
45
%
46
.7
10
2.
6
25
.0
%
46
.0
%
57
.3
%
58
.8
%
-3
.4
%
3.
4%
17
.0
%
-1
4.
7%
-7
.8
%
4.
2%
20
07
42
.8
6%
49
.2
1%
62
.9
6%
27
2.
6
32
7.
2
28
%
43
%
45
.5
25
.0
%
46
.0
%
57
.3
%
n
.a
.
-3
.1
%
3.
2%
17
.0
%
-1
4.
4%
-8
.0
%
5.
7%
20
06
42
.8
8%
49
.2
3%
62
.9
6%
26
5.
5
31
8.
7
28
%
43
%
44
.3
28
.0
%
48
.2
%
59
.0
%
n
.a
.
-5
.3
%
1.
1%
14
.8
%
-1
6.
1%
-9
.7
%
4.
0%
20
05
42
.8
9%
49
.2
4%
62
.9
5%
25
9.
5
31
1.
5
28
%
43
%
43
.3
28
.0
%
48
.2
%
59
.0
%
n
.a
.
-5
.3
%
1.
1%
14
.8
%
-1
6.
1%
-9
.7
%
4.
0%
20
04
42
.8
6%
49
.2
1%
62
.9
5%
25
4
30
4.
8
28
%
43
%
42
.4
30
.0
%
49
.6
%
60
.1
%
n
.a
.
-6
.7
%
-0
.4
%
13
.4
%
-1
7.
2%
-1
0.
9%
2.
9%
20
03
43
.7
1%
49
.2
3%
62
.9
6%
19
8
29
5.
3
28
%
43
%
41
.1
30
.0
%
49
.6
%
60
.1
%
n
.a
.
-5
.9
%
-0
.4
%
13
.4
%
-1
6.
4%
-1
0.
9%
2.
9%
20
02
43
.6
9%
49
.2
1%
62
.9
6%
19
1.
2
28
5.
2
28
%
43
%
39
.7
30
.0
%
49
.6
%
60
.1
%
n
.a
.
-5
.9
%
-0
.4
%
13
.4
%
-1
6.
4%
-1
0.
9%
2.
9%
20
01
44
.9
2%
50
.3
8%
63
.3
6%
17
7.
9
27
6.
9
28
%
40
%
38
.5
30
.0
%
49
.6
%
58
.0
%
n
.a
.
-4
.7
%
0.
8%
13
.8
%
-1
3.
1%
-7
.6
%
5.
4%
20
00
45
.2
0%
50
.6
6%
63
.3
5%
16
4.
3
26
7.
6
25
%
40
%
37
.2
32
.0
%
49
.0
%
59
.2
%
n
.a
.
-3
.8
%
1.
7%
14
.4
%
-1
4.
0%
-8
.5
%
4.
2%
19
99
45
.4
7%
50
.9
3%
63
.3
4%
15
1
25
8.
4
25
%
40
%
36
32
.0
%
49
.0
%
59
.2
%
n
.a
.
-3
.5
%
1.
9%
14
.3
%
-1
3.
7%
-8
.3
%
4.
1%
19
98
45
.1
6%
50
.6
8%
62
.0
1%
13
9
25
1.
2
25
%
40
%
35
34
.0
%
50
.5
%
60
.4
%
n
.a
.
-5
.3
%
0.
2%
11
.5
%
-1
5.
2%
-9
.7
%
1.
6%
19
97
46
.5
1%
52
.0
3%
63
.8
5%
13
5.
3
24
4.
6
25
%
40
%
34
34
.0
%
50
.5
%
60
.4
%
n
.a
.
-4
.0
%
1.
5%
13
.4
%
-1
3.
9%
-8
.4
%
3.
5%
19
96
47
.0
9%
51
.7
4%
65
.3
1%
13
4.
5
24
3.
1
25
%
40
%
33
.8
34
.0
%
50
.5
%
60
.4
%
n
.a
.
-3
.4
%
1.
2%
14
.8
%
-1
3.
3%
-8
.7
%
4.
9%
19
95
46
.9
8%
54
.5
0%
66
.3
6%
13
0.
9
23
6.
6
30
%
40
%
32
.9
34
.0
%
53
.8
%
60
.4
%
n
.a
.
-6
.8
%
0.
7%
12
.6
%
-1
3.
4%
-5
.9
%
6.
0%
19
94
47
.5
1%
56
.5
3%
67
.4
2%
13
0
23
4.
9
30
%
40
%
32
.7
34
.0
%
53
.8
%
60
.4
%
n
.a
.
-6
.3
%
2.
7%
13
.6
%
-1
2.
9%
-3
.9
%
7.
0%
La
b
o
r 
in
co
m
e
 t
ax
C
ap
it
al
 in
co
m
e
C
o
m
p
ar
is
o
n
 (
la
b
o
r 
vs
. c
ap
it
al
 in
co
m
e
) 
137 
 
 
Numerical example 
 
  
Company tax 0.2450
Dividend tax 0.4200
1-((1-company tax) * (1-dividend tax)) 0.5621
Personal tax 0.5622
Simulation (using 2014 marginal tax rates) 
Pay salary Pay dividend
Firm income before tax and salary 1200 1200
Salary -800 0
EBT 400 1200
Tax -98 -294
E 302 906
Equity beginning 2000 2000
+ E 302 906
- Div 0 -604
Equity end 2302 2302
Personal income after tax 350.24 350.32
Decomposition of taxes paid: 
Company tax -98 -294
Dividend tax 0 -254
Personal tax -450 0
Total -548 -548
138 
 
 
 
Figure B.5: Difference between marginal tax rates of labor income and capital income (first taxed at the firm level as 
corporate tax and then taxed at the personal level as dividends/capital gains) 
 
This figure shows level of tax alignment between top marginal tax rates of labor income and capital income. Top marginal labor income tax rates 
are collected from OECD, table I.7, column 2 (“all-in-rate”). Top marginal capital income tax rates are collected from OECD, table II.4 
Source: OECD, 2017 numbers   
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Interview details  
 To further understand how SDEM firms obtain benefits in the form of lower cost of debt we 
conduct four semi-structured interviews with four of the five largest systematic Danish banks. 
Thus, our interviews include representatives for the vast majority of the Danish lending market. 
Because the interviewees reveal proprietary and business sensitive information all interviewees 
prefer to be anonymous, and we have not recorded any of the interviews. In the following, we 
provide descriptive information of the interviews, the interview guide that we used, and insights 
based on our notes. To avoid the identification of any specific bank, we aim to keep our 
descriptions and insights on a general level.  
 
Descriptive information 
Interview form The interviews were conducted with the semi-structured approach, where 
we prepared an interview guide preceding the interviews but allowed the 
interviewees to speak freely.  
 
To avoid blurring the interviewees’ answers, we introduced our overall 
aim – to understand the lending decisions – and let the interviewees know 
that we were investigating earnings management in private firms. 
Importantly though, we did not reveal that we are specifically investigating 
owner-managers that shift their income from salary to dividends.  
During the interview we asked how lenders use salary information, 
dividend information, how they treat different ownership structures, and in 
the end we revealed that we looked at SDEM and asked for their opinion.  
Interviewers Two of the four interviews were conducted with two of the authors 
present, and two interviews were conducted with only one of the authors 
present.  
Interviewees At one interview four interviewees were present, at one interview three 
interviewees were present, at one interview two interviewees were present, 
and at one interview one interviewee was present.  
 
The interviewees covered a range of positions and tasks, including top 
management of rating (back office), management of business customers, 
financial analysts (back office), and lending officers (front office).  
 
The interviewees were responsible for loan exposures in the range DKK 
250t – DKK 500m (EUR 33t – EUR 67m). We specifically asked about 
loans in the lower range.  
Timing of 
interviews 
One interview was conducted in the fall of 2018, and three were conducted 
during the summer of 2019.  
Interview length The interviews had a length of 45-60 minutes.  
Site Three interviews were conducted on site (i.e. at the bank’s headquarters) 
and one was conducted via telephone.  
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Interview notes 
 From the interviews we wrote notes and coded those notes with NVIVO. The following 
reveals the insights that we uncover from those interviews. To uphold the anonymity of the 
interviewee banks the term “some banks” may refer to one or more banks.  
Lending process The lending processing takes between 3 hours and one and a half day, 
depending on the complexity and size of the company. Some banks extract 
financial statement information from centralized data providers, while 
others manually enter the information from publicly available annual 
reports. In those banks that manually enter the information, the lending 
officer (front office) typically does it him/herself for small engagements, 
while is it the job of the financial analysts for larger engagements.  
 
The information is processed in a credit rating model that produces a rating 
that is presented to the lending officer. Within certain size limits, the 
lending officer has discretion to change the credit rating. Above certain 
credit ratings, the deviation from the prediction of the credit rating model 
must be approved centrally.  
Monitoring over 
time 
Some banks have annual meetings with all borrowing firms. Other banks 
use an automated model that predicts engagements that are selected for 
loan renegotiation/renewal. Other banks discretionarily pick borrower 
firms for follow-ups. 
 
Loan covenants or non-legally binding trip-wires are used in loan 
contracts, also for small private firms. However, banks differ in in when 
covenants or other trip-wires are used. Some banks use such mechanisms 
for the majority of their business loans, whereas other banks use them for 
risky borrower firms. Loans can typically be called with few months at the 
discretion of the bank.  
 
The competition level is currently perceived as high, and it is possible that 
good customers automatically see their cost of debt decreased. Because of 
the fierce competition, some banks find it difficult to increase the interest, 
and require more collateral instead.  
Hard information 
vs. soft 
information, and 
other private 
information. 
All banks view financial statements as the central element in the lending 
decision. Banks assess that financial statements contribute to about 70%-
80% of the credit score.  
 
Some banks expressed that they were moving away from a human factor 
and more towards hard information. It is possible that lending officers have 
an incentive to increase the rating to issue more loans and hence obtain 
more compensation. Other banks note that the quality assessment of 
borrower firm management is becoming relatively more important.  
 
All banks include qualitative information in their credit scoring to some 
extent. Qualitative information includes management quality, market 
position, supply chain, customers, suppliers, and general risks. One 
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interviewee mentioned that although much automatization is ongoing in 
the lending market, business lending is still a “craftsmanship”.  
 
Banks frequently ask for periodic reports, for example quarterly or 
monthly reports. However, this typically applies to larger establishments.  
Further, banks ask for revenue data and EBITDA (which are not always 
disclosed in the financial reports because they are not legally mandatory).  
 
Cash flow statements are automatically calculated from balance sheet 
numbers by the banks’ software systems.  
 
Budgets are sometimes collected, but do not seem to matter a lot in the 
credit decision.  
Adjustments to 
reported numbers 
Adjustments can vary significantly between industries.  
 
At several banks we heard that they try to follow external guidelines in the 
lending decision, such as S&P or Moody’s (we note that S&P and 
Moody’s do not mention income shifting).  
 
Some banks use scenario analysis regarding the credit rating. For example 
credit ratings are calculated with and without goodwill.  
 
Adjustments happen frequently on the balance sheet, not so often on 
performance measures.  
 
Lenders typically look for changes in accounting practices and practically 
all lenders mentioned that they look for unexplained changes in working 
capital accounts (closely related to accrual earnings management). Non-
recurring expenses are typically excluded, but we see variation between 
banks on this practice. Further, banks look into and sometimes adjust for 
goodwill (or make sensitivity analyses as described above), work in 
progress, tax assets, and other debt.  
 
However, it was also pointed out that time and resources are limited, and 
the time spent on adjusting numbers (and the lending decision in general) 
depend on the size of the loan.  
 
Notably, no interviewees mentioned the manager’s salary – even when we 
asked “do you look for something particular when the owner and the 
manager is the same person?” 
Loss firms Loss firms are typically penalized by banks. Some banks in their credit 
rating model have “bins” of earnings – and one bin naturally starts at zero. 
Others have an indicator for “loss” in their credit rating model.  
 
Interviewees generally agree that it is “difficult” to get a loan if earnings 
are negative.  
 
One interviewee mentioned him/herself that it is difficult for loss firms, 
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and firms with negative equity, to get funding, because the bank is legally 
required to hold more capital when lending to those firms.  
 
One interviewee mentioned that “a loss is a loss – the magnitude is not so 
important”.  
 
Banks assess if the loss is non-recurring or persistent.  
SDEM When we asked about how banks view the borrowing firm’s manager’s 
salary (we asked both in general and when the owner and the manager is 
the same person), the general concern was that the manager was draining 
the firm (i.e. paying an abnormally high salary). No banks answered that 
they looked at changes in salary and its potential influence on reported 
earnings.  
If the performance in the company looks good, salary is not really a 
concern.  
 
When we asked about dividends, some banks mentioned that it is the 
standard that dividends must be approved by the bank before they can be 
paid out. However, not all banks had such a policy. As with the salary 
level, the attention dividends attract depend on the performance of the 
firm. Extraordinary dividends typically attract attention.  
 
SDEM 
In the end, we revealed what we were investigating – income shifting from 
salary to dividends and lower cost of debt. Three of four banks agreed that 
this could indeed induce cost of debt benefits.  
One bank disagreed, and argued that the bank would capture such 
accounting gimmicks and qualitatively adjust the numbers – although the 
bank did not consistently require salary data from borrowing firms (and 
hence cannot consistently unravel SDEM).  
 
 
Interview guide  
 The following outlines the interview guide that we have used to guide our interviews. The 
interviews were conducted in Danish, and the interview guide is translated to English here.  
 Introduction of ourselves: We are investigating earnings management in private firms. 
We will tell you in the end what we are specifically examining.  
 Generally: What are your roles? Size of loan engagements?  
o Please explain the lending process. What happens if I walk into your shop and 
want a loan for my company?  
o What happens when the loan is issued? How do you monitor your loans?  
 Hard information 
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o How important is the annual report (are the financial statements)?  
o How do you get data from the annual report? Who gathers the information and 
enters it into the system?  
o Do you adjust the reported numbers? If so, how? Who makes adjustments?  
 Please mention the last three adjustments you made to reported numbers 
o How do you treat loss firms?  
 Soft information 
o What information do you collect beside the annual report? What do you look for?  
o How much discretion does the lending officer have to deviate from the credit 
score? Why do lending officers deviate?  
 Corporate governance 
o How does the board of directors influence the credit evaluation?  
o How does the ownership structure influence the credit evaluation?  
o Do you treat owner-managed firms in a special way? Any specific things you 
look after in this setting?  
 Risk compensation 
o How do you compensate yourself from borrower firms’ risk? 
o Interest rates?  
o Collateral? How much, what, when? Do you take collateral in firm managers’ 
private assets (such as house)?  
o Debt covenants 
 Auditing 
o Do you require borrowing firms to be audited?  
o How much does an audit matter?  
 SDEM:  
o Do you care about the salary of the firm manager?  
o How do you interpret dividends?  
o We look at SDEM – could this really have an effect?  
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ABSTRACT: It is well established in the literature that executives influence 
corporate culture and firm behavior. In this paper, I predict and find that traits of 
rank-and-file employees capture a distinct but correlated aspect of corporate culture 
beyond what is explained by executive traits. Controlling for executives’ criminal 
record, I find that firms with criminal employees are more likely to use earnings 
management. This effect is concentrated in firms where both executives and 
employees are relatively criminal. My results highlight the importance of 
employees in financial reporting, and show how employee traits can be used to 
capture corporate culture.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 Following major corporate scandals the topic of corporate culture and business ethics has 
gained increased attention from the popular press, business schools, regulatory bodies such as 
the SEC
1
, and corporate managers
2
. Corporate culture, commonly defined as the shared values 
and beliefs of employees (Liu 2016; Van Den Steen 2010), is an important determinant of 
opportunistic firm behavior. Anecdotal evidence suggests that unethical culture is linked to 
opportunistic firm behavior, and that such behavior requires cooperation of many employees. 
For example, the employees of HealthSouth were told to generate fictitious entries lower than 
$5,000 per time to avoid attention from auditors, and to move expenses to capital accounts. 
Overstating income of $2.7 billion indisputably required the participation of many employees 
and a certain corporate culture.
 3
 
 Despite the importance of corporate culture on firm behavior and thus financial reporting 
outcomes, empirical accounting and finance research on the topic has been limited, likely 
because culture is difficult to quantify. Prior research has resorted to focus on traits of firm 
executives (Liu 2016; Biggerstaff et al. 2015) relying on an assumption that rank-and-file 
employees share values and beliefs with top managers
4
, or used geographic proxies such as 
religiosity (McGuire et al. 2012; Dyreng et al. 2012), which are not firm specific.  
 Executives’ beliefs are important determinants of corporate culture because executives tend 
to hire employees with similar beliefs through screening and self-sorting mechanisms (Van Den 
Steen 2010). However, significant variation in this relation exists, and employee beliefs 
represent an important aspect of corporate culture not explained by executives’ beliefs. Prior 
theoretical research on corporate culture argues that top management beliefs capture how things 
are ought to be, whereas employee beliefs define how things actually are (O’Reilly 1989), and 
corporate culture can persist even after the original managers who contributed to defining the 
corporate culture have left the firm (Van Den Steen 2010). In this paper, I show how executive 
                                                 
1
 Linda C. Thomsen, Director, Division of Enforcement, SEC: “Finally, what we have learned from stock options 
backdating — and from every other scandal in the financial markets in recent years — is that character matters.” 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch103006lct.htm 
2
 William C. Dudley, President and CEO, New York Fed: A full speech about culture in financial institutions 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2014/dud141020a.html  
Gred Smith, former CEO of Goldman Sachs: A speech of his motivations to leave the company, blaming change in 
culture to be the key driver. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/14/opinion/why-i-am-leaving-goldman-sachs.html 
3
 See case description at https://stakeholder11.wordpress.com/2014/11/24/healthsouth-inc-a-case-of-corporate-
fraud/ 
4
 As explicitly stated by Liu (2016) “it is reasonable to assume that lower level employees have similar values as 
their leaders” (p 310) 
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traits and employee traits both separately and jointly are associated with financial reporting 
behavior in the form of earnings management. 
 I identify several channels through which employees may influence financial reporting: First, 
employees affect financial reporting through their participating role in the generation of 
financial reporting data, as the firm’s final earnings report is compiled of several sub-reports 
within the firm. Through this channel, employees can choose to (1) submit (or not submit) 
opportunistic sub-reports, and (2) comply (or not comply) with opportunistic managers’ request 
to help managing earnings. Second, employees play an important governance role and may (or 
may not) take corrective action or report intentional financial misreporting
5
. I expect such 
employee choices to be influenced by the corporate culture, because individuals seek to conform 
to group norms (Liu 2016; Hackman 1992; O’Reilly 1989).  
 I acknowledge that earnings management is not fraud per se, but lies in the grey area between 
truthful reporting and fraud at the extremes. However, I point out that fraud, defined by SAS 99 
as “an intentional act that results in a material misstatement in financial statements”, and 
earnings management, defined by Healy and Wahlen (1999) as “when managers use judgment 
in financial reporting […] to mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company […]”, are two closely related concepts, and accordingly prior 
research links corporate culture to both earnings management and fraud (Biggerstaff et al. 2015; 
Liu 2016).  
 To measure individuals’ beliefs and values I rely on comprehensive criminal registers from 
Denmark covering all crimes convicted by a Danish court dating back to 1980 of all Danish 
citizens and foreigners registered with a Danish address. Through employer-employee links 
provided by Statistics Denmark, I am able to link individual employees and their criminal record 
to the firm in which they work, and finally the financial reports of those firms. Theoretical 
research on criminality predicts that criminal behavior is driven by a lack of self-control, and 
that individuals lacking self-control are characterized as impulsive, insensitive, risk-taking, and 
short-sighted (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990), all characteristics that are closely related to 
opportunism and short-termism inherent in earnings management behavior. Accordingly, 
Davidson et al. (2015) find that firms with criminal executives are more likely to misreport.  
                                                 
5
 For example, in the case of HealthSouth an employee was the one of the first to inform the firm’s auditors about 
“severe accounting problems in the Accounting Department”.  
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 First, I examine the channels through which corporate culture influences individual behavior. 
Consistent with screening and self-sorting (Van Den Steen 2010) I document that criminal 
executives tend to employ criminal employees: The proportion of employees with a criminal 
record is about 36% higher in firms where the majority of executives have a criminal record, 
relative to firms where criminal executives are the minority. However, I observe substantial 
variation in this relation
6
, highlighting the importance of assessing both executive traits and 
employee traits when investigating corporate culture. Then, consistent with social norm theory, 
predicting that individuals seek to conform to group norms (O’Reilly 1989; Hackman 1992; 
Elster 1989), I find that individuals are more likely to commit crime when they work in a firm 
with more criminal employees. This relation holds for individuals with a prior record and for 
individuals who have never committed crime before.  
 After exploring these channels, I turn to examine how corporate culture influences firm 
behavior in the form of earnings management. Stimulated by Larson et al. (2018) I model 
comprehensive discretionary accruals (DACC) as the proportion of comprehensive operating 
accruals not explained by current cash flows, two leads and lags of cash flows, growth in 
employees (both current and for the following year), and lagged performance. I examine signed 
discretionary accruals during events where the firm raises new finance, a setting in which prior 
beliefs exist that incentives to opportunistically increase earnings are present.  
 In simple univariate mean comparisons during a firms’ issuance of new finance, I find that 
DACC of firms with a criminal executive team (majority of executives have a criminal record) 
are positive and larger than DACC of firms with a non-criminal executive team. To explore the 
influence of employees and executives collectively as well as separately, I additionally split the 
sample by the relative criminality of the workforce, where a firm’s workforce is defined as 
relatively criminal if the percentage of employees with a criminal record is above the within-
year median. In these univariate tests, I find that firms with both a criminal executive team and a 
criminal workforce increase earnings the most. Notably, firms with a criminal executive team 
and a non-criminal workforce do not use discretion in the accrual estimation to increase 
earnings. The results suggest that traits of a firm’s employees capture one important element of 
corporate culture, not fully explained by the traits of firm executives.  
                                                 
6
 For example, when the majority of executives are criminal, the standard deviation of the percentage of criminal 
employees corresponds to approximately two thirds of the mean.  
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 Then, I turn to multiple regressions. I estimate accruals in a one-step procedure (Chen et al. 
2018) controlling for (1) variables used previously to estimate discretionary accruals, (2) other 
firm-specific variables used previously in the earnings management literature (logarithm of total 
assets, gearing, earnings variability and tangibility of assets), and (3) industry and year fixed 
effects. In regressions where I include only executive effects, I find that the percentage of 
executives with a criminal background is positively associated with discretionary accruals when 
the firm raises new finance (captured by the slope on an interaction of a new finance indicator 
and a variable measuring the percentage of executives with a criminal record). Albeit 
investigating a different outcome variable the results are consistent with Davidson et al. (2015), 
who find that criminal executives are more likely to misreport. Then I add to the estimation a 
variable capturing the percentage of employees with a criminal record, and find that it is 
positively related (incremental to the effects of executives) to accruals when the firm issues new 
finance.  
 Next, I investigate the combined effect of the executive team and employees. Similar to the 
univariate analysis, I split the sample into four groups by conditioning on firms’ with (1) a 
criminal (non-criminal) executive team and (2) a criminal (non-criminal) workforce. In these 
regressions, across several different estimations, I consistently find that firms with both a 
criminal executive team and a criminal workforce are positively associated with income-
increasing accruals compared to each of the other three groups. The results provide similar 
insights as the univariate statistics described above.  
 The latter results are largely robust in regressions where I control for firm fixed effects, 
control for other governance mechanisms, and where I limit the sample to firm-year 
observations related to the issuance of new finance. Further, in indications outside discretionary 
accruals, I find some evidence that firms with criminal executives and criminal employees are 
more likely to meet or beat last year’s earnings, but not more likely to meet or beat the zero 
earnings benchmark. Also, these firms have lower earnings persistence indicating lower 
earnings quality. 
 The findings of this paper make an important contribution to the literature on corporate 
culture and financial reporting. The findings complement and extend research that relies on 
executive traits to capture corporate culture (Liu 2016; Biggerstaff et al. 2015) by showing that 
traits of rank-and-file employees capture a part of corporate culture not explained by executive 
traits. Future research might benefit from looking beyond executive traits when examining 
corporate culture and financial reporting. This applies even to settings in which data availability 
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is not as comprehensive as in this study. For example, researchers have recently started to 
extract data from LinkedIn on for example executives (Hope et al. 2019; Nguyen et al. 2019) 
and loan officers (Campbell et al. 2019), and a similar approach could be used to extract data on 
rank-and- file employees.  
 Companies are mandated to disclose detailed information about non-human investments in 
the annual report, for example the value and age of production facilities. The findings of this 
paper suggest that employees exert an influence on financial misreporting: A result that has 
implications for regulators and raises the question if companies should disclose in the annual 
report information on human capital; a significant capital factor in a knowledge economy that is 
subject to low disclosure requirements. Such disclosures could help resolve information 
asymmetries. The results thus contribute to recent literature on the information value of human 
capital disclosure (Gutiérrez et al. 2019).  
 The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: The next section discusses related research 
and develops empirical predictions. Sample composition and key measures are outlined in 
section 3. Section 4 outlines the research design and presents the results. Section 5 discusses 
results and limitations, and concludes. 
 
2.  BACKGROUND AND EXPECTATIONS 
2.1 Criminal record 
 The criminology literature lends support to the idea that criminal behavior is an observable 
outcome of a certain inherent personal trait. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990)
7
 argue that a lack of 
self-control is the essential element of criminality, independent of the nature of the crime, and 
base their theory on the assumption (and observations) that crime provides easily accomplished, 
immediate gratification, and that these motivations for crime even extend to white-collar crime, 
which is empirically supported by Blickle et al. (2006). The theory suggests that a lack of self-
control increases the propensity of individuals to obtain easy, immediate gratification through 
crimes, and permeates a nexus of an individual’s analogue behaviors such as the tendency to 
smoke, excessive drinking, driving fast, and gambling. Those individuals lacking self-control 
are characterized as impulsive, insensitive, risk-taking, and short-sighted, all characteristics that 
are closely related to opportunism and short-termism inherent in earnings management behavior. 
                                                 
7
 Gottfredson and Hirschi’s book “A general theory of crime” is considered fundamental in the criminal literature 
(Pratt and Cullen 2006) with more than 12,500 citations on Google Scholar (31 July 2019).  
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In a meta-analysis based on 21 studies and 126 size effects Pratt and Cullen (2006) provide 
empirical evidence supporting Gottfredson and Hirschi’s general theory of crime, across several 
empirical measures used to quantify “lack of self-control”. Consistently, accounting and finance 
research links criminal behavior of executives to firm behavior (Davidson et al. 2015; Kallunki 
et al. 2018), and show that opportunistic behavior is rather a “sticky” trait than a domain specific 
outcome (Ali and Hirshleifer 2017).  
 
2.2 Corporate culture and executives 
 Corporate culture is commonly defined as the shared values and beliefs of employees (Van 
Den Steen 2010; Liu 2016). Van den Steen (2010) shows analytically how corporate culture 
evolves, and derives that organizations have a tendency to develop homogenous beliefs (i.e. 
corporate culture). Two mechanisms through which the corporate culture evolves are screening 
(a manager will hire an employee with similar beliefs) and self-sorting (employees tend to 
choose to work with firms with similar beliefs), suggesting that firm managers are important 
determinants for corporate culture. Labor economics research provides extensive evidence on 
the sorting mechanism in labor markets
8
.   
 Within the finance and accounting literature, researchers find that corporate culture is an 
important contributor to firm (mis)behavior. For example, the survey and interview evidence of 
Graham, Grennan, et al. (2016) and Graham, Harvey, et al. (2016) indicate that executives view 
corporate culture as one of the top drivers of firm value, and that executives believe that 
corporate culture influences corporate ethics and proxies for earnings management. Specifically, 
they report that 85% of their respondents believe that poor culture increases the likelihood that 
employees might act “unethically”, which they proxy by compliance, tax aggressiveness, quality 
of financial reporting, and importance of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks. From the 
psychology literature, in a comprehensive meta-analysis Kish-Gephart et al. (2010) provide 
evidence that unethical culture is linked to unethical corporate outcomes, such as 
misrepresentation in financial reports or lying to customers. 
                                                 
8
 For example, prior labor economics research provides evidence that risk-averse workers sort into occupations with 
low earnings risk, and vice versa (Bonin et al. 2007; Cornelissen et al. 2011), that workers sort into certain jobs that 
match their profiles and thereby increase their wage (Dechter 2015; Jinkins and Morin 2018), and that honest 
workers self-sort into the public sector (results based on a low corruption country) (Barfort et al. 2019). 
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 A large body of quantitative research measures corporate culture based on executives’ beliefs 
and values. For example, Biggerstaff et al. (2015) find that executives who benefit from option 
backdating are more likely to engage in other forms of corporate misbehavior, such as financial 
reporting fraud, meeting or beating analyst forecasts, and accrual earnings management in order 
to meet or beat analyst forecasts, and Ali and Hirschleifer (2017) find that executives with 
opportunistic insider trades are related to outcomes of firm misconduct, such as earnings 
management, restatements, SEC enforcement actions, and shareholder litigation, suggesting that 
opportunistic firm behavior is driven by a certain corporate culture that tolerates or even 
encourages such behavior
9
.  
 Other studies use “off-the-job” traits of executives and link those personal traits to corporate 
behavior. For example, Liu (2016) finds that the corruption index of executives’ country of 
ancestry is related to firms’ engagement in earnings management, accounting fraud, option 
backdating, and opportunistic insider trading, claiming that executives’ corruption attitudes 
proxy corporate culture and a firm’s general attitude towards opportunistic behavior. Davidson 
et al. (2015) find that criminal behavior of the CEO and CFO is positively related to the 
propensity to misreport (executives named in SEC AAERs), and further find that insiders (other 
than the CEO) in firms with low frugality
10
 CEOs are more likely to be named in AAERs. They 
explain the latter results with a culture explanation, where CEOs influence the corporate culture. 
Cline et al. (2018) find that executives with personal indiscretions disseminated by news media 
(allegations of dishonesty, substance abuse, sexual misadventure, accused of violence) are more 
likely to manipulate earnings, amongst other opportunistic corporate outcomes. Indeed, 
corporate culture and opportunistic firm behavior are influenced by managers and their beliefs. 
 To the extent that the presence of a criminal record is an observable outcome measure for 
certain values and beliefs, and that firm managers influence corporate culture based on those 
values and beliefs, I predict that firms with criminal executives are relatively more prone to use 
earnings management. Albeit not the main hypothesis of this paper, for completeness and to link 
my results to related research, I formally state the following hypothesis:  
H1: Firms with criminal executives are relatively more prone to manage earnings  
 
                                                 
9
 Biggerstaff et al. attribute their findings to “unethical culture”. Ali and Hirschleifer suggest that their results are 
driven either by corporate culture or having “a set of managers who are inherently prone to cheating” (p. 491).  
10
 Frugality is a psychological trait that reflects discipline in buying and using consumer goods and services to 
achieve long-term goals. Davidson et al. measure frugality using executives’ ownership of luxury goods, such as 
expensive cars, boats, or expensive houses. See Davidson et al. for further discussion of frugality.  
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2.3 Corporate culture and employees 
 Consistent with the view of Van den Steen (2010), O’Reilly (1989) view corporate culture as 
shared beliefs and expectations by an organization’s members. O’Reilly argues that individuals 
are influenced by the common expectations by other individuals within the group, because 
individuals seek to be accepted and live up to peer individuals’ expectations and therefore ought 
to conform to other individuals’ beliefs and expectations. Hence, corporate culture functions as a 
“social control” system. This view is broadly supported in the literature, for example by 
Hackman (1992) and social norm theory (Elster 1989).  
 Whereas Van den Steen (2010) models corporate culture as an outcome of the manager’s 
decision to employ employees with similar beliefs (the sorting channel), O’Reilly (1989) 
recognizes that employee beliefs do not necessarily conform to top management beliefs, and 
note that the management’s beliefs capture how things are ought to be, whereas employee 
beliefs define “how things actually are” (p. 13). Further, Van Den Steen (2010) extend his 
theory and note that corporate culture can persist even when the original managers who 
contributed to defining the corporate culture have left the firm. From a theoretical standpoint it 
seems that employees have a say in corporate culture.  
 There are several channels through which employees can influence firm financial reporting. 
Accounting data originate far from the C-suite, and many employees participate in the 
generation of financial reporting data, because the firm’s final report is compiled of several sub-
reports within the firm. Through thus channel, employees can choose to submit (or not submit) 
opportunistic sub-reports. This phenomenon is a well-recognized issue in the management 
accounting literature, where budget targets provide subordinates incentives to manage earnings 
(Libby and Lindsay 2010; Courty et al. 2004; Jensen 2003). Employees can manage their 
earnings estimates they submit to superiors to personally gain reputation and/or obtain bonus 
payments. Also through this channel, employees can choose to comply (or not comply) with 
opportunistic managers’ request to help managing earnings, which is what happened in for 
example the HealthSouth case. In this case, employees might succumb to a manager’s pressure 
and help manage earnings in order to keep his/her job.  
 Beyond their participating role in the accounting information generation, employees play an 
important governance role and may (or may not) take corrective action or report intentional 
financial misreporting. For example, in the case of HealthSouth an employee was one of the first 
to inform the firm’s auditors about severe accounting problems in the Accounting Department. 
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Dyck et al. (2010) find that employees detect fraud more often than both the SEC and firm 
auditors and Call et al. (2016) find that firms involved in financial reporting violations take 
actions to motivate employees not to report financial misconduct emphasizing the importance of 
employees as a governance mechanism. 
 In the finance and accounting literature empirical research on employees, corporate culture 
and financial reporting is limited, likely because employee beliefs are difficult to quantify. 
Therefore, researchers have resorted to proxy corporate culture using executive traits (as 
discussed in the previous section) or used proxies such as the level of religiosity (McGuire et al. 
2012; Dyreng et al. 2012) or education (Call et al. 2017) at the geographic proximity of a firm’s 
headquarter
11
. A notable exception is the research by Guiso et al. (2015), who use employee 
survey responses administered by the Great Place To Work Institute, and find that firms in 
which employees score their executives high on integrity experience higher profitability. 
 By exploiting a hack of the infidelity website Ashley Madison, Griffin et al. (2019) find that 
financial advisors active on the webpage are significantly more likely to engage in misconduct
12
, 
and that individuals active on the webpage are significantly more likely to be defendants of SEC 
litigation alleging fraud and white-collar crime, suggesting that employees’ actions in their 
professional lives are shaped by their personal traits and beliefs. 
 Because of employees’ influence on corporate culture and their ability to affect financial 
reporting, I predict that firms with relatively criminal employees are relatively more prone to use 
earnings management, and I expect this association to be incremental to the association between 
criminal executives and earnings management. I point out that criminal employees may 
influence financial reporting themselves, or through their influence on corporate culture and thus 
non-criminal employees’ behavior, because individuals seek to conform to group norms.  
H2: Incremental to the effect of executives, firms with a criminal workforce are 
relatively more prone to manage earnings.  
 
 Lastly, because I expect criminal executives and criminal employees to capture two distinct 
but correlated aspects of corporate culture, I predict that firms with both criminal executives and 
criminal employees are relatively more likely to engage in earnings management. The 
hypothesis is motivated by anecdotal evidence (for example the case of HealthSouth) where it is 
                                                 
11
 I point out that McGuire et al. and Dyreng et al. argue that managers (end not employees) even self-select or 
conform to local norms, whereas Call et al. use a geographic proxy to capture traits of a firm’s workforce.   
12
 The forms of misconduct include customer disputes, employment separation, regulatory, and criminal violations.  
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evident that firm executives need the cooperation of a nexus of employees to push through their 
opportunistic accounting gimmicks. Therefore, firms with criminal executives who employ 
criminal employees are expected to engage the most in earnings management.  
H3: Firms with both criminal executives and a criminal workforce are relatively 
more prone to manage earnings 
 
3.  SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION AND KEY MEASURES 
3.1 Data sources and data description 
 I gather data from several sources. Throughout the process I use unique personal identifiers 
(CPR numbers
13
) and unique firm identifiers (CVR numbers
14
) to link employees and managers 
to the firms in which they work.  
 
3.1.1 Firm financials 
 From the ORBIS database, I obtain annual report data of all firms incorporated in Denmark 
for the period 1998-2016. From EXPERIAN, I obtain enriched line item accounting data on 
current assets and current liabilities enabling me to compute accruals. Non-current line items 
required for the estimation are available in the ORBIS dataset.  
 
3.1.2 Executive, ownership, employee, and criminal record data 
 Firm executives and ownership data are obtained through filings with the Danish Business 
Authority. I define an executive as an individual filed as “executive” with the Danish Business 
Authority
15.  I access the data through Statistic Denmark’s “Researcher Service” which enables 
me to link the data with other proprietary datasets held by Statistics Denmark
16
. I identify 
                                                 
13
 All persons born or residing in Denmark are assigned a unique individual national identification number. CPR 
numbers are private information. In Denmark, CPR-numbers are used by banks, employers when paying salary, 
governmental bodies, etc., enabling me to merge information on individuals from a wide variety of sources.  
14
 All legal business entities in Denmark are assigned a unique CVR-number. CVR numbers are publicly disclosed. 
15
 The Danish Business Authority requires all companies to file firm executives. Failing to do so may result in 
rejection of the firm establishment in case of a start-up or compulsory dissolution in the case of established firms.  
https://erhvervsstyrelsen.dk/sites/default/files/vejl_om_ledelses_revisor_vedtaegtsaendring.pdf.pdf.  
Further, I have been in contact with the Danish Business Authority about the enforcement and accuracy of the 
executive data. From these interviews I have learned that firms benefit from filing firm executives in the way that 
executive status is a requirement for the individual to make significant decisions on behalf of the firm (for example 
apply for debt). 
16
 When accessing the executive and ownership data through Statistics Denmark data are delivered with proprietary 
CPR numbers, which are anonymization by a proprietary key held by Statistics Denmark. Because CPR numbers 
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employees through the Integrated Database for Labor Market Research (IDAN database) 
developed and maintained by Statistics Denmark. The database contains annual information on 
employer-employee links, employment starting and termination dates, and individual level data 
on salary received from the company. It is not costly for employers to report employee data to 
Statistics Denmark, because firms have salary software that automatically report each 
individual’s income to the Danish Tax Authorities, which is then collected by Statistics 
Denmark. I define a person as an employee of a firm if he/she (1) receives salary from the firm, 
(2) is registered as an employee at year-end, and (3) is not identified as an executive. 
 I acquire access to comprehensive criminal registers through Statistics Denmark’s Researcher 
Service. The registers cover all crimes convicted by a Danish court dating back to 1980 of all 
Danish citizens and foreigners registered with a Danish address, along with a classification code 
of the crime committed
17
 and the year of the conviction.  
 
3.1.3 Sample selection 
 I merge these datasets and impose several screens. I exclude (1) financial reports not 
covering 12 months, (2) hobby firms with total assets below DKK 1m (~EUR 134t), (3) 
companies that do not meet the European Commission’s SME thresholds18, (4) extreme 
observations, potentially due to mergers or acquisitions that I cannot observe, (5) certain 
industries (financial, utilities, and state-owned) consistent with prior research, (6) subsidiaries, 
to avoid double counting of firms, (7) listed firms, (8) firm-year observations with less than 15 
full-time equivalent employees to allow variation in employee traits, and (9) observations with 
missing explanatory variables. The screening procedure is displayed in Table C.1. The final 
dataset covers the years 2001-2014
19
, 9,002 unique firms, 50,398 firm-years, 968,483 individual 
persons, 3,205,113 person-year observations, and 3,287,002 person-firm-year observations
20
.  
                                                                                                                                                            
 
are anonymized and coded by Statistics Denmark with a similar key across all datasets, I am able to link data on 
individuals across several datasets (including their criminal background and financial information) and to the firms 
in which they work, and unable to observe a person’s CPR number and name. 
17
 Description of criminal classification codes are available at 
 https://www.dst.dk/da/Statistik/dokumentation/Times/kriminalstatistik/afg-ger7 (in Danish) 
18
 The SME definition is based on total assets, revenue, and the number of employees. To extend the availability of 
revenue data (because the majority of firms are subject to exemption rules allowing them to not report revenue) 
needed to compute the SME category I obtain access to proprietary data on revenue from tax filings through 
Statistics Denmark. If revenue data are still unavailable I use only total assets and the number of employees to 
define SMEs.  
19
 I note that accounting information for the years preceding and following this period is included in the financial 
ratio generation. Also, the preceding and following years are included to compute leaded and lagged cash flows 
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Table C.1: Sample selection procedure 
Note Screen applied Observations 
dropped 
Sample size Decrease in 
sample size, 
% 
 Firm-years with employer-employee link  1,013,945  
 Keep financial reports with 12 months 308,515 705,430 30% 
1 Keep firm-years with ta>1m 161,429 544,001 23% 
2 Keep SMEs 46,761 497,240 9% 
3 Remove extreme variables 51,926 445,314 10% 
4 Remove certain industries 51,469 393,845 12% 
5 Remove subsidiaries 5,323 388,522 1% 
 Remove listed firms 545 387,977 0% 
6 Remove firm-years with less than 15 employees 291,617 96,360 75% 
  Keep observations with variables available for 
estimation 
45,962 50,398 48% 
This table shows the sample selection procedure. Notes: (1): I exclude observations with less than DKK 1m in total assets to remove small 
hobby companies. (2): I follow the SME definition of the European Commission available at https://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/business-friendly-
environment/sme-definition_da. To extend the availability of revenue data (because the majority of firms are subject to exemption rules allowing 
them to not report revenue) needed to compute SME category I obtain access to proprietary data on revenue from tax filings through Statistics 
Denmark. If revenue data are still unavailable I use only total assets and the number of employees to define SMEs (3): In addition to winsorizing 
procedures, I apply several screens to avoid regressions being influenced by extreme outliers. I remove the following: ROA>1, ROA<1, firms 
with negative equity, growth in GP scaled by assets >1, growth in GP scaled by assets <1. (4): Consistent with prior accounting and finance 
research I exclude certain regulated industries (financials and utilities), and further exclude state-owned companies. (5) To avoid double 
counting I exclude subsidiaries. (6): For any given firm-year, I require at least 15 employees (measured as full-time equivalents) to allow 
variation in employee traits. 
 
3.2 Key variables 
3.2.1 Criminal executives and criminal workforces 
 On the person level, I define an indicator CRIME that takes the value one if a person has a 
prior criminal record, excluding crimes related to traffic offences such as parking tickets, 
speeding tickets, etc. (similar to Kallunki et al. 2018), and zero otherwise
21
. Then, I aggregate 
the CRIME information to the firm-year level, and construct the following variables:  
 %CrimEXEC denotes the percentage of executives with a criminal record (percentage of 
executives where CRIME=1) within a firm-year, and %CrimEMPL denotes the percentage of 
employees with a criminal record (percentage of employees where CRIME=1) within a firm-
year. %CrimEXEC is used to test H1 and %CrimEMPL is used to test H2.  
                                                                                                                                                            
 
used for accrual estimation (for example, observations for the year 2014 include cash-flow information for the years 
2012-2016).   
20
 The number of person-firm-year observations is slightly higher than the number of person-year observations, 
because one person can be employed at more than one firm at the same time. 
21
 In untabulated tests I repeat all analyses using only traffic related offences and find insignificant results, 
indicating that more serious crimes (i.e. non-traffic related crimes) are driving the results.  
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 Then, to test H3, I divide the observations into four groups based on both the proportion of 
executives with a criminal record and the proportion of employees with a criminal record. First, 
I define when the executive team is classified as criminal and when the workforce is classified 
as criminal. The variable CrimEXEC takes the value one if the majority of the executive team 
members has a criminal record (%CrimEXEC>0.5), and zero otherwise. The variable 
CrimEMPL takes the value one if the proportion of employees with a criminal background is 
above the within-year median (%CrimEMPL>within-year median of %CrimEMPL), and zero 
otherwise. I use the within-year median of %CrimEMPL to define CrimEMPL to overcome 
fluctuations of criminal employee distributions over time, and to measure the “criminality” of 
the workforce relative to other firms. I use a cutoff of 0.5 (i.e. the “majority”) of executives to 
define CrimEXEC, because only one executive is identified for 82% of the sample observations, 
and thus using the within-year median is not feasible. From these definitions, I categorize the 
observations into four groups, as depicted in Table C.2:   
Table C.2: Four groups based on CrimEXEC and CrimEMPL 
Groups based on CrimEXEC 
and CrimEMPL 
CrimEXEC=1 CrimEXEC=0 
CrimEMPL=1 1/1 0/1 
CrimEMPL=0 1/0 0/0 
Where the 1/1 group (both executives and the workforce are relatively criminal) is the group 
relevant for testing H3.  
 
3.2.2 Discretionary accruals 
 I estimate discretionary accruals (DACC) as the residuals of the following estimation: 
𝑂𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐺𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐺𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐺𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽4𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽5𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛽8𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡+2 +
𝛽9𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 +
∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
(1) 
where i indexes firms and t indexes time (year). OPACC is comprehensive operating accruals, 
including both working capital accruals and non-current operating accruals. Following Larson et 
al. (2018) I control for current comprehensive operating cash flows (OPCF), two leads and lags 
of OPCF, growth in employees (EMPLGR
22
), and an interaction of EMPLGR and lagged net 
operating assets scaled by assets (EMPLGRt*NOAt-1).  
                                                 
22
 Revenue data, as used in conventional research when estimating discretionary accruals, is not available for the 
vast majority of the sample firms due to exemption rules allowing firms below certain thresholds to not disclose 
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 Additionally, I control for negative cash flows (dumOPCF) and an interaction between 
negative cash flow and cash flow (DumOPCF*OPCF) to allow a piecewise linear relation 
between current OPCF and OPACC (Ball and Shivakumar 2006)
23
. Further, I complement 
Larson et al.’s (2018) model and include lagged return on assets (ROAt-1) to control for 
performance (Kothari et al. 2005). I control for lagged ROA and not current ROA because 
current ROA and current OPCF would perfectly explain OPACC. I also control for future 
employee growth (EMPLGRt+1) because firms invest based on expectations to future growth 
(Collins et al. 2017)
24
. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level to 
accommodate for outliers, and all variables are defined in appendix. I point out that in all but 
descriptive analyses I estimate discretionary accruals in a one-step procedure (Chen et al. 2018).  
 
3.2.3 New finance 
 In my identification of an opportunistic setting in which the firm has incentive to manage 
earnings, I use events where the firm raises new financing (either debt or equity financing). In 
my identification I follow Godsell et al. (2017), who likewise base their analysis on ORBIS 
data, and use a similar method to identify an opportunistic setting when using accruals as proxy 
for earnings management
25
.  
 First, I calculate the difference between long-term bank debt in year t+1 and long-term bank 
debt in year t-1, and scale the difference by assets in year t-1. I define DEBT_ISSUE as an 
indicator variable taking the value one if the change in debt scaled by assets is larger than 0.05, 
and zero otherwise. Second, I calculate the difference between shareholders’ equity in year t+1 
and shareholders’ equity in year t-1, and further deduct the sum of net income in year t and net 
income in year t+1, and scale this number by assets in year t-1. I define EQUITY_ISSUE as an 
indicator variable taking the value one if the change in equity (controlling for concurrent 
income) scaled by lagged assets is larger than 0.05, and zero otherwise. Finally, I define the 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
revenue. Instead, I use employee growth – a growth measure not subject to manipulation (as for example revenue) – 
similar to Allen et al. (2013) and Larson et al. (2018).  
23
 I point out that Larson et al. (2018) use a piecewise version of MTB (market-to-book ratio) to model 
conditionally conservative accruals, but use negative cash flows (DumCF and DumCF*CF) in robustness tests. 
Market values are naturally not available for private firms.  
24
 I note that Collins et al. (2017) use MTB to proxy for growth opportunities, which is not available for my sample. 
Therefore, I use realized employee growth for year t+1 instead.  
25
 Godsell et al. provide a detailed description of their procedure on page 445 
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variable NEW_FIN as an indicator variable taking the value one if either DEBT_ISSUE or 
EQUITY_ISSUE equals one, and zero otherwise. 
 The variable captures firms raising new finance in year t or t+1. Due to the lack of cash flow 
statements I am not able to directly observe cash flows originating from financing activities; 
hence I proxy those using ORBIS’ standardized balance sheet items. 
 
4.  EMPIRICAL DESIGN AND RESULTS 
4.1 Empirical design  
 I estimate the effect of criminal executives and criminal employees on accruals with the 
following equation:  
𝑂𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑉𝑂𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐸𝑊_𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑉𝑂𝐼𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝐸𝑊_𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅  +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
(2) 
where i indexes firms and t indexes time (year). OPACC is comprehensive operating accruals, 
including both working capital and non-current operating accruals (inspired by Larson et al. 
2018). VOI is the variable of interest, and refers to %CrimEXEC, %CrimEMPL, or the four 
groups based on CrimEXEC and CrimEMPL (1/1, 1/0, 0/1, 0/0, respectively), dependent on the 
hypothesis being tested. The indicator NEW_FIN captures a setting in which the firm has an 
incentive to manage earnings, which is important when investigating discretionary accruals 
(Godsell et al. 2017). The slope on β3 captures the incremental effect of VOI on accruals, given 
that the firm issues new finance, and is used to test the hypotheses H1 through H3. The research 
design of using interactions to capture the incremental effect of a construct in a certain setting is 
commonly used in related research (Ayers et al. 2006 Table 1, Panel D; Balsam et al. 2002 
Table 3; Call et al. 2014 Table 5; Frankel et al. 2016 Table 5; Gul et al. 2003 Table 4; Doukakis 
et al. 2019 equation 1).  
 FIRM_CONTROLS are firm specific variables used in prior research examining earnings 
management (Chen et al. 2018), and include the logarithm of total assets (Log(TA), a measure of 
size), total liabilities to total assets (TLTA), the standard deviation of return on assets 
(STD_ROA), and property, plant and equipment (PPE). DACC_CONTROLS are firm-specific 
variables used to estimate innate and discretionary accruals, as defined earlier. INDUSTRY and 
YEAR indicators control for industry and year fixed effects.  
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 Following Chen et al. (2018) I estimate discretionary accruals with a one-step procedure, 
rather than the conventional two-step procedure
26
, which has proved to provide biased estimates. 
The slope on VOI (and β3) thus captures the effect of VOI on accruals controlling for the effects 
of known determinants of accruals and earnings management.  
 In the main analysis, by using interactions I impose a structure between OPACC and 
FIRM_CONTROLS and DACC_CONTROLS, respectively, that does not differ when the firm 
issues new finance (NEW_FIN=1) and when it does not (NEW_FIN=0). In robustness tests I 
relax this restriction and repeat the analysis where I limit the sample to firms issuing new 
finance (and hence β2 and β3 disappear from Eq. (2)). These estimations come at the cost of 
reduced statistical power as the number of observations decreases significantly.  
 
4.2 Channels through which corporate culture influences criminal behavior  
 The theoretical literature predicts two channels through which corporate culture influences 
individuals’ behavior and thereby firm behavior: (1) Firms with a criminal executive team 
attract criminal individuals through sorting mechanisms (Van Den Steen 2010), and (2) 
individuals are likely to act in accordance with the firm culture because individuals seek to 
conform to group norms (O’Reilly 1989; Hackman 1992; Elster 1989). In the following I 
empirically examine each of the two channels. 
 In Table C.3 I provide descriptive information on the correlation between criminal executives 
and criminal employees. For the full sample, I find that firms with a criminal executive team are 
more likely to have a higher proportion of employees with a criminal background employed. 
The pearson (biserial) correlation between %CrimEXEC (CrimEXEC) and %CrimEMPL is .187 
(.381). Additionally, a firm in which the majority of executives have a criminal record on 
average has 36% (.209/.154) more criminals employed, than a firm with a similar number of 
employees and a minority of executives with a criminal background. These simple statistics 
provide empirical evidence for an underlying assumption of Liu (2016) and Biggerstaff et al. 
(2015); that executives tend to hire employees with similar beliefs. However, as evident from 
standard deviations and the interquartile range I empirically show that significant variation 
exists in the relation between criminal executives and criminal employees.  
                                                 
26
 Conventionally, researchers in the first stage estimate discretionary accruals as the residual of an OLS regression. 
In the second stage the residuals from the first stage are typically used as dependent variable. However, such 
procedure ignores correlations between control variables from the first stage and control variables from the second 
stage and thus biases coefficient estimates.  
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Table C.3: Criminal executives and criminal employees 
Correlations             
σ(%CrimEXEC, %CrimEMPL), pearson 0.187       
σ(CrimEXEC, %CrimEMPL), biserial 0.381       
σ(CrimEXEC, CrimEMPL), tetrachoric 0.208       
              
              
Descriptive statistics           
  CrimEXEC=1 
  N Mean Std p25 p50 p75 
%CrimEMPL 7,827 0.209 0.139 0.103 0.179 0.286 
CrimEMPL 7,827 0.625 0.484       
              
  CrimEXEC=0 
  N Mean Std p25 median p75 
%CrimEMPL 42,555 0.154 0.104 0.08 0.134 0.207 
CrimEMPL 42,555 0.474 0.499       
This table shows correlations between criminal executives and criminal employees, as well as distributions of criminal employees conditioning 
on criminal executives. %CrimEXEC denotes the percentage of executives with a prior criminal record. %CrimEMPL denotes the percentage of 
employees with a prior criminal record. CrimEXEC indicates that the majority of executives have a criminal record. CrimEMPL indicates that 
the workforce is relatively criminal, and takes the value one when the percentage of employees with a criminal record is above the within-year 
median. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent level. 
 
 Then, in Table C.4 I estimate on the individual level the propensity to commit a new crime as 
a function of firm characteristics and controls for personal characteristics. Column 1 and 2 show 
the estimation with individuals with and without a prior record and column 3 and 4 limit the 
sample to individuals without any prior record. I estimate the propensity with a hazard model 
(Shumway 2001), and therefore observations for the time-period following the first 
“NEW_CRIME” observation are not included in the estimation27. The estimations show that the 
propensity to commit crime is positively affected by both the percentage of executives and the 
percentage of employees with a criminal background, in the firm in which the individual is 
employed, suggesting that corporate culture influences behavior on the individual level. One 
standard deviation in %CrimEMPL is associated with an increase in the probability of 
committing a crime in any given year of about 0.11 percentage points ([0.0100 or 
0.0095]*0.112)
28
, or about 8% of the sample average probability (0.11/0.0136). 
 
 
                                                 
27
 In untabulated analyses I estimate comparable models with logistic regression and obtain qualitatively similar 
results. In these regressions the slope on %CrimEMPL is even higher than reported in this paper.  
28
 Standard deviation is extracted from Table C.5.  
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Table C.4: Criminal firms and propensity of individuals to commit new crime 
Sample: Individuals with and without 
prior record 
 Individuals without prior record 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
  NEW_CRIMEt NEW_CRIMEt  NEW_CRIMEt NEW_CRIMEt 
  Coefficient Marginal 
effect 
 Coefficient Marginal 
effect 
Firm variables      
 %CrimEMPLt-1 2.6672
***
 0.0100
***
  2.9230
***
 0.0095
***
 
  (16.35)   (14.83)  
 %CrimEXECt-1
 
0.1999
***
 0.0008
***
  0.1919
***
 0.0006
***
 
  (4.00)   (3.33)  
 
Person variables 
     
 Log(age) -1.1039
***
 -0.0042
***
  -1.1890
***
 -0.0038
***
 
  (-18.64)   (-17.75)  
 Female -1.5338
***
 -0.0058
***
  -1.5470
***
 -0.0050
***
 
  (-22.02)   (-20.63)  
 Married -0.5267
***
 -0.0020
***
  -0.5384
***
 -0.0017
***
 
  (-10.46)   (-8.99)  
 HighEduc -0.6454
***
 -0.0024
***
  -0.6142
***
 -0.0020
***
 
  (-4.80)   (-4.23)  
 CORRUPT 0.4774
***
 0.0018
***
  0.5186
***
 0.0017
***
 
  (6.68)   (6.59)  
 PersEquity -0.1845
***
 -0.0007
***
  -0.1754
***
 -0.0006
***
 
  (-4.49)   (-3.67)  
 #CRIMESt-1 0.1539
***
 0.0006
***
    
  (13.92)     
 Intercept -1.7287
***
   -1.5610
***
  
  (-8.94)   (-7.22)  
N 2,367,116 2,367,116  2,124,838 2,124,838 
Pseudo R. sq. 0.0676   0.0688  
AUROC 0.7577   0.7601  
NEW_CRIME (estimation sample) 0.0038  0.0033 
NEW_CRIME (all individuals) 0.0136 
This table shows the influence of firms on individuals’ propensity to commit new crime. Estimated with a hazard function (Shumway 2001).  
NEW_CRIME indicates that an individual commits crime in the year. #CRIMES denotes the number of crimes an individual has committed. 
HighEduc indicates that an individual holds a university degree. CORRUPT indicates that an individual has emigrated (first or second 
generation) from a country with a corruption index below 80 (Transparancy International’s ranking, a high index denotes low corruption). 
PersEquity is an individual’s personal equity measured in DKK million. %CrimEXEC denotes the percentage of executives with a prior criminal 
record. %CrimEMPL denotes the percentage of employees with a prior criminal record. Hazard adjusted z statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * 
Represent significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively (two-tailed test). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 
percent level. 
 
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
4.3.1 General descriptive statistics 
 Table C.5 provides descriptive statistics for firm specific and person specific variables. The 
average sample firm has approximately 42 full time equivalent employees and is relatively small 
with total assets of EUR 6.4m. Further, I note that 23% of the firm-year observations are 
classified as NEW_FIN=1 observations. 82% of the firm-year observations have only one 
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executive filed with the Danish Business Authority. 17% of executives have a criminal record, 
and on average 16% of a firm’s workforce have a criminal record29.  
 
Table C.5: Descriptive statistics 
 count mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
 
Firm variables 
        
TA (DKKm) 50,398 47.9 122.0 1.0 10.8 21.7 48.4 6,861.8 
TA (EURm)  50,398 6.4 16.3 0.1 1.4 2.9 6.5 914.9 
TLTA 50,398 0.639 0.196 0.133 0.509 0.664 0.790 0.976 
STD_ROA 50,398 0.078 0.078 0.006 0.031 0.055 0.095 0.516 
PPE 50,398 0.259 0.228 0.000 0.067 0.190 0.407 0.880 
NEW_FIN 50,398 0.231 0.421 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
Variables related to discretionary accruals estimation 
EMPLGR 50,398 0.036 0.178 -0.871 -0.053 0.006 0.098 1.500 
NOA 50,398 0.476 0.304 -0.389 0.284 0.498 0.683 1.275 
ROA 50,398 0.075 0.115 -0.229 0.010 0.055 0.126 0.481 
OPACC 50,398 0.032 0.185 -0.466 -0.066 0.017 0.117 0.688 
OPCF 50,398 0.043 0.211 -0.656 -0.062 0.041 0.153 0.643 
DumOCPF 50,398 0.389 0.488 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
DACC 50,396 0.000 0.073 -0.218 -0.039 -0.001 0.039 0.227 
 
Person variables 
       
EMPLOYEES 50,398 42.1 37.3 15.0 19.0 28.0 48.0 250.0 
EXECUTIVES 50,398 1.2 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 15.0 
%CrimEXEC 50,398 0.173 0.366 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
%CrimEMPL 50,398 0.162 0.112 0.000 0.083 0.140 0.217 1.000 
 
Governance variables 
       
OM 50,398 0.566 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Board_present 50,398 0.863 0.344 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
CEO_onboard 50,398 0.645 0.478 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
This table shows descriptive statistics of firm specific variables, variables used for discretionary accrual estimation, person specific variables, 
and governance variables. All firm-specific ratios and ratios used to estimate discretionary accruals are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
Firm specific variables and variables used to estimate discretionary accruals are defined in appendix (along with all other variables). Person 
specific variables are aggregated to firm-year level. %CrimEXEC denotes the percentage of executives with a prior criminal record. 
%CrimEMPL denotes the percentage of employees with a prior criminal record. OM denotes owner-managed firms. Board_present denotes that 
the firm has a board. CEO_onboard denotes that the CEO is on the board. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent level. 
 
 In Table C.6 I show the distribution of offences. Column 1 shows the percentage of all 
sample persons with a criminal record, per type of crime. Column 2 and 3 split the sample by 
executives and employees respectively. In column 4-6 the sample is limited to person-years with 
a criminal record, and shows the distribution of crimes across all sample persons, executives and 
                                                 
29
 These percentages are slightly lower than reported in Kallunki et al. (2018), potentially because Kallunki et al. 
include individuals who have been under investigation for serious crimes, however not convicted, in their definition 
of criminal individuals. In this study, I include only convicted criminals, because most Western countries operate 
under the concept of “presumption of innocence” or “innocent until proven guilty”. 
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employees, respectively. I observe that approximately 46% of executive crimes are related to 
“offences of other specialty laws”. This category covers a wide range of laws, and includes 
restraining orders, offences of the bookkeeping act, offences of marketing practices, and many 
more
30. 28% of executive crimes are related to “offences against property” including document 
forgery and fraud, burglary, theft, embezzlement and general fraud. These two offence 
categories represent the two largest executive crime categories. 9.2% of the executives’ offences 
relate to violent offences, and 1.5% relate to sexual offences. From column 5, I find that 45% of 
employees’ offences relate to “offences against property”, and 16% relate to “offences of other 
specialty laws” as described above. As with the executives, these two offense categories 
represent the two largest crime categories of employees.  
 
Table C.6: Distribution of offences 
    Sample: all observations Sample: CRIME=1 
Crime 
code 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Offence Individ. Exec. Empl. Individ. Exec. Empl. 
11 Sexual offences 0.42% 0.29% 0.42% 1.90% 1.48% 1.91% 
12 Violent offences 3.35% 1.81% 3.38% 15.20% 9.21% 15.30% 
13 Offences against property 9.86% 5.49% 9.94% 44.71% 28.00% 44.99% 
14 Other offences 1.41% 1.13% 1.41% 6.39% 5.76% 6.40% 
32 Drug related offences 1.98% 0.24% 2.01% 8.99% 1.22% 9.12% 
34 Weapon related offences 1.13% 0.97% 1.13% 5.12% 4.95% 5.12% 
36 Tax and fiscal offences 0.19% 0.72% 0.18% 0.87% 3.66% 0.82% 
38 Offences of other specialty laws 3.71% 8.96% 3.61% 16.83% 45.70% 16.34% 
Total   22.05% 19.61% 22.09% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Observations (person-years) 3,205,113 60,002 3,145,111 706,657 11,766 694,891 
This table shows the distribution of offences per executives and employees. “Crime code” refers to the 2-digit offence codes used in the criminal 
registers available at https://www.dst.dk/da/Statistik/dokumentation/Times/kriminalstatistik/afg-ger7 (in Danish). I point out that the total 
percentage differs from the percentage of criminals reported in Table C.5, because one person can be convicted for more than one offence. Code 
14 offences (Other offences) include offences against public authority, false statement in court, crimes related to money and evidence, 
smuggling, illegal business, and more. Code 38 offences (Offences of other specialty laws) include offences of the immigration act, offences of 
the consolidation act of order, offences of the administration of justice act, restraining orders, offences of the act of bookkeeping, offences of the 
marketing practices act, and more.  
 
4.3.2 Discretionary accruals, criminal executives, and criminal employees 
 In the following I provide univariate statistics of discretionary accruals (DACC) for firm-year 
observations related to the issuance of new finance (NEW_FIN=1), across CrimEXEC, 
CrimEMPL, and the four groups mixed by CrimEXEC and CrimEMPL, respectively. I provide 
these univariate statistics in Table C.7.  
                                                 
30
 Full overview of laws covered by this category is available at  
https://www.dst.dk/da/Statistik/dokumentation/Times/kriminalstatistik/afg-ger7 (in Danish) 
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Table C.7: Discretionary accruals across criminal executives and criminal employees traits, conditional on NEW_FIN=1 
                
Panel A: Criminal executives and DACC     
  
Non-criminal executives 
CrimEXEC=0     
Criminal executives 
CrimEXEC=1 Difference 
DACC 0.003
***
     0.008
***
 0.005
**
 
  (3.37)     (4.22) (2.37) 
N 9,778     1,834 11,612 
      
Panel B: Criminal employees and DACC     
  
Non-criminal employees 
CrimEMPL=0     
Criminal employees 
CrimEMPL=1 Difference 
DACC 0.001     0.006
***
 0.004
***
 
  (1.06)     (5.62) (2.93) 
N 5,413     6,199 11,612 
                
Panel C: Criminal executives, criminal employees, and DACC    
 
Non-criminal executives and 
CrimEXEC=0   
Criminal executives and 
CrimEXEC=1  
  
Non-criminal 
workforce 
CrimEMPL=0 
Criminal 
workforce 
CrimEMPL=1 Difference   
Non-criminal 
workforce 
CrimEMPL=0 
Criminal 
workforce 
CrimEMPL=1 Difference 
DACC 0.001 0.005
***
 0.004
**
   0.003 0.010
***
 0.007
*
 
  (0.79) (4.04) (2.19)   (0.93) (4.62) (1.69) 
N 4,820 4,958 9,778   593 1,241 1,834 
This table shows the average discretionary accruals (DACC) when the firm issues new finance, by (1) criminal executives (majority of 
executives have a criminal record) and (2) criminal workforce (the proportion of employees with a criminal record above within-year median).  
CrimEXEC indicates that the majority of executives have a criminal record. CrimEMPL indicates that the workforce is relatively criminal, and 
takes the value one when the percentage of employees with a criminal record is above the within-year median. t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, 
* Represent significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively (two-tailed test). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 
percent level. 
 
Criminal executives: In Panel A, I find that DACC of firms run by criminal executives 
(CrimEXEC=1, i.e. the majority of executives are criminal) are positive (0.008) and significantly 
larger than DACC of firms run by non-criminal executives (CrimEXEC=0) (two-tailed t-test of 
means, p-value=0.018). These results provide initial evidence that firms run by criminal 
executives are associated with income-increasing accrual earnings management when issuing 
new finance, consistent with H1.  
 
Criminal employees: In Panel B, I find that DACC of firms with relatively criminal employees 
(CrimEMPL=1, i.e. the percentage of employees with a criminal record is above the within-year 
median) are positive (0.006) and significantly larger than DACC of firms with relatively non-
criminal employees (CrimEMPL=0) (two-tailed t-test of means, p-value<0.01). These tests 
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provide initial evidence that firms with a relatively criminal workforce are associated with 
income-increasing accrual earnings management when issuing new finance, consistent with H2.  
 To further explore the relation between employees and discretionary accruals, I classify 
observations into quantiles based on the 3-year changes in %CrimEMPL (i.e. the changes in the 
percentage of employees with a criminal record). In Figure C.1, Panel A, I display the changes 
in DACC per changes in %CrimEMPL quintile, and observe a remarkably linear trend. I point 
out that in these plots, I do not condition on NEW_FIN=1, because very few firms issue new 
finance in one year, change the composition of the workforce, and then issue new finance three 
years later. In Panel B, I show a comparable plot, but include only those firms without any CEO 
changes, i.e. I hold the CEO fixed. These plots provide further evidence for H2.  
 
Figure C.1: Changes in %CrimEMPL and changes in DACC 
Panel A: All firms 
 
Panel B: Firms where the CEO does not change 
 
This figure shows the 3-year changes in DACC per 3-year changes in %CrimEMPL quintile. The x-axis denotes the 3-year change in 
%CrimEMPL quintile. The left hand side y-axis shows the 3-year DACC change (bars). The right hand side y-axis shows the 3-year 
%CrimEMPL change (line).  
 
Criminal executives and criminal employees: In Panel C, I show the collective influence of 
executives and employees on discretionary accrual choices. Conditioning on the executive team 
being criminal (CrimEXEC=1) I find that firms with criminal employees (CrimEMPL=1), 
relative to firms with non-criminal employees (CrimEMPL=0) use discretion to increase 
earnings more when the firm issues new finance. The difference in DACC is 0.7 percentage 
points and is (marginally) statistically significant (two-tailed t-test of means, p-value=0.091). 
Conditioning on the executive team not being criminal (CrimEXEC=0) firms with criminal 
employees (CrimEMPL=1) use discretionary accruals to increase earnings by 0.04 percentage 
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points more than firms with non-criminal employees (CrimEMPL=0) (two-tailed t-test of means, 
p-value=0.029). These results provide additional empirical evidence on the influence of 
employees on financial reporting and support H2.  
 The average DACC of firms with criminal executives and criminal employees (0.010) is 
significantly larger than the average DACC of firms with non-criminal executives and criminal 
employees (0.005) (two-tailed t-test of means, p-value=0.036, untabulated), suggesting that the 
effect of criminal individuals on financial reporting is mostly pronounced when both executives 
and employees have criminal backgrounds, consistent with H3.   
 In Figure C.2 I graph time-series properties of DACC across the four CrimEXEC/CrimEMPL 
groups as described above. Time (x-axis) refers to year relative to the NEW_FIN=1 year(s). The 
graphs shows an upward kink in year t=0, i.e. when the firm issues new finance, for the 1/1 
group, i.e. where CrimEXEC=1 and CrimEMPL=1. The preceding and following years do not 
show any sign of income-increasing earnings management. The graph resembles that reported 
by Cohen and Zarowin (2010 Table 2) investigating discretionary accruals around seasoned 
equity offerings, and gives confidence that discretionary accruals capture earnings management 
in this setting. For the other three groups such a relationship is not very pronounced, if present at 
all. The results corroborate the findings above, and depict the importance of investigating 
accruals in a setting where incentives provide a priori expectation on the sign of DACC.  
 
4.4 Regression results  
 In the following, I extend the univariate insights above with multiple regressions. I estimate 
Eq. (2) using pooled OLS, cluster standard errors by firm and year (Gow et al. 2010), and 
present the results in Table C.8. In column 1 I show the estimation with only firm related 
variables. Accruals are insignificantly related to Log(TA) and negatively related to TLTA, 
consistent with single-step regressions in Chen et al. (2018). Both current and future employee 
growth is positively related to accruals. Lagged and leaded cash flows are negatively related to 
accruals, and current cash flows are positively related to accruals, consistent with Larson et al. 
(2018). Accruals are positively related to lagged ROA, consistent with Kothari et al. (2005).  
 In column 2 I show the effect of criminal executives, and find that firms run by criminal 
executives are more prone to use earnings management (captured by the coefficient of the 
interaction between %CrimEXEC and NEW_FIN). These results are consistent with Davidson et 
al. (2015). Then, in column 3 I include the effect of employees. In this regression, the effect of 
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executives is muted and becomes insignificant, potentially due to high correlation between 
%CrimEXEC and %CrimEMPL. However, the effect of criminal employees is highly 
statistically and economically significant: one standard deviation of %CrimEMPL is associated 
with an increase in ROA of 0.4 percentage points (0.112*(0.0262+0.0099)).  
 
Figure C.2: time-series properties of DACC per executive/workforce group 
 
This figure shows the time-series properties of DACC by time preceding and following NEW_FIN=1. Ranges denote 95% confidence intervals. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent level. CrimEXEC indicates that the majority of executives have a criminal 
record. CrimEMPL indicates that the workforce is relatively criminal, and takes the value one when the percentage of employees with a criminal 
record is above the within-year median. 1/1 is an indicator taking the value one if CrimEXEC=1 and CrimEMPL=1. 1/0 is an indicator taking the 
value one if CrimEXEC=1 and CrimEMPL=0. 0/1 is an indicator taking the value one if CrimEXEC=0 and CrimEMPL=1. 0/0 is an indicator 
taking the value one if CrimEXEC=0 and CrimEMPL=0. 
 
 In column 4 through 6 I show the results of the four groups based on CrimEXEC and 
CrimEMPL, respectively. Relative to each of the other three groups, I consistently find that 
firms with both criminal executives (CrimEXEC=1) and criminal employees (CrimEMPL=1) 
are associated with income-increasing DACC when the firm issues new finance (captured by the 
slope on 1/1*NEW_FIN). The effects are statistically significant (two-tailed tests, p-values in the 
range <0.001;0.022) and are economically significant, as DACC is used to increase ROA by 
0.82-1.25 percentage points, or about 11.4-17.4% of the sample mean ROA (0.0082/0.075 ; 
0.0125/0.075).  
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 The results provide empirical evidence for H3 and corroborate the results of the univariate 
analyses above: earnings management is positively associated with firms in which both 
executives and employees are relatively criminal. A notable finding is that within firms with 
criminal executives, the positive association with earnings management is driven by firms who 
also employ criminal employees.  
 
Table C.8: Discretionary accruals, criminal executives and criminal employees 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OPACCi,t OPACCi,t OPACCi,t OPACCi,t OPACCi,t OPACCi,t 
 
Proportion of criminal executives and criminal employees 
 %CrimEXECi,t  0.0006 0.0004    
   (0.62) (0.40)    
 %CrimEXECi,t*NEW_FINi,t  0.0064
**
 0.0047    
   (1.98) (1.51)    
 %CrimEMPLi,t   0.0099
*
    
    (1.78)    
 %CrimEMPLi,t*NEW_FINi,t   0.0262
***
    
    (2.90)    
 
CrimEXEC / CrimEMPL 
 1/1i,t    0.0022
*
 0.0002 0.0014 
     (1.90) (0.13) (0.56) 
 1/1i,t* NEW_FINi,t    0.0125
***
 0.0082
***
 0.0108
**
 
     (4.29) (2.64) (2.30) 
 1/0i,t    0.0008 -0.0012 Base level 
      (0.45) (-0.58) 
 1/0i,t* NEW_FINi,t    0.0016 -0.0026 Base level 
       (0.31) (-0.57) 
 0/1,t    0.0020
**
 Base level 
 
0.0012 
     (2.26) (0.58) 
 0/1i,t*NEW_FINi,t    0.0042
*
 Base level 
  
0.0026 
     (1.79) (0.57) 
 0/0i,t    Base level 
 
-0.0020
**
 -0.0008 
     (-2.24) (-0.46) 
 0/0i,t*NEW_FINi,t    Base level 
  
-0.0042
*
 -0.0016 
     (-1.79) (-0.31) 
 NEW_FINi,t 0.0063
**
 0.0052
**
 0.0010 0.0031 0.0073
**
 0.0047 
  (2.47) (2.12) (0.46) (1.49) (2.30) (0.81) 
 
Firm controls 
 log(TA)i,t 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
  (0.47) (0.52) (0.73) (0.62) (0.62) (0.61) 
 TLTAi,t -0.0682
***
 -0.0683
***
 -0.0686
***
 -0.0686
***
 -0.0686
***
 -0.0686
***
 
  (-10.45) (-10.46) (-10.50) (-10.54) (-10.54) (-10.54) 
 STD_ROAi,t -0.0175 -0.0175 -0.0180
*
 -0.0175 -0.0175 -0.0175 
  (-1.59) (-1.60) (-1.66) (-1.59) (-1.59) (-1.59) 
 PPEi,t -0.0088
***
 -0.0090
***
 -0.0099
***
 -0.0095
***
 -0.0095
***
 -0.0095
***
 
  (-2.87) (-2.96) (-3.28) (-3.20) (-3.20) (-3.20) 
 
Discretionary accruals controls 
 EMPLGRi,t 0.0612
***
 0.0613
***
 0.0611
***
 0.0612
***
 0.0612
***
 0.0612
***
 
  (10.96) (10.98) (10.83) (10.84) (10.84) (10.84) 
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 EMPLGRi,t+1 0.0862
***
 0.0862
***
 0.0862
***
 0.0861
***
 0.0861
***
 0.0861
***
 
  (25.39) (25.24) (25.80) (25.70) (25.69) (25.69) 
 EMPLGRi,t*NOAi,t-1 0.0084 0.0082 0.0077 0.0078 0.0078 0.0078 
  (0.65) (0.64) (0.60) (0.61) (0.61) (0.61) 
 OPCFi,t-2 0.0353
***
 0.0353
***
 0.0354
***
 0.0354
***
 0.0354
***
 0.0354
***
 
  (12.38) (12.39) (12.35) (12.38) (12.38) (12.38) 
 OPCFi,t-1 0.0750
***
 0.0750
***
 0.0750
***
 0.0750
***
 0.0750
***
 0.0750
***
 
  (15.71) (15.72) (15.79) (15.74) (15.74) (15.74) 
 OPCFi,t -0.7088
***
 -0.7088
***
 -0.7089
***
 -0.7088
***
 -0.7088
***
 -0.7088
***
 
  (-96.77) (-96.48) (-96.22) (-96.36) (-96.35) (-96.33) 
 DumOPCFi,t 0.0039
***
 0.0039
***
 0.0038
**
 0.0038
***
 0.0038
***
 0.0038
***
 
  (2.59) (2.61) (2.57) (2.61) (2.61) (2.61) 
 DumOPCFi,t*OPCFi,t -0.1648
***
 -0.1648
***
 -0.1652
***
 -0.1650
***
 -0.1650
***
 -0.1650
***
 
  (-14.13) (-14.13) (-14.13) (-14.15) (-14.15) (-14.15) 
 OPCFi,t+1 0.0915
***
 0.0915
***
 0.0915
***
 0.0915
***
 0.0915
***
 0.0915
***
 
  (20.62) (20.65) (20.56) (20.60) (20.60) (20.60) 
 OPCFi,t+2 0.0485
***
 0.0485
***
 0.0486
***
 0.0486
***
 0.0486
***
 0.0486
***
 
  (16.64) (16.61) (16.58) (16.59) (16.60) (16.52) 
 ROAi,t-1 0.2777
***
 0.2774
***
 0.2769
***
 0.2768
***
 0.2768
***
 0.2768
***
 
  (18.04) (18.01) (18.11) (18.18) (18.18) (18.18) 
 Intercept 0.0743
***
 0.0741
***
 0.0732
***
 0.0737
***
 0.0757
***
 0.0745
***
 
  (12.15) (12.20) (11.70) (12.04) (12.56) (11.35) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 50,396 50,396 50,396 50,396 50,396 50,396 
Adjust R. sq. 0.8185 0.8186 0.8187 0.8187 0.8187 0.8187 
This table shows the results of estimating Eq. (2), i.e. how criminal executives and criminal employees are related to accruals. %CrimEXEC is 
the proportion of the workforce with a criminal record. %CrimEMPL is the proportion of the executives with a criminal record. CrimEXEC 
indicates that the majority of executives have a criminal record. CrimEMPL indicates that the workforce is relatively criminal, and takes the 
value one when the percentage of employees with a criminal record is above the within-year median. 1/1 is an indicator taking the value one if 
CrimEXEC=1 and CrimEMPL=1. 1/0 is an indicator taking the value one if CrimEXEC=1 and CrimEMPL=0. 0/1 is an indicator taking the value 
one if CrimEXEC=0 and CrimEMPL=1. 0/0 is an indicator taking the value one if CrimEXEC=0 and CrimEMPL=0. Firm controls and 
discretionary accruals controls are defined in appendix. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Gow et al. 2010). t statistics in 
parentheses. ***, **, * Represent significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively (two-tailed test). All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent level. 
 
4.5 Robustness tests 
4.5.1 Firm fixed effects  
 In the following I repeat the analyses with the four CrimEXEC/CrimEMPL groups and 
control for firm fixed effects. First, in Table C.9, I provide descriptive statistics on firms that 
change groups throughout their sample lifetime, i.e. firms in which either the executives or 
employees change from criminal to non-criminal, or vice versa. The total sample covers 9,002 
unique firms and 50,398 firm-year observations. Approximate two thirds of the firms never 
change groups. Of those that change group 640 firms have at some point in their sample lifetime 
been in group CrimEXEC/CrimEMPL=1/1. Of those firms, 147, 340, and 384 have at some 
point been in group CrimEXEC/CrimEMPL=0/0, 0/1, and 1/0, respectively, and of those firms 
only 58, 172, and 171, respectively, issue new finance when they are in group 
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CrimEXEC/CrimEMPL=1/1. In the table, I further provide statistics on the provide information 
on the (relatively low) number of observations being investigated in the regressions with firm 
fixed effects, because firm fixed effects eliminate observations which are firm-invariant.  
 
Table C.9: Information of CrimEXEC/CrimEMPL group changes 
  Unique firms 
Firm-year  
observations 
Total firms 9,002 50,398 
Of which change CrimEXEC/CrimEMPL group 3,015 23,921 
      
Of which at some point were/are in group 1/1  640 5,093 
Of which at some point were/are in group:      
0/0 147 1,387 
0/1 340 2,991 
1/0 384 2,958 
      
Of which issue new finance when in group 1/1   
0/0 58 526 
0/1 172 1,564 
1/0 171 1,400 
This table shows descriptive statistics on firms that change CrimEXEC/CrimEMPL groups over their lifetime. CrimEXEC indicates that the 
majority of executives have a criminal record. CrimEMPL indicates that the workforce is relatively criminal, and takes the value one when the 
percentage of employees with a criminal record is above the within-year median. 1/1 is an indicator taking the value one if CrimEXEC=1 and 
CrimEMPL=1. 1/0 is an indicator taking the value one if CrimEXEC=1 and CrimEMPL=0. 0/1 is an indicator taking the value one if 
CrimEXEC=0 and CrimEMPL=1. 0/0 is an indicator taking the value one if CrimEXEC=0 and CrimEMPL=0. 
 
Table C.10: Discretionary accruals, criminal executives and criminal employees, controlling for firm fixed effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  OPACCi,t OPACCi,t OPACCi,t OPACCi,t 
 
CrimEXEC / CrimEMPL 
    
 1/1i,t  0.0022 -0.0003 0.0025 
   (0.66) (-0.10) (0.79) 
 1/1i,t*NEW_FINi,t  0.0084
**
 0.0077
**
 0.0087
*
 
   (2.51) (2.34) (1.66) 
 1/0i,t  -0.0003 -0.0028 Base level 
    (-0.08) (-0.82) 
 1/0i,t*NEW_FINi,t  -0.0002 -0.0010 Base level 
    (-0.05) (-0.20) 
 0/1,t  0.0025
*
 Base level 
 
0.0028 
   (1.79) (0.82) 
 0/1i,t*NEW_FINi,t  0.0007 Base level 
 
0.0010 
   (0.32) (0.20) 
 0/0i,t  Base level 
 
-0.0025
*
 0.0003 
   (-1.79) (0.08) 
 0/0i,t*NEW_FINi,t  Base level 
 
-0.0007 0.0002 
   (-0.32) (0.05) 
 NEW_FINi,t 0.0058
***
 0.0045
***
 0.0053
***
 0.0043 
  (5.32) (2.62) (3.30) (0.96) 
Firm controls     
 log(TA)i,t 0.0490
***
 0.0489
***
 0.0489
***
 0.0489
***
 
  (20.70) (20.70) (20.70) (20.70) 
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 TLTAi,t -0.2213
***
 -0.2213
***
 -0.2213
***
 -0.2213
***
 
  (-34.30) (-34.28) (-34.28) (-34.28) 
 STD_ROAi,t 0.0574
***
 0.0571
***
 0.0571
***
 0.0571
***
 
  (3.88) (3.86) (3.86) (3.86) 
 PPEi,t -0.0499
***
 -0.0497
***
 -0.0497
***
 -0.0497
***
 
  (-8.15) (-8.13) (-8.13) (-8.13) 
Discretionary accruals controls     
 EMPLGRi,t 0.0684
***
 0.0684
***
 0.0684
***
 0.0684
***
 
  (11.87) (11.86) (11.86) (11.86) 
 EMPLGRi,t+1 0.0723
***
 0.0723
***
 0.0723
***
 0.0723
***
 
  (21.91) (21.91) (21.91) (21.91) 
 EMPLGRi,t*NOAi,t-1 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 OPCFi,t-2 0.0296
***
 0.0296
***
 0.0296
***
 0.0296
***
 
  (13.05) (13.05) (13.05) (13.05) 
 OPCFi,t-1 0.0779
***
 0.0779
***
 0.0779
***
 0.0779
***
 
  (26.71) (26.72) (26.72) (26.72) 
 OPCFi,t -0.7528
***
 -0.7528
***
 -0.7528
***
 -0.7528
***
 
  (-145.47) (-145.49) (-145.49) (-145.49) 
 DumOPCFi,t 0.0053
***
 0.0053
***
 0.0053
***
 0.0053
***
 
  (4.81) (4.84) (4.84) (4.84) 
 DumOPCFi,t*OPCFi,t -0.1278
***
 -0.1278
***
 -0.1278
***
 -0.1278
***
 
  (-16.92) (-16.92) (-16.92) (-16.92) 
 OPCFi,t+1 0.0625
***
 0.0624
***
 0.0624
***
 0.0624
***
 
  (20.85) (20.82) (20.82) (20.82) 
 OPCFi,t+2 0.0229
***
 0.0229
***
 0.0229
***
 0.0229
***
 
  (8.72) (8.71) (8.71) (8.71) 
 ROAi,t-1 0.0402
***
 0.0398
***
 0.0398
***
 0.0398
***
 
  (5.53) (5.48) (5.48) (5.48) 
 Intercept -0.2602
***
 -0.2612
***
 -0.2587
***
 -0.2615
***
 
  (-10.65) (-10.70) (-10.58) (-10.54) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
N 50,396 50,396 50,396 50,396 
Adjust R. sq. 0.8523 0.8523 0.8523 0.8523 
This table shows the regression tables from estimating Eq. (2) with firm fixed effects, i.e. how criminal executives and criminal employees are 
related to accruals. CrimEXEC indicates that the majority of executives have a criminal record. CrimEMPL indicates that the workforce is 
relatively criminal, and takes the value one when the percentage of employees with a criminal record is above the within-year median. 1/1 is an 
indicator taking the value one if CrimEXEC=1 and CrimEMPL=1. 1/0 is an indicator taking the value one if CrimEXEC=1 and CrimEMPL=0. 
0/1 is an indicator taking the value one if CrimEXEC=0 and CrimEMPL=1. 0/0 is an indicator taking the value one if CrimEXEC=0 and 
CrimEMPL=0. Firm controls and discretionary accruals controls are defined in appendix. Standard errors are clustered by firm. t statistics in 
parentheses. ***, **, * Represent significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively (two-tailed test). All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent level. 
 
 I show the results of estimating Eq. (2) with firm fixed effects in Table C.10. Generally, prior 
conclusions remain unchanged. The coefficients on the interaction 1/1*NEW_FIN slightly 
decrease in these estimations to 0.77-0.87 percentage points. When comparing the 1/1 group to 
the two groups with non-criminal executives (0/0 in column 2 and 0/1 in column 3, respectively) 
the results are statistically significant at conventional levels (two-tailed tests, p-values in the 
range 0.012;0.019). When comparing the 1/1 group to the 1/0 group in column 4, the results are 
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marginally significant (two-tailed tests, p-value=0.096). Using firm fixed effects generally 
lowers the statistical significance, because only firms that change groups (hence fewer 
observations as discussed above) are included the analysis.  
 
4.5.2 Controlling for other governance mechanisms 
 In the following I re-estimate Eq. (2) and further add controls for other governance 
mechanisms. Specifically, I control for BOARD_PRESENT (an indicator taking the value one if 
the firm has a board, and zero otherwise), CEO_ONBOARD (an indicator taking the value one if 
the CEO is on the board, and zero otherwise), and OM (an indicator taking the value one if the 
CEO is an owner-manager, and zero otherwise)
31
. The results are presented in Table C.11. For 
brevity, FIRM_CONTORLS and DACC_CONTROLS are estimated but not reported. I find that 
boards are marginally associated with an attenuating effect on earnings management (captured 
by the slope on the interaction BOARD_PRESENT*NEW_FIN), and that this attenuating effect 
practically disappears when the CEO is on the board (captured by the sum of the slopes of 
CEO_ONBOARD*NEW_FIN and BOARD_PRESENT*NEW_FIN). Owner-managed firms are 
positively associated with earnings management; the effect is significant at the 1% level 
(captured by the slope of OM*NEW_FIN).  
 Controlling for conventional governance characteristics, the results of the 
CrimEXEC/CrimEMPL=1/1 group decrease in magnitude: the 1/1 group is associated with 
increased ROA through accrual earnings management in the range 0.52-0.94 percentage points 
(relative to 0.82-1.25 percentage points in the main analysis without governance controls). 
When comparing the 1/1 group to the 0/0 group in column 3 and 1/0 group in column 5, 
respectively, the incremental effect is statistically significant at conventional levels (two-tailed 
tests, p-values in the range 0.003;0.045). Interestingly, when comparing the 1/1 group to the 0/1 
group, i.e. the group with non-criminal executives but criminal employees, the effect is only 
marginally significant (two-tailed test, p-value=0.092), emphasizing the ability of employees to 
capture unobserved corporate culture.  
 
 
                                                 
31
 The variable OM takes the value one if the CEO owns more than 95% of the firm. For the observations where 
ownership data are missing, the variable OM takes the value one if the current CEO was the founder of the firm 
(was a CEO on the date the firm was founded), and zero otherwise.  
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Table C.11: Discretionary accruals, criminal executives and criminal employees, controlling for other governance 
mechanisms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  OPACCi,t OPACCi,t OPACCi,t OPACCi,t OPACCi,t 
 
CrimEXEC / CrimEMPL 
     
 1/1i,t   0.0020
*
 0.0000 0.0015 
    (1.69) (0.01) (0.63) 
 1/1i,t*NEW_FINi,t   0.0083
***
 0.0052
*
 0.0094
**
 
    (2.97) (1.69) (2.01) 
 1/0i,t   0.0005 -0.0015 Base level 
     (0.30) (-0.75) 
 1/0i,t*NEW_FINi,t   -0.0011 -0.0042 Base level 
    (-0.20) (-0.94)  
 0/1,t   0.0020
**
 Base level 
 
0.0015 
    (2.24) (0.75) 
 0/1i,t*NEW_FINi,t   0.0031 Base level 0.0042 
    (1.34)  (0.94) 
 0/0i,t   Base level 
 
-0.0020
**
 -0.0005 
    (-2.24) (-0.30) 
 0/0i,t*NEW_FINi,t   Base level -0.0031 0.0011 
     (-1.34) (0.20) 
Governance controls      
 BOARD_PRESENTi,t  -0.0070
***
 -0.0071
***
 -0.0071
***
 -0.0071
***
 
   (-4.48) (-4.53) (-4.52) (-4.52) 
 BOARD_PRESENTi,t*NEW_FINi,t  -0.0074
*
 -0.0068
*
 -0.0068
*
 -0.0068
*
 
   (-1.85) (-1.71) (-1.71) (-1.71) 
 CEO_ONBOARDi,t  0.0047
***
 0.0046
***
 0.0046
***
 0.0046
***
 
   (4.19) (4.09) (4.09) (4.09) 
 CEO_ONBOARDi,t*NEW_FINi,t  0.0069
***
 0.0064
**
 0.0064
**
 0.0064
**
 
   (2.74) (2.47) (2.47) (2.47) 
 OMi,t  -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
   (-0.30) (-0.29) (-0.29) (-0.29) 
 OMi,t*NEW_FINi,t  0.0122
***
 0.0116
***
 0.0116
***
 0.0116
***
 
   (5.06) (4.96) (4.96) (4.96) 
 NEW_FINi,t 0.0063
**
 0.0022 0.0001 0.0033 -0.0009 
  (2.47) (0.45) (0.03) (0.60) (-0.12) 
FIRM_CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES 
DACC_CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
N 50,396 50,396 50,396 50,396 50,396 
Adjust R. sq. 0.8185 0.8191 0.8192 0.8192 0.8192 
This table shows the results of estimating Eq. (2) with governance controls added to the right hand-side. Eq. (2) estimates how criminal 
employees and criminal executives are related to accruals. FIRM_CONTROLS and DACC_CONTROLS are estimated but not reported. 
CrimEXEC indicates that the majority of executives have a criminal record. CrimEMPL indicates that the workforce is relatively criminal, and 
takes the value one when the percentage of employees with a criminal record is above the within-year median. 1/1 is an indicator taking the 
value one if CrimEXEC=1 and CrimEMPL=1. 1/0 is an indicator taking the value one if CrimEXEC=1 and CrimEMPL=0. 0/1 is an indicator 
taking the value one if CrimEXEC=0 and CrimEMPL=1. 0/0 is an indicator taking the value one if CrimEXEC=0 and CrimEMPL=0. Firm 
controls and discretionary accruals controls are defined in appendix. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Gow et al. 2010). t statistics 
in parentheses. ***, **, * Represent significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively (two-tailed test). All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent level. 
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Table C.12: Discretionary accruals, criminal executives and criminal employees, conditional on NEW_FIN=1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  OPACCi,t OPACCi,t OPACCi,t OPACCi,t 
 
CrimEXEC / CrimEMPL 
    
 1/1i,t  0.0086
***
 0.0061
**
 0.0074 
   (3.10) (2.51) (1.52) 
 1/0i,t  0.0012 -0.0013 Base level 
    (0.22) (-0.25) 
 0/1,t  0.0025 Base level 
 
0.0013 
   (1.03) (0.25) 
 0/0i,t  Base level 
 
-0.0025 -0.0012 
   (-1.03) (-0.22) 
Firm controls     
 log(TA)i,t -0.0020
*
 -0.0019
*
 -0.0019
*
 -0.0019
*
 
  (-1.85) (-1.74) (-1.74) (-1.74) 
 TLTAi,t -0.0824
***
 -0.0831
***
 -0.0831
***
 -0.0831
***
 
  (-8.22) (-8.42) (-8.41) (-8.41) 
 STD_ROAi,t -0.1287
***
 -0.1291
***
 -0.1291
***
 -0.1291
***
 
  (-6.02) (-6.09) (-6.09) (-6.09) 
 PPEi,t 0.0120
**
 0.0110
*
 0.0110
*
 0.0110
*
 
  (2.06) (1.93) (1.93) (1.93) 
Discretionary accruals controls     
 EMPLGRi,t 0.0748
***
 0.0748
***
 0.0748
***
 0.0748
***
 
  (5.51) (5.49) (5.49) (5.49) 
 EMPLGRi,t+1 0.0850
***
 0.0850
***
 0.0850
***
 0.0850
***
 
  (11.19) (11.27) (11.26) (11.26) 
 EMPLGRi,t*NOAi,t-1 -0.0229 -0.0236 -0.0236 -0.0236 
  (-1.03) (-1.06) (-1.06) (-1.06) 
 OPCFi,t-2 0.0394
***
 0.0394
***
 0.0394
***
 0.0394
***
 
  (7.28) (7.32) (7.32) (7.30) 
 OPCFi,t-1 0.0765
***
 0.0766
***
 0.0766
***
 0.0766
***
 
  (10.35) (10.34) (10.34) (10.32) 
 OPCFi,t -0.7371
***
 -0.7370
***
 -0.7370
***
 -0.7370
***
 
  (-62.04) (-60.77) (-60.77) (-60.77) 
 DumOPCFi,t 0.0035 0.0035 0.0035 0.0035 
  (1.13) (1.14) (1.14) (1.14) 
 DumOPCFi,t*OPCFi,t -0.1322
***
 -0.1324
***
 -0.1324
***
 -0.1324
***
 
  (-7.57) (-7.49) (-7.49) (-7.49) 
 OPCFi,t+1 0.0819
***
 0.0819
***
 0.0819
***
 0.0819
***
 
  (13.01) (12.97) (12.96) (12.97) 
 OPCFi,t+2 0.0529
***
 0.0531
***
 0.0531
***
 0.0531
***
 
  (7.57) (7.61) (7.62) (7.61) 
 ROAi,t-1 0.3422
***
 0.3412
***
 0.3412
***
 0.3412
***
 
  (13.94) (14.01) (14.01) (14.01) 
 Intercept 0.1172
***
 0.1152
***
 0.1177
***
 0.1164
***
 
  (8.21) (7.98) (8.59) (7.08) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
N 11,622 11,622 11,622 11,622 
Adjust R. sq. 0.8412 0.8413 0.8413 0.8413 
This table shows the results of estimating Eq. (2) where the sample is limited to NEW_FIN=1 firm-years observations. CrimEXEC indicates that 
the majority of executives have a criminal record. CrimEMPL indicates that the workforce is relatively criminal, and takes the value one when 
the percentage of employees with a criminal record is above the within-year median. 1/1 is an indicator taking the value one if CrimEXEC=1 and 
CrimEMPL=1. 1/0 is an indicator taking the value one if CrimEXEC=1 and CrimEMPL=0. 0/1 is an indicator taking the value one if 
CrimEXEC=0 and CrimEMPL=1. 0/0 is an indicator taking the value one if CrimEXEC=0 and CrimEMPL=0. Firm controls and discretionary 
accruals controls are defined in appendix. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Gow et al. 2010). t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * 
Represent significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively (two-tailed test). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 
percent level. 
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4.5.3 Limit sample to NEW_FIN=1 firm-year observations 
 In the following I re-estimate Eq. (2) but include in the estimation only NEW_FIN=1 firm-
year observations, and hence I make the analysis independent of the assumption in the main 
analysis that accruals and firm-specific explanatory variables are similar across NEW_FIN=1 
and NEW_FIN=0 firm-year observations. These estimations come at the cost of statistical 
power, because the sample size decreases by ~77%. I present the regression tables in Table 
C.12. FIRM_CONTROLS and DACC_CONTROLS relate to accruals with similar direction and 
significance as in the main analysis. In these regressions, I find that the 1/1 group, compared to 
the 0/0 group in column 2 and the 0/1 group in column 3, respectively, is associated with 
income-increasing accruals of 0.61-0.86 percentage points, statistically significant at 
conventional levels (two-tailed tests, p-values in the range 0.002;0.012). In column 4 I compare 
the 1/1 group with the 1/0 group, and observe a coefficient of 0.0074, which is slightly lower 
than in prior estimations. The coefficient estimate is insignificant in two-tailed tests, but is 
marginally significant in one-tailed tests (p-value=0.065).  
 
4.5.4 Indications outside discretionary accruals 
 In the following I explore if firms with criminal executives and criminal employees are 
associated with other accounting outcomes related to earnings management and earnings 
quality: (1) the propensity to meet or beat earnings benchmarks and (2) earnings persistence.  
 First, I explore the propensity to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. I use the estimation 
model developed by Byzalov and Basu (2019) to explore the propensity of firms with criminal 
executives and criminal employees to meet or beat two earnings benchmarks: (1) the zero 
earnings benchmark, i.e. the propensity to report a zero or a small profit, and (2) last year’s 
earnings benchmark, i.e. the propensity to report a zero change or small earnings increase. 
Analyst forecasts are naturally not available for private firms. The results are tabulated in Table 
C.13. In column 1 through 3 I find no evidence that the firms with criminal executives and 
criminal employees are more likely to meet or beat the zero earnings benchmark. In column 5 
and 6 I find some evidence that these firms are more likely to meet or beat the last year’s 
earnings benchmark, but this finding does not extend to column 4 where I compare to the 0/0 
group.  
 Then, I explore another important aspect of earnings quality: earnings persistence. In Table 
C.14 I show the regression tables of standard persistence estimations, where I regress future 
ROA on current ROA. I consistently find that the earnings persistence of the 1/1 group is lower 
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than the three other groups of firms, indicating that earnings quality is lower in firms with both 
criminal executives and criminal employees. In Table C.15 I decompose current ROA into the 
cash flow component (OPCF) and the accrual component (OPACC), and find that both cash 
flow persistence and accrual persistence is lower in the 1/1 group.  
 
Table C.13: Criminal executives, criminal employees, and the propensity to meet or beat earnings benchmarks 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
   
Propensity to meet or beat the zero earnings 
benchmark 
  
Propensity to meet or beat the last year’s 
earnings benchmark 
 
CrimEXEC / CrimEMPL 
      
 1/1 -0.0138 -0.0359 -0.0597  0.0452 0.0860
**
 0.1020
*
 
  (-0.24) (-0.61) (-0.74)  (1.10) (2.08) (1.68) 
 1/0 0.0458 0.0238 Base level  -0.0568 -0.0160 Base level 
  (0.66) (0.34)   (-1.09) (-0.31)  
 0/1 0.0221 Base level -0.0238  -0.0407 Base level 0.0160 
  (0.59)  (-0.34)  (-1.53)  (0.31) 
 0/0 Base level -0.0221 -0.0458  Base level 0.0407 0.0568 
   (-0.59) (-0.66)   (1.53) (1.09) 
 k 0.3859
***
 0.4080
***
 0.4317
***
  0.0393
**
 -0.0014 -0.0175 
  (14.60) (15.12) (6.61)  (2.10) (-0.08) (-0.36) 
N 19,751 19,751 19,751  28,115 28,115 28,115 
Adjust R. sq. 0.0064 0.0064 0.0064  0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 
This table shows the propensity of firms with different compositions of criminal executives and criminal employees to report a zero or small 
profit (column 1 through 3) and to report a zero or a small earnings increase (column 4 through 6). The model is estimated with the STATA 
command kindly made available by Byzalov and Basu (2019). CrimEXEC indicates that the majority of executives have a criminal record. 
CrimEMPL indicates that the workforce is relatively criminal, and takes the value one when the percentage of employees with a criminal record 
is above the within-year median. 1/1 is an indicator taking the value one if CrimEXEC=1 and CrimEMPL=1. 1/0 is an indicator taking the value 
one if CrimEXEC=1 and CrimEMPL=0. 0/1 is an indicator taking the value one if CrimEXEC=0 and CrimEMPL=1. 0/0 is an indicator taking 
the value one if CrimEXEC=0 and CrimEMPL=0. Polynomial slopes and interactions are estimated but not reported. I estimate with the 
following parameter model inputs: binwidth=0.0025, estimation bins=16, earnings management bins=4 (i.e. 4*0.0025=0.01), polynomial 
degree=3. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * Represent significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
5.  LIMITATIONS, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 Discussion 
 In this paper I investigate how firms with criminal executives and criminal employees are 
associated with financial reporting outcomes, across different research designs, different control 
variables (for example firm fixed effects and governance variables), and different accounting 
outcome variables (for example discretionary accruals when the firm issues new finance (which 
indeed is the main analysis), the propensity to meet or beat earnings benchmarks, and earnings 
persistence). Albeit the results are generally consistent across all these various estimations –
firms with criminal executives and criminal employees are associated with proxies of earnings 
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Table C.14: Criminal executives, criminal employees, and earnings persistence 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  ROAi,t+1 ROAi,t+1 ROAi,t+1 ROAi,t+1 
ROAi,t 0.6056
***
 0.6297
***
 0.5846
***
 0.6326
***
 
 (37.07) (31.93) (36.50) (19.34) 
 
CrimEXEC / CrimEMPL 
    
 1/1i,t  0.0021 0.0015 0.0015 
   (0.91) (0.77) (0.42) 
 1/1i,t*ROA,t  -0.0859
***
 -0.0408
**
 -0.0888
***
 
   (-4.79) (-2.17) (-3.02) 
 1/0i,t  0.0007 0.0000 Base level 
   (0.24) (0.00) 
 1/0i,t*ROAi,t  0.0029 0.0480
*
 Base level 
   (0.10) (1.78)  
 0/1,t  0.0007 Base level -0.0000 
   (0.39) (-0.00) 
 0/1i,t*ROAi,t  -0.0452
***
 Base level -0.0480
*
 
   (-3.04)  (-1.78) 
 0/0i,t  Base level -0.0007 -0.0007 
   (-0.39) (-0.24) 
 0/0i,t*ROAi,t  Base level 0.0452
***
 -0.0029 
    (3.04) (-0.10) 
 Intercept 0.0092
**
 0.0087
**
 0.0093
***
 0.0093
*
 
  (2.47) (2.15) (2.89) (1.71) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
N 39,553 39,553 39,553 39,553 
Adjust R. sq. 0.3970 0.3980 0.3980 0.3980 
This table shows standard earnings persistence regressions, and how earnings persistence differs by the composition of criminal executives and 
criminal employees. CrimEXEC indicates that the majority of executives have a criminal record. CrimEMPL indicates that the workforce is 
relatively criminal, and takes the value one when the percentage of employees with a criminal record is above the within-year median. 1/1 is an 
indicator taking the value one if CrimEXEC=1 and CrimEMPL=1. 1/0 is an indicator taking the value one if CrimEXEC=1 and CrimEMPL=0. 
0/1 is an indicator taking the value one if CrimEXEC=0 and CrimEMPL=1. 0/0 is an indicator taking the value one if CrimEXEC=0 and 
CrimEMPL=0. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Gow et al. 2010). t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * Represent significance 
levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively (two-tailed test). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent level. 
 
management and earnings quality – I acknowledge that the statistical significance differs across 
estimations, and that I find no results when I explore the propensity to meet or beat the zero 
earnings benchmark. However, the collective evidence provided in this paper taken into 
consideration, on balance the results suggest that firms with criminal executives and criminal 
employees are associated with adverse financial reporting outcomes.  
 
5.2 Limitations 
 Despite the consistency of the findings across various analyses, I caution the reader to 
interpret this study carefully. I recognize that studying individuals’ underlying cognitive 
processes and traits using observable characteristics is challenging. The results are based on a 
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Table C.15: Criminal executives, criminal employees, and earnings persistence 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  ROAi,t+1 ROAi,t+1 ROAi,t+1 ROAi,t+1 
OPCFi,t 0.5788
***
 0.5939
***
 0.5632
***
 0.6160
***
 
 (34.66) (31.66) (32.14) (20.00) 
OPACCi,t 0.5391
***
 0.5534
***
 0.5232
***
 0.5653
***
 
 (36.03) (32.11) (33.68) (21.48) 
 
CrimEXEC / CrimEMPL 
    
 1/1i,t  -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0004 
   (-0.08) (0.00) (-0.10) 
 1/1i,t*OPCFi,t  -0.0584
***
 -0.0277 -0.0805
**
 
   (-2.98) (-1.45) (-2.41) 
 1/1i,t*OPACCi,t  -0.0441
**
 -0.0139 -0.0560
*
 
   (-2.40) (-0.83) (-1.80) 
 1/0i,t  0.0002 0.0004 Base level 
   (0.07) (0.13)  
 1/0i,t*OPCFi,t  0.0221 0.0528
**
 Base level 
   (0.79) (2.07)  
 1/0i,t*OPACCi,t  0.0119 0.0421
*
 Base level 
   (0.51) (1.70)  
 0/1i,t  -0.0002 Base level -0.0004 
   (-0.12)  (-0.13) 
 0/1i,t*OPCFi,t  -0.0307
**
 Base level -0.0528
**
 
   (-2.53)  (-2.07) 
 0/1i,t*OPACCi,t  -0.0301
**
 Base level -0.0421
*
 
   (-2.47)  (-1.70) 
 0/0i,t  Base level 0.0002 -0.0002 
    (0.12) (-0.07) 
 0/0i,t*OPCFi,t  Base level 0.0307
**
 -0.0221 
    (2.53) (-0.79) 
 0/0i,t*OPACCi,t  Base level 0.0301
**
 -0.0119 
    (2.47) (-0.51) 
 Intercept 0.0160
***
 0.0160
***
 0.0158
***
 0.0162
***
 
  (4.29) (3.97) (4.69) (3.43) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
N 39,553 39,553 39,553 39,553 
Adjust R. sq. 0.3932 0.3939 0.3939 0.3939 
This table shows standard earnings persistence regressions, and how earnings persistence differs by the composition of criminal executives and 
criminal employees. In this regression table, current earnings are separated into comprehensive operating cash flows (OPCF) and comprehensive 
operating accruals (OPACC), respectively. CrimEXEC indicates that the majority of executives have a criminal record. CrimEMPL indicates that 
the workforce is relatively criminal, and takes the value one when the percentage of employees with a criminal record is above the within-year 
median. 1/1 is an indicator taking the value one if CrimEXEC=1 and CrimEMPL=1. 1/0 is an indicator taking the value one if CrimEXEC=1 and 
CrimEMPL=0. 0/1 is an indicator taking the value one if CrimEXEC=0 and CrimEMPL=1. 0/0 is an indicator taking the value one if 
CrimEXEC=0 and CrimEMPL=0. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Gow et al. 2010). t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * 
Represent significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively (two-tailed test). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 
percent level. 
 
belief that the presence of criminal record is an observable outcome of a certain personal trait.  
 Additionally, the criminal registers cover only Danish citizens and foreigners with a Danish 
address and hence (1) persons with a criminal record from a country not Denmark and (2) 
foreigners not residing in Denmark, working in Danish companies are not covered by the 
sample. Based on employer-employee data provided by Statistics Denmark, I find that 98% of 
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executives are Danish citizens, and 93% of employees are Danish citizens, and hence the 
limitation seems of minor importance, and bias against the findings of this paper. Also, the 
criminal registers cover crimes dating back to 1980, and hence there is a risk that individuals are 
classified as non-criminal, albeit they have been convicted prior to 1980. This is particularly 
pertinent to the early years of the firm-year observations used in this dataset.  
 Further, my conclusions are subject to the standard caveat of whether discretionary accruals 
during events where a firm issues new finance actually capture earnings management. Several 
prominent researchers have raised concerns with accrual estimation models (see e.g. Ball 2013). 
However, I exploit recent academic advancements in accrual estimation techniques enhancing 
my ability to distinguish normal from discretionary accruals (Godsell et al. 2017). Further, the 
insights from Figure C.2 (that firms with criminal executives and criminal employees have 
income-increasing accruals when the firm issues new finance but not in the preceding and 
following years) corroborate my interpretation that the measure of discretionary accruals 
actually captures earnings management. Further, the findings outside discretionary accruals – 
that these firms are more likely to meet or beat last year’s earnings benchmark, and have lower 
earnings persistence – conform to an overall story that these firms are more likely to manage 
earnings.  
 
5.3 Conclusion 
 This paper explores and provides evidence that firms with criminal executives and criminal 
employees are positively associated with earnings management. The general objective of this 
paper is to proxy corporate culture and to explore how corporate culture is associated with 
financial reporting behavior. First, I hypothesize and find that executives with a criminal record 
impose a certain corporate culture which is associated with earnings management. Second, 
based on prior theoretical work on corporate culture, I predict that the percentage of a firm’s 
employees with a criminal record capture an aspect of corporate culture, that is not explained by 
the traits of the firm’s executives. I identify several channels through which employees may 
influence financial reporting, and empirically show that the percentage of employees with a 
criminal record is positively associated with earnings management. Third, I argue that both 
criminal executives and criminal employees proxy two non-perfectly correlated aspects of 
corporate culture. I thus hypothesize and find that earnings management behavior is 
concentrated in firms with both criminal executives and criminal workforces.  
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 The results of this paper complement and extend recent research on corporate culture and 
financial reporting (Liu 2016; Biggerstaff et al. 2015) by providing evidence that employee trait 
proxies, incremental to executive trait proxies, capture an aspect of corporate culture which 
influences a firm’s financial reporting. The paper has implications for researchers interested in 
corporate culture and firm behavior, and suggests that proxies of employee traits are powerful 
measures of corporate culture.   
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7.  APPENDIX 
Table C.16: Variable definitions 
Variable Measure of Definition 
 
Firm-specific 
  
TA Total assets  
Log(TA) Logarithm of total 
assets 
 
TLTA Gearing, total 
liabilities to total 
assets 
𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡
 
STD_ROA Smoothness of 
earnings 
Standard deviation of ROA. Calculated using the five most recent 
years’ data, requiring at least three years’ observations.  
PPE Asset composition, 
tangible fixed assets to 
total assets 
𝑃𝑃𝐸 =
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡
 
NEW_FIN Indicator of event 
where the firm obtains 
new finance  
Following Godsell et al. (2017) p 445:  
 
NEW_FIN takes the value one if:  
 
𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡+1−(𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1+𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡+1+𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
> 0.05  
or 
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡+1−𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡−1
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
> 0.05  
 
, and zero otherwise 
 
Variables related 
to discretionary 
accruals estimation 
  
EMPLGR Growth in employees 
𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐺𝑅𝑡 =
𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑂𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑡−𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑂𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑡−1
𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑂𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑡−1
  
Where EMPLOYEES denotes the number of full-time equivalent 
employees 
NOA Net operating assets 
(the “magnitude” of 
accrual-related line 
items) 
 
𝑁𝑂𝐴 =
𝑁𝑂𝐴_𝐵𝑆𝑡 − 𝑁𝑂𝐴_𝐵𝑆𝑡−1
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
 
 
Where 
NOA_BS is Net Operating Assets before scaling 
𝑁𝑂𝐴_𝐵𝑆 = 𝑂𝐴 − 𝑂𝐿 
 
Where 
OA = Operating Assets  
= total assets 
-cash and cash equivalents 
-properties held for sale 
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-receivables from closely held parties 
 
OL = Operating Liabilities 
= total liabilities 
-long term interest bearing debt 
-current part of mortgage 
-current part of bank debt 
-liabilities to closely related parties 
-dividends if included in current liabilities 
ROA Return on assets 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
 
OPACC Comprehensive 
operating accruals 
 
𝑂𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 =
𝑁𝑂𝐴_𝐵𝑆𝑡 − 𝑁𝑂𝐴_𝐵𝑆𝑡−1
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
 
 
OPCF Comprehensive 
operating cash flow 
 
𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 − (𝑁𝑂𝐴_𝐵𝑆𝑡 − 𝑁𝑂𝐴_𝐵𝑆𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
 
  
DumOPCF Indicator of negative 
OPCF 
DumOPCF takes the value 1 if OPCF<0, and zero otherwise.  
DACC Comprehensive 
discretionary accruals  
Residuals from the following estimation model 
𝑂𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡+1 +
𝛽3𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽5𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽6𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽9𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽10𝑂𝑃𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡+2 + 𝛽11𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 +
∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    
 
 
Person specific 
variables 
  
CRIME Indicator that an 
individual has a 
criminal record 
CRIME is an indicator variable that takes the value one if an 
individual has a criminal record, and zero otherwise. Traffic-
related crimes (for example speed tickets or parking tickets) are 
excluded from the definition. 
NEW_CRIME Indicator that an 
individual commits 
crime in the year 
NEW_CRIME is an indicator variable that takes the value one if an 
individual commits crime within a year, and zero otherwise.  
EMPLOYEES The number of full-
time equivalent 
employees 
This metric is either extracted from the annual report (through the 
ORBIS database) or provided by Statistics Denmark.  
EXECUTIVES The number of 
executives registered 
with the Danish 
Business Authority 
 
%CrimEXEC The proportion of 
executives with a 
criminal record 
At the individual level, each executive is defined as a criminal if 
the person has any prior criminal record. Traffic-related crimes 
(for example speed tickets or parking tickets) are excluded from 
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the definition. 
%CrimEXEC denotes the percentage of executives within each 
firm-year observations with a criminal record.  
%CrimEMPL The proportion of 
employees with a 
criminal record 
At the individual level, each employee is defined as a criminal if 
the person has any prior criminal record. Traffic-related crimes 
(for example speed tickets or parking tickets) are excluded from 
the definition. An employee is a person that (1) receives salary 
from the firm, (2) is registered as an employee at year-end, and (3) 
is not identified as an executive. 
%CrimEMPL denotes the percentage of executives within each 
firm-year observations with a criminal record. 
CrimEXEC Indicator that the 
majority of executives 
have a criminal record 
CrimEXEC takes the value one if the majority of the registered 
executives (i.e. %CrimEXEC>0.5) have a criminal record, and 
zero otherwise.  
CrimEMPL Indicator that the 
workforce is relatively 
criminal 
CrimEMPL takes the value one if %CrimEMPL is above the 
within-year median and zero otherwise.  
Log(age) Logarithm of an 
individual’s age 
 
Female Gender indicator Female is an indicator that takes the value one if an individual is 
female, and zero otherwise.  
Married Married indicator Married is indicator variable that takes the value one if an 
individual is married, and zero otherwise.  
HighEduc High education 
indicator  
HighEduc is an indicator variable that takes the value one if an 
individual holds either a bachelor’s degree, a master’s degree, or a 
PhD degree, and zero otherwise.  
CORRUPT  CORRUPT is an indicator variable that takes the value one if an 
individual is an immigrant (first or second generation) emigrating 
from a country with a corruption index below 80. The corruption 
index is based on public available data from Transparency 
International, and is the average index for the period 1995-2018. A 
low score denotes high corruption. In the sample, Denmark has the 
highest score of 93.8.  
PersEquity  PersEquity=Personal Assets-Personal Liabilities, denoted in DKK 
million. 
 
Where,  
Personal Assets include bank deposits, traded securities (shares, 
bonds, etc.), and cash value of property/house. Boat value, car 
value, and pensions are not included in the calculation.  
 
Personal Liabilities include all debt to financial institutions, 
including bank debt, debt to other financial institutions, study 
debt, and mortgage. Private debt (for example debt to parents) data 
are naturally not available.   
 
Governance 
variables 
  
OM Indicates that the firm 
has an owner-manager 
OM takes the value one if the owner directly or indirectly owns 
more than 95% of the firm and is the CEO of the firm, and zero 
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otherwise.  
In December 2014 new regulation was enforced which required 
firm owners to file ownership data with the Danish Business 
Authority, with a retrospective effect, meaning that managers had 
to disclose the starting date of their ownership. Hence, the 
ownership data which I acquire from the Danish Business 
Authority is limited in coverage back in time. 
Therefore, in the cases where ownership data is missing, the OM 
variable takes the value one if the current CEO was also a CEO on 
the date the firm was founded, and zero otherwise.  
BOARD_PRESENT Indicates that the firm 
has a board 
BOARD_PRESENT is an indicator variable that takes the value 
one if the firm has a board, and zero otherwise.  
CEO_ONBOARD Indicates that the CEO 
is on the board 
CEO_ONBOARD is an indicator variable that takes the value one 
if the CEO of the firm has a seat on the board, and zero otherwise.  
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